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The seasonal fishery closure (SFC) policy is an important initiative for protecting and 
conserving the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Philippines, yet there are many problems with 
its implementation. It lacks consideration of the human dimensions of resource management, and 
empirical evidence on its effects on the regulated species. Using mixed methods, this study is 
conducted to gain a better understanding of the effects of the SFC implemented in the Visayan Sea 
on the fishery resources and stakeholders, as well as the underlying factors that affect policy 
outcomes.  
 
Chapter 1 provides a brief background on the world fisheries, the Philippine fisheries 
sector, the SFC policy implemented in the Visayan Sea and its gaps, the objectives of this study 
and the research questions it attempts to address. Chapter 2 contains the necessary background to 
the Philippine fisheries, SFC experiences in other countries, a description of the political ecology 
theoretical framework and its application in this study, as well as examples of political ecology 
and related studies that have valuable insights and application in fisheries management. Chapter 3 
 
 
discusses the materials and methods used in data gathering, processing and analysis. It also 
presents the research framework, description of the study sites and the respondents. Chapter 4 
explores how knowledge and perceptions of municipal fisheries stakeholders about the SFC vary 
among the respondent groups and municipalities, and how this influence their compliance with the 
SFC. It also examines how the SFC policy affects people’s livelihoods, incomes, household 
dynamics, traditional practices, among other things. The political factors that undermine the 
conservation goals of the SFC in the Visayan Sea are likewise discussed. The last section of 
Chapter 4 presents the before-after control-impact (BACI) analysis that empirically tests reports 
of increasing fish stocks in the Visayan Sea. The conclusions and recommendations are provided 
in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively.  
 
The research outputs can contribute to improving the present management framework for 
Visayan Sea and in designing development programs that are in-sync with the specific needs and 
capacities of municipal fisheries stakeholders towards a more inclusive development in the 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The declining trends in the world fisheries suggest the need to reduce fishing capacity in 
both large-scale and small-scale fisheries (FAO 2018; Costello et al. 2012). A similar trend is 
observed in the Philippine fisheries (Dalzell et al. 1987; Muallil et al. 2012; DA-BFAR 2014). 
Over the years, yields of fish species like the round scads, sardines, and anchovies, which are 
considered icons of food security, have significantly declined (Ani 2016). Various approaches 
toward reduction of fishing capacity have been proposed and adopted in many areas. These include 
vessel or gear restrictions, closed seasons, and incentives that promote limited entry, among others 
(Smith 1980).  
 
In the Philippines, a closed season (referred to as seasonal fishery closure or SFC in this 
study) was first implemented in 1939 to conserve important fishery commodities in the Visayan 
Sea, namely sardines and herrings. In 1989, mackerels were included in the list of regulated species 
in the Visayan sea during the SFC. These species are among the frequently caught fishes in terms 
of volume (DA-BFAR 2014), and rank first in marine municipal fisheries, and third in commercial 
fisheries production (DA-BFAR VI 2017). The SFC is in line with the provisions of the Philippine 
Fisheries Code of 1998 [Republic Act (R.A.) 8550], which provides the legal framework and 
guiding principles for the development, management, protection and conservation of fisheries and 
aquatic resources in the country. Section 9 of this Act states that, “the Secretary of the Department 
of Agriculture (DA) may declare a closed season in any or all Philippine waters outside the 
boundary of municipal waters and in bays, for conservation and ecological purposes.” The Act 
further states that it is unlawful to fish in overfished areas during the closed season (Section 95). 
Furthermore, “the closed season may be extended to waters under the jurisdiction of special 
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agencies, municipal waters and bays reserved for the use of the municipal fisherfolk…., provided 
that there is concurrence and approval or recommendation of such special agency and the 
concerned local government unit (LGU) and Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Management Council 
(FARMC)”. This is further supported in Section 16 of the R.A. 8550 which states that “municipal 
or city government, in consultation with the FARMC, shall be responsible for the management, 
conservation, development, protection, utilization, and disposition of all fish and fishery/aquatic 
resources within their respective municipality/city waters in the areas to be covered by the closed 
season”.  
 
Municipal fishing in the Philippines is characterized by many small-scale, labor-intensive 
fishing boats of 3 gross tons (GT) or less, and fishing that does not require the use of fishing 
vessels, operating within municipal waters (0-15 km seaward from the coastline). Some municipal 
fishers have non-motorized fishing boats. Commercial fishing on the other hand, involves taking 
of fishery species by passive1 or active2 gear for trade, business or profit beyond subsistence or 
sports fishing. This subsector is composed of capital-intensive corporate enterprises with more 
centralized fishing operations. Commercial fishing is further classified into: small-scale 
commercial fishing (fishing with passive or active gear utilizing fishing boats of 3.1 GT up to 20 
GT); medium-scale commercial fishing (fishing utilizing active gear and boats of 20.1 GT up to 
150 GT); and large-scale commercial fishing (fishing utilizing active gears and boats of more than 
150 GT). Commercial fishing operations take place beyond the 15 kms boundary of the municipal 
 
1 Passive fishing gear is characterized by the absence of gear movements and/or the pursuit of the target species, such 
as, but not limited to, hook and line, fish pots, traps, and gill nets across the path of the fish (R.A. 8550 1998). 
2 Active fishing gear is a fishing device characterized by gear movements, and/or the pursuit of the target species by 
towing, lifting, and pushing the gears, surrounding, covering, dredging, pumping, and scaring the target species to 
impoundments, such as, but not limited to, trawl, purse seines, Danish seines, bag nets, paaling, drift gill net and tuna 
longline (R.A. 8550 1998). 
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waters up to the seaward edge of the 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (R.A. 
8550 1998). In some municipalities however, commercial fishing operations are allowed from 10.1 
km beyond the coastline depending on municipal ordinances (e.g., some Mayors allow commercial 
fishers to operate in municipal waters that are deeper than 7 fathoms). While municipal fisheries 
are closely tied to geographically dispersed coastal fishing communities, commercial fishing 
operations involve a mix of members of communities (small- to medium-scale) and large fishing 
companies (large-scale). This classification of municipal and commercial fishing activities shows 
important distinctions between these groups in terms of fishing objectives and practices. According 
to Dalzell et al. (1991), although production data shows that the commercial and municipal 
fisheries sectors of the Philippine fishing industry catch roughly equal volumes of fish, gross 
benefits from the resource are divided between far fewer fishermen within the commercial sector. 
 
Currently, SFCs are implemented in Davao Gulf for big-eyed scads, small mackerel and 
round scads, Palawan (round scads), Zamboanga Peninsula (sardines), and Visayan Sea (sardines, 
herring, and mackerels) to help declining fishery stocks recover. This study concentrates on the 
SFC in the Visayan Sea, one of the major fishing grounds in the Philippines which serves as a 
traditional fishing ground to many Visayans. Fish catch from the Visayan Sea comprises 
approximately 10-13% of the total production of sardines and mackerel in the country (DA-BFAR 
2012). Further, this study focuses on the municipal fisheries stakeholders in the fishing 
communities surrounding the Visayan Sea primarily because the enclosed area is largely 
comprised by municipal waters (~75%). Second, the SFC policy is implemented at the municipal 
level through the LGUs, wherein most of the potential problems resulting from implementation 
unfold. Hence, it is critical to understand the dynamics of fisheries management at the municipal 
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level. Third, the municipal fisheries sector is a significant contributor to the country’s economy; 
understanding the municipal fisheries stakeholders’ perspectives is vital in its sustainable 
management. In 2018, the municipal fisheries sector contributed 55% to the country’s total 
fisheries production value (~PhP 93.97 B or USD ~1.88 B). 
 
The SFC in the Visayan Sea is implemented annually, initially from November 15 to March 
15 (4 months), for the conservation of sardines and herrings, as per Fish and Game Administrative 
Order No. 13, s. 1939 (DA-BFAR 1939). During that time, the now Bureau of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources3 (BFAR) was operating under the Department of Agriculture and Commerce4. 
In 1989, the BFAR issued the Fisheries Administrative Order No. 167, s. 1989, which reiterates 
the stipulations of the Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 13, s. 1939, but this time, it 
included mackerels in the species covered by the SFC in the Visayan Sea (DA-BFAR 1989). In 
1990, the Fisheries Administrative Order No. 167-1, s. 1990, was issued by BFAR, suspending the 
effectivity of the Fisheries Administrative Order No. 167 from November 15, 1990 to March 15, 
1991 (DA-BFAR 1990). This was followed by the Fisheries Administrative Order No. 167-2, s. 
1991, which suspends the SFC for the conservation of sardines, mackerels and herrings in the 
Visayan Sea from November 15, 1991 to March 15, 1992 (DA-BFAR 1991). The most recent 
issuance related to the SFC is the Fisheries Administrative Order No. 167-3, s. 2013, which 
shortens the SFC period into 3 months, from November 15 to February 15 (DA-BFAR 2013a). 
 
3 The BFAR is the lead government agency responsible for the development, improvement, management, and 
conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Philippines. It has a national office in Quezon City, Manila, 
and 16 regional field offices in the islands of Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.  
4 The agency has undergone several reorganizations and was placed under different administrative jurisdictions from 
1930 until the 60’s. It was in 1972 that BFAR finally earned its name and was placed under the Ministry of Natural 
Resources. The agency’s staff function and integration of its regional offices to the Department of Agriculture was 
fully implemented in 1987. 
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This change was prompted by the realization on the part of the BFAR management that poor 
compliance of fishers with the SFC is caused by the longer SFC period.  
 
Despite being in effect for 8 decades, it was only in 2012 that the Philippine government 
paid serious attention to its enforcement. Strict implementation of the SFCs coincided with the 
term of then National Director of the BFAR, Atty. Asis Perez, who assumed office in June of 2011. 
Atty. Perez, who served as the former Executive Director of a public interest environmental office, 
not only vowed to fight destructive fishing methods and the continuous intrusion of commercial 
fishers in the municipal waters, but also revitalized the conservation efforts in fisheries (DA-BFAR 
2011). It was during his term when the SFCs were not only actively implemented but were also 
reviewed and amended.  
 
However, the SFC implemented in the Visayan Sea has many grey areas. For example, the 
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 167-3, s. 2019 specifies the fish species (i.e., sardines, herrings 
and mackerels) that are banned from fishing during the closure period, but it does not state which 
specific fishing gears or fishing boats (e.g., municipal or commercial) are not allowed during the 
SFC. Personal correspondence with BFAR personnel at the regional and national levels reveals 
contradicting statements (June 2019). According to the national BFAR, the SFC applies only to 
commercial fishing vessels, while the regional BFAR says the SFC includes both commercial and 
municipal fishers. Anecdotal evidence indicates that some municipalities extend the fishing ban to 
municipal fishers [as per principal investigator’s personal correspondence with representatives of 




Further, the BFAR highlights the success of the SFC, noting an increase in fish stocks at 
the end of the closure period (DA-BFAR 2013b; Ramos 2014). However, empirical evidence has 
yet to emerge from assessment studies conducted to support these cited positive impacts on the 
resource or the fishing communities. There is also disagreement about the implementation of the 
SFC in the country. An article published in the Business Mirror captures the varying perceptions 
of stakeholders about this policy (Mayuga 2017). The National Federation of Small Fisherfolk 
Organizations in the Philippines (Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya Pilipinas), an 
umbrella organization for fishers in the Philippines, strongly opposes the implementation of the 
SFC because of the apparent impact on municipal fishers. Questions have been raised about this 
fishery policy because of the lack of a comprehensive study on its environmental, social, and 
economic impacts. Oceana Philippines’ Senior Scientist further stated that the SFC is not 
addressing the overfishing problem in the Philippines because it did not consider the biogeographic 
characteristics of sardines, general fisheries assessment, and the socio-economic impacts, and that 
such management tool can only be effective when implemented honestly and guided by correct 
science (Mayuga 2017). 
 
Stakeholders in fisheries have different goals, practices, values, needs, and capacities, and 
several fisheries management initiatives in the past have failed because resource managers 
overlooked these critical factors in designing management plans. This study posits that 
management goals of the SFC in the Visayan Sea must take into consideration the multiple 
concerns and specific contexts of its various stakeholders, as well as the different factors in the 
community that influence policy outcomes, for more inclusive fisheries management in the 
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Philippines. This aligns with the key principles of ecosystem-based management approach that has 
recently gained momentum in marine managament initiatives (Long et al. 2015).   
 
Using a political ecology theoretical framework, this study aims to provide a better 
understanding of the SFC implemented in the Visayan Sea to inform current fishery management 
framework in the Philippines. Political ecology encompasses the cultural, economic, political, and 
environmental systems at different scales, with emphasis on access and control over resources, 
interactions of production, policy and decision-making power relative to environmental changes 
and adaptations (Andreatta and Parlier 2010).  
 
The study objectives and specific research questions are the following: 
1. Determine the knowledge and perceptions of the different fisheries stakeholders about the 
SFC and its implementation.  
Q1: Are fisheries stakeholders knowledgeable about the SFC in the Visayan Sea?  
Q2: What are their perceptions about the SFC? 
Q3: How does knowledge and perceptions about the SFC policy and its implementation 
differ across fisheries stakeholders and municipalities? 
Q4: How does fisheries stakeholder’s knowledge and perceptions about the SFC policy 
affect compliance and implementation? 
Q5: Is there a varying interpretation on who is included in the SFC policy and thus, 





2. Determine the socio-economic and cultural impacts of the SFC on the fisheries 
stakeholders. 
Q6: What are the socio-economic and cultural impacts of the SFC? 
Q7: How do fisheries stakeholders cope with the impacts of SFC? 
Q8: Is there any assistance provided to the affected fisheries’ stakeholders? 
 
3. Determine the political challenges that affect the implementation of the SFC. 
Q9: What political challenges affect the implementation of the SFC? 
 
4. Assess whether the SFC has improved the fisheries production of the banned species. 
Q10: Is there an increase in the catch of sardines and mackerels in the study sites? 
 
 
CHAPTER 2. LOOKING AT THE VISAYAN SEA THROUGH A POLITICAL 
ECOLOGY LENS 
 
Today, the oceans and the ecosystem services they provide are under more serious threat 
than ever before because of coastal development, overfishing, population growth, marine 
pollution, sea-level rise, ocean warming, acidification, and other environmental changes. The 
many problems caused by either regional mismanagement or global climate change render marine 
protection a challenge (MARIBUS et al. 2015).  Most fisheries around the world are managed as 
common pool resources, hence its rival and non-exclusive nature makes management more 
challenging (Costello et al. 2010), although many regions have been moving toward privatizing 
fisheries with limited entry and individual transferrable quotas (ITQs) and the state can also restrict 
access. The Status of Fisheries and Aquaculture 2018 report shows that a portion of fish stocks 
that are within biologically sustainable levels has decreased from 90.0% in 1974 to 66.9% in 2015, 
while the percentage of stocks fished at biologically unsustainable levels increased from 10% in 
1974 to 33.1% in 2015 (FAO 2018). In 2015, maximally sustainably fished stocks (formerly 
termed fully fished stocks) accounted for 59.9% and underfished stocks for 7.0% of the total 
assessed stocks (FAO 2018). The declining trends in world fisheries suggest the need to reduce 
fishing capacity in both large-scale and small-scale fisheries (FAO 2018; Costello et al. 2012).  
 
In the Philippines, a similar declining trend in fisheries has been observed (Dalzell et al. 
1987; Siason et al. 2004; Muallil et al. 2012; DA-BFAR 2014; Anticamara and Go 2016). Previous 
studies show that small pelagic fishery in the country, which are caught largely by small-scale 
municipal fishermen, were biologically and economically overfished (Dalzell and Ganaden 1987; 
Dalzell et al. 1987, 1990). The expansion of commercial fisheries after the World War II and the 
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continued growth of the small-scale municipal fisheries sector, coupled by population increase, 
have led to the overexploitation of the small pelagic fishery in the country. Dalzell et al. (1991) 
explains that the industrialization of fisheries in the Philippines can be attributed to the initial profit 
potential of this sector, and the increasing poverty in rural areas, which drives people into small-
scale artisanal fishing to survive. Prior to the World War II, the level of industrial commercial 
fishing in the country was limited to Japanese fishermen using beam trawls from sail-powered 
vessels in Manila Bay since the 1900, and in the late 1920s, this fishery began to expand as the 
fishing companies operating there introduced diesel-powered vessels (Morgan and Staples 2006). 
Before that, the occupation of the Spaniards in the country created a huge demand, especially in 
Manila (the capital), which served as the seat of government and political power when the 
Philippines became a colony of the Spanish regime. This attracted Chinese immigrants and created 
opportunities for them, considering that Filipino fishers then were not geared to supply the large 
urban demand (Spoehr 1984). In 1754, guilds of Chinese fishers were documented in Manila 
(Diaz-Trechuelo 1966, as cited by Spoehr 1984). These Chinese fishers introduced the large lever 
net, gill nets, and cast nets to the Philippines. 
 
In 1976, the BFAR and the South China Sea Fisheries Programme analyzed the national 
BFAR catch data from 1965-1974 to identify possible management action for the heavily exploited 
stocks of Visayan Sea and Sibuyan Sea areas. Six (6) pelagic species were investigated (i.e., round 
scads, chub mackerels, sardines and herrings, anchovies, big eyed scads, and squids and 
cuttlefishes), and results show that catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) of these species have consistently 
decreased (SCS/GEN/76/7 1976, as cited by Armada 1999). Sardines and mackerels are among 
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the commercially important small pelagic fishes that historically dominated the Philippine fishery 
(Dalzell and Ganaden 1987; Dalzell et al. 1990).  
 
In a more recent study conducted by Anticamara et al. (2016) that looks at the long-term 
spatio-temporal trends of Philippine fisheries production based on the landed national fish catch 
data (1980–2012), shows that total Philippine fish catch volume (in metric tons or MT) of most 
capture fisheries throughout the country has either stagnated or declined over the last 3 decades. 
They have also found that the decline is more prominent at the provincial level, suggesting spatial 
serial depletion of the country's fisheries. Muallil et al. (2012) also report that 64% of coastal 
fisheries in the country are overfished, although this figure is a conservative estimate since impacts 
of destructive fishing practices and the intrusion of the highly efficient commercial fishers to 
coastal fishing grounds were not accounted.  
 
The Visayan Sea is a major fishing ground located in central Philippines (FAO 2000; Ferrer 
2009) and was among the areas listed by the BFAR as overfished in 1976 (Ronquillo and Llana 
1987). Armada (1999) assessed the management of small pelagic fisheries in the Visayan Sea by 
analyzing BFAR fish catch data from 1975-1984 using the Schaeffer (1954) and Fox (1970) 
surplus production model and results show that the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for most 
of the pelagic species investigated was attained in the mid-70s (Dalzell et al. 1991). Further, 
analysis of species composition of different gears designed to catch pelagic and demersal species 
in the Visayan sea shows that sardines (Sardinella fimbriata, S. longiceps5) and mackerels 
 
5 Previous data reported as Indian oil sardines (Sardinella longiceps) is the Bali sardinella (Sardinella lemuru), as per 
BFAR Administrative Circular Oder No. 1 Series of 2019 and PSA approved memorandum of Correcting 
Nomenclature of Indian oil sardines to Bali sardinella dated 03 July 2019. 
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(Rastrelliger kanagurta and R. brachysoma) were the most frequently caught fishes. The same 
results were observed by Guanco et al. (2009) when they assessed the commercial fisheries in the 
central and western Visayan sea using the National Stock Assessment Program (NSAP) data from 
1998-2002: 67% of the catch from commercial fishing vessels (e.g., Danish seine, purse seine, 
trawl, and ring net) were predominantly pelagic fishes, with sardines and mackerels dominating 
the catch.  
 
According to Willette et al. (2011), areas with high landings of sardines exhibit high rates 
of primary productivity. Chlorophyll concentrations in the Visayas, for example, were the highest 
of any Philippine basin measures, which is attributed largely to mobilized nutrients from land 
(Willette et al. 2011). Further, peak sardine productivity and spawning in the Philippines often 
coincide with the southwest monsoon winds (locally known as ‘Habagat’) which occurs from June 
to October (Dalzell 1990, as cited by Willette et al. 2011). The distinct seasonal climate in the 
Philippines that is largely influenced by rainfall brought by typhoons and tropical storms during 
southwest monsoon, influences the production of fishes such as small pelagics that live closely to 
the water surface. For example, Dalzell at al. (1991) note that peak production of clupeoid fishes 
(anchovies, herrings, and sardines) occurs through the periods of maximum rainfall. These 
observations are supported by the report by Guanco et al. (2009), which shows that production6 of 
sardine species such as S. gibbosa peaks in August, while production of S. fimbriata peaks in June. 
Production of S. longiceps (now identified as S. lemuru) on the other hand, peaks in September. 
Guanco et al. (2009) further note that there are 2 recruitment7 pulses per year for sardine species 
 
6 Production estimate is derived by multiplying the annual catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) by the actual fishing days and 
number of fishing boat units (Guanco et al. 2009). 
7 Recruitment is defined as the stage when a stock enters a fishing area (Guanco et al. 2009). 
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in the Visayan Sea, i.e., February-June for S. gibbosa, July-September for S. fimbriata, and March-
May for S. longiceps.   
 
A succeeding report by Bayate and Mesa (2012) that reviews the Visayan Sea sardine stock 
and its fishery conservation initiatives in Western Visayas shows that high spawning of S. gibbosa 
is observed in the months of November and December and dominance of ripe and spawning stage 
sardines is observed during this period (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Monthly frequency distribution of gonadal stages and Gonado-Somatic Index (GSI) of 
female S. gibbosa in Western Visayan Sea during the period September 2009 to April 2010 
(Phase I) and September 2012-April 2013 (Phase II) (Bayate and Mesa 2012). 
 
Bayate and Mesa (2012) further report that while growth and recruitment overfishing are 
observed in the Visayan Sea, there is a significant increase in the catch for sardines after the SFC 
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period, which they attribute to the active implementation of the SFC through their information, 
education, and communication (IEC) and monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) activities. 
 
Sardines are known as migratory species, however, very little is known about sardines’ 
migratory routes and behaviors in the Philippines, except for some anecdotal accounts of arrival 
of exceptionally high numbers of sardines within the Tañon Strait, between Cebu and Negros 
Oriental, in late 2009 to late 2010 (Willette et al. 2011).  Willette et al. (2011) further cite anecdotal 
claims by Bognot (unpublished review) and an unpublished version of the Sulu Sea Management 
Plan, about a continuous, migrating population sardines between the Visayan and Celebes Seas, 
and Sardinella spp. migrating between northwest Mindanao and the west side of the Sulu 
archipelago.  In terms of distribution, S. lemuru and S. gibbosa are primarily concentrated in the 
central Visayan water bodies, southeastern coasts of Luzon, and around the islands in Autonomous 
Region of Muslim Mindanao and Palawan, with a patchier distribution in northern Luzon and 
southeastern Mindanao. According to Willette et al. (2011), these regions have high primary 
productivity along their coastlines, but with little correspondence to the offshore upwelling near 
Mindanao and northwestern Luzon. 
 
While the status of sardines is frequently presented by the BFAR in its reports, there is not 
much information about the biology and ecology of mackerels in the Philippines. For example, the 
report by Guanco et al. (2009) presents information on R. kanagurta only, described with peak 
months between January-February, and lean months from September-October. Guanco et al. 
(2009) also cite the work of Rasalan (1957) which notes that that peak season for mackerels in the 
Philippines is between January-May. These observations are also supported by a study of Dalzell 
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et al. (1991), which notes that certain species of mackerels (and fusiliers) do not appear to have 
production peaks in concert with the rainfall cycle. However, a study by Szanton (1971) notes that 
mackerel production in Estancia, Iloilo (one of the municipalities included in the SFC in the 
Visayan Sea) peaks in June, July, and August. 
 
General information about mackerels are provided in the FishBase website by Collette and 
Nauen (1983). Adults of R. kanagurta are known to form schools and are found in coastal bays, 
harbors, and deep lagoons, usually in turbid plankton-rich waters. These species feed on 
phytoplankton (diatoms) and small zooplankton (cladocerans, ostracods, larval polychaetes); adult 
individuals feed on macroplankton such as larval shrimps and fish. In comparison, R. brachysoma 
is described as an epipelagic, neritic species that tolerates slightly reduced salinities in estuarine 
habitats and in areas where surface temperature range between 20° and 30°C. Batch spawning is 
believed to extend from March through September. This species feeds mainly on 
microzooplankton with a high phytoplankton component (Collette and Nauen 1983). 
 
Despite the yearly closure of the Visayan Sea since the implementation of the Fisheries 
Administrative Order No. 167 in 1989 (under the BFAR flagship), Santos et al. (2017) report that 
intense fishing pressure for sardines and mackerels persists as shown in their exploitation rates8 
(E), which are higher than the limit reference point for small pelagic species (E>.60). Intense 
 
8 Exploitation rate (E) is the ratio of fishing mortality (F) over total mortality (Z). NSAP set the estimated optimum 
exploitation of E = 0.50, which is the limit reference point (LRP) for most fishes in the Philippines, with the exception 
of small pelagics (E=0.60; based on high fecundity and relatively short life cycle of ~3 years) and oceanic tunas (E = 
0.40; long lived with a life cycle of ~10-12 yrs). E rates higher than the LRP suggest unsustainable harvest of the fish 
stocks (Santos et al. 2017). 
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fishing pressure can be associated with the overfishing and the excess fishing capacity in the 
Philippines. 
 
Excess fishing capacity leads to a number of negative impacts such as resource use 
conflicts, declines and collapse of fish populations, overfishing, environmental degradation, 
economic waste, security threat, increased poverty, and a lower overall standard of living and 
national welfare (Pomeroy et al. 2007; Salayo et al. 2008). Several strategies have been employed 
to reduce fishing capacity such as catch share programs (Jardine and Sanchirico 2013; Birkenbach 
et al. 2017), vessel buyback programs (Kirkley et al. 2006); bag and possession limits, restrictions 
on the size of fish and prohibition of retention (Matlock et al. 1988); and gear and vessel 
restrictions (FAO 2008; McClanahan 2010; Farmer et al. 2016). In the Philippines, SFC is a fishery 
management strategy of choice due to the multi-species nature of its fisheries and it is easier to 
enforce than some of the abovementioned strategies.  
 
Various justifications have been offered for closing fisheries for limited or longer periods. 
All these share a common objective of protecting the fish stock from exploitation during at least 
part of its life history or during seasons of high vulnerability and may enclose part or all the range 
of the resource in question (Caddy 1984). Temporal and closed seasons or SFCs, in many 
variations, are marine resource management strategies that are easily enforced and often accepted 
by fishers because of their simplicity (Beets and Manuel 2007). This measure has been widely 
used in fisheries management to prevent overfishing and reduce bycatch of protected species like 
the federally protected North Atlantic right whales Eubalaena glacialis, resulting in the prohibition 
of the use of pot gear in the commercial harvest of Black Sea Bass Centropristis striata in the 
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southeastern United States during winter (Farmer et al. 2016).  In other cases, SFCs are imposed 
during the breeding period of harvested species with the aim that this will achieve greater annual 
reproductive output (Arendse et al. 2007), but several studies show varying effects (Arendse et al. 
2007; Jiang et al. 2009; Mendoça and Sobrinho 2013; Wang et al. 2015). Several scientists argue 
that the implementation of spawning area closures remains controversial due to the frequent lack 
of clear objectives, monitoring and empirical evidence (Sadovy and Domeier 2005; Beets and 
Manuel 2007; Gruss et al. 2014b; Clarke et al. 2015). Further, the effectiveness of SFCs is rarely 
tested (Clarke et al. 2015). In a paper that reviews the temporal and seasonal closures used in 
fisheries management in tropical and subtropical regions and important species groups for Hawaii, 
Beets and Manuel (2007) report that managers conclude that SFCs are beneficial and useful based 
on perceived benefits and stock effects, although quantitative analyses of the specific value of this 
fishery management strategy has not been conducted. The design of SFCs also presents a challenge 
because the net benefits to the fishery or other resources are often unknown (Sanchirico and Wilen 
2001; Sanchirico 2005).  
 
Some of the noted failures in SFCs implemented for different fisheries include the 
groundfish fishery in New England (Sinclair and Valdimarsson 2003; Brodziak et al. 2004) and 
Pacific halibut fishery (Skud 1984), while closed seasons implemented in the Gulf of Mexico 
shrimp fishery (Beets and Manuel 2007), US Virgin Islands grouper fishery (Beets and Friedlander 
1999) and coral reefs in Kenya (McClanahan 2010) show positive results. It is important to note 
that the success or failure of an SFC can be attributed to a number of factors such as status of the 
fishery prior to implementation of the closure, design (size and positioning of the enclosed area), 
law enforcement, and other natural variation in the environment.  
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The development and implementation of a fisheries management system have important 
repercussions in terms of biological, economic, and social outcomes for fishers and fishing 
communities alike (Schmidt 2003). The maintenance of management areas, including the 
imposition of time-area closures, can result in impacts to a fishery, the other resources affected by 
the fishery, and fishing communities that rely on the fishery (Cheuvront et al. 2005; Beets and 
Manuel 2007; Farmer et al. 2016; Loring 2017). Some of the negative impacts of fishery closures 
in fishing communities include unemployment (Gien 2000; Chimba and Musuka 2014), economic 
losses (Beets and Manuel 2007; Ani 2016; Brillo et al. 2016), and adverse effects on the 
psychological well-being of affected individuals (Gien 2000; Smith et al. 2003). Overall, any 
measure that changes the nature and dependence or engagement in fisheries harvesting or 
processing can affect the community in the following areas: the overall volume of product that is 
harvested and/or processed; the number of fishing boats that visit the community; the composition 
of the fleet in terms of boat type and fishery; the number of fishing families that live in the 
community; the level of community solidarity among fishing families and other community 
members; political activity and community support; the cultural identity and sense of place among 
community members (EPA 2002). Further, it affects the community character and historical 
connection to fishing; population shifts and resulting changes in social services, labor markets, 
housing, community mobility, social stratification, and power structure; levels of social deviance 
and conflict on land and at sea; and the overall adaptability of the community to future changes 
(Cheuvront et al. 2005).  
 
The complex and multi-faceted nature of fishery management calls for a holistic approach 
that views environmental problems as both a social problem and a biophysical condition. This 
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study draws on a political ecology theoretical framework, an academic discipline that is deemed 
to be the most important line of recent social scientific thinking about environment and 
development (Peet and Watts 1996). In a nutshell, political ecology is the study of the relationships  
between political, economic, and social factors with environmental issues and changes. According 
to Peet and Watts (1996), political ecology emerged in response to the theoretical need to integrate 
concerns in ecology with local-global political economy, and the growing politicization of the 
environment. Biersack (2006) reports that Eric R. Wolf’s first use of the term political ecology to 
signify the study of how power relations mediate human-environment relations marked the 
departure from the established economic analysis by Marx and Engels, which disregarded nature 
and environment. Political ecology places power at the core of its analysis and thus, differs from 
an apolitical cultural ecology that focused on adaptation issues to the environment without regard 
to the structures of inequality that mediated human interactions (Biersack 2006). By integrating 
ecology and political economy, political ecology strives to rectify the shortfalls in both 
frameworks. Over time, the growing field of political ecology has attracted scholars from the fields 
of anthropology, forestry, development studies, environmental sociology, environmental history, 
and geography (Robbins 2012).  
 
A review of the term political ecology shows important differences in emphasis. Various 
scholars provide different definitions of political ecology depending on their research interest. For 
example, some definitions highlight political economy (e.g., Greenberg and Park 1994), while 
others focus on the political institutions (e.g., Hempel 1996). Some stress on environmental 
changes (e.g., Blaikie and Brookfield 1987), while others emphasize narratives about the changes 
(e.g., Cockburn and Ridgeway 1979). Robbins (2012) categorizes these school of thought whithin 
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political ecology into 5 dominant narratives that seek to explain different but interrelated issues 
that govern human-nature articulations. Robbins’ first narrative, the degradation and 
marginalization thesis, posits that environmentally harmless production systems have led to 
overexploitation of natural resources (on which marginal people depend) as a response to 
development and globalization. Efforts to improve production systems in response to development 
resulted in decreased sustainability of local practice which have corresponding negative effect on 
equitable resource distribution. Second, the conservation and control thesis, highlights the adverse 
effects caused by environmental conservation efforts, which sometimes result in failure. Most of 
the work in this area demonstrate that where local productions have historically been productive 
and relatively benign, they have been characterized as unsustainable by state authorities or other 
players in the struggle to control resources. Third is the environmental conflict and exclusion 
thesis, which explains that increasing scarcities produced through resource enclosure or allocation 
by state authorities, private firms, or social elites accelerate conflict between groups that are 
differentiated by gender, class, or ethnicity. Fourth, the environmental subjects and identity thesis, 
links political identities and social struggles to basic issues of livelihood and environmental 
activity.  This thesis posits that people’s beliefs and attitudes do not lead to new environmental 
actions, behaviors, or rules systems; rather, new environmental actions, behaviors, or rules systems 
lead to new kinds of people.  Lastly, Robbins (2012) describes the political objects and actors 
thesis, wherein political and economic systems are shown to be underpinned and affected by the 
non-human actors with which they are intertwined. This thesis recognizes that people, institutions, 
communities, and nations assemble and participate in the networks that emerge from such 




For the purpose of this study, Watts’ (2000) description of political ecology is adopted, 
which states that political ecology seeks to understand the complex relations between nature and 
society through a careful analysis of the forms of access and control over resources and their 
implications for environmental state and sustainable livelihoods. It aims to explain environmental 
conflict, particularly in terms of struggles over ‘knowledge, power and practice’, and ‘politics, 
justice and governance’ (Watts 2000).  
 
In this regard, this study digs deeper into the conservation and control thesis of political 
ecology, which posits that officials’ and managers’ decision to pull the control of resources and 
landscapes from the producers through the implementation of conservation efforts for 
sustainability, community and nature, results in inevitable repercussions on the local systems of 
livelihood, production and socio-political organizations. According to Brogden and Greenberg 
(2005), since bureaucratic structures are set up to simplify and regularize decision making, their 
responsiveness to local variance and ability to mediate competing claims to resources are limited 
as the rules of access and use become inscribed in law and administrative procedures. These 
concepts are explored in understanding the political ecology of SFC policy implemented for the 
conservation of important fishery commodities in the Visayan Sea, Philippines. 
 
The central premise in political ecology is that environmental problems are fundamentally 
social and political problems, not technical or managerial, and therefore demand a theoretical 
foundation for analyzing the complex social, economic, and political relations in which ecological 
change is embedded (Brookfield and Blaikie 1987). Political ecology attempts to provide critiques, 
as well as alternatives, in the interplay of these critical factors, i.e., “…critically explaining what 
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is wrong with dominant accounts of environmental change, while at the same time, exploring 
alternatives, adaptations, and creative human action in the face of mismanagement and 
exploitation...” (Robbins 2012: 20). Hence, it has useful applications in: 1) Informing 
policymakers and organizations of the complexities surrounding environment and development, 
thereby contributing to better environmental governance; 2) Understanding the decisions that 
communities make about the natural environment in the context of their political environment, 
economic pressures, and societal regulations; and 3) Examining how unequal relations in and 
among societies affect the natural environment, especially in the context of government policy 
(Healy et al. 2019).  
 
Over the years, political ecologists have paid growing attention to the ethnic identities, 
gender roles and relations, multiform institutions, governance apparatuses, political involvements 
and other social factors that condition the knowledge, decisions, and actions of diverse land 
managers (Paulson and Gezon 2005). According to Peet and Watts (1996), political ecology began 
in the 1980s to “combine the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political 
economy…[which] encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based 
resources” (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). Hence, it is not surprising that most of the earlier works 
in this field focused on terrestrial examples such as land management and degradation, water 
resources, agroforestry, agriculture, and pastoralism. Recently, more scholars have extended the 
political ecology lens to analyze human-coastal environment articulations, especially in the context 
of fisheries management. Below are political ecology and other relevant studies that have valuable 
insights and application in fisheries management.   
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The state through its national agencies, are responsible for regulating access to the natural 
resources, such as fisheries. States are the primary intermediary of property relations in most inland 
and capture fisheries (Campling et al. 2012). According to Brogden and Greenberg (2005), as the 
state defines spaces and organizes resources through the implementation of jurisdictional and 
administrative rules, it creates an enabling environment for disputes and conflicts because such 
arrangements draw social and political fault lines, and competing interests tend to influence or 
control the agencies, laws, and regulations that govern natural resources.  
 
A study by Tan-Mullins (2007) explores how key agents in state agencies at provincial and 
district levels translate Thai political and legal systems at the local level, showing that access to 
coastal resources is highly regulated by unequal power relations among actors at various levels. 
She focuses her analysis on actors, namely local state agencies and grassroots leaders, who have 
direct influence at the village level. One important point she raises in her study is that while the 
state and its agencies act under the guise of ‘national’ interest, and thus, are in the position to play 
a pivotal role in resolving problems at different levels of government, when such broad authority 
is coupled by administrative inefficiency, unequal power relations at various level and varying 
willingness of stakeholders to participate in resource management, it empowers local agencies and 
official to interpret the policies and regulations according to their own interests. Similar results 
were found by Karnad et al. (2013) in their study of Indian fisheries wherein they report that the 
convoluted interactions between ineffective community and state regulations that guide the 
fishermen’s actions inhibited them from developing successful fisheries management. Smith 
(2010) reports the same observation in the European countries’ attempt to manage their common 
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fisheries resources which resulted in a precarious situation because of the overlapping jurisdictions 
and competing interests of the member states. 
 
Research in political ecology tends to reveal winners and losers, hidden costs, and the 
differential power that produces social and environmental outcomes (Robbins 2012). For example, 
McCay and Finlayson (1996) report that while the moratorium on northern cod fishing (and 
associated decline or closure of other groundfish fisheries) was a crisis for many fishers and their 
families and communities, it is not the case for companies positioned to take advantage of the more 
recent phase of globalization in the fisheries. The large fishery firms of eastern Canada transformed 
into brokers and imported fish processors, ventures that are much more profitable than the 
production halted by the moratorium. These observations are corroborated by Loring (2017) in his 
paper which explores the challenges of a parametric management (i.e., the management of how, 
where and when fishing occurs) in fisheries, and the possibility to address scientific and political 
decisions separately, in the context of the commercial net ban enacted in Florida in 1995, and the 
failed ban on set gillnets in parts of Alaska. He explains that whereas large players in the fishing 
industry may have the resources to adapt and capitalize on the changes that come with ecological 
reforms, the consequences for small-scale and artisanal fishers can be livelihood-altering. Loring’s 
(2017) findings demonstrate that ethical considerations are inseparable from the ecological aspects 
of managing fisheries, and that when communities grapple with the sustainability of fisheries, they 
are simultaneously seeking to define the socially acceptable uses of those resources (i.e., whether 
fish ought to be allocated to tourism, local food systems, commerce and export, or some 
combination of the three). Further, he stresses that when governance focuses on legible concepts 
like specific fishing gears or sectors, it masks the differences in scale and the varying needs and 
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concerns of the stakeholders involved. In effect, governance overlooks the fact that members of 
small-scale fishing families and maritime cultures obtain myriad non-economic benefits from 
fishing that enhance their health and well-being. 
 
Coastal resource management encompasses a wide range of complex, overlapping, and 
often contradictory interests. As populations and investment in coastal regions grew in the last 25 
years, so are claims over land and biotic resources as new, often global, industries have sought 
access to and control over fish production through both fisheries and aquaculture (Bush and 
Marschke 2016). Ideally, fishery governance links government with civil society, harmonizing 
individual, sectoral, and societal perspectives and maintaining social order and productive socio-
ecological systems; it legitimizes and balances stakeholders’ interactions, enforces decisions and 
regulations and maintains coherence across jurisdictional spatial, and time scales (FAO 2016). In 
practice, however, challenges related to coastal resource management abound that need to be 
unraveled and contextualized, requiring a holistic framework that political ecology offers.  
 
In fisheries, management decisions (e.g., quotas, the timing or length of a fishing season, 
and the kinds of fishing gear allowed) are influenced by myriad factors but are in theory, dependent 
on information and understandings from a probabilistic but deterministic science known as stock 
assessment (McCay and Finlayson 1996). Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) challenge the heavy focus 
on technological fixes that is, oftentimes, the response of the scientific community and 
governmental agencies to environmental problems. Instead, they encourage an approach that 
represents environmental degradation both in light of a social issue and a biophysical condition. A 
political ecology framework comes in handy because of its emphasis on the connections between 
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ecology and social context by matching ecological and social chronologies, thereby contributing 
to the understanding of their interactions and the social production of landscapes (Vacarro et al. 
2013). In that sense, using a political ecology framework is a pragmatic approach in fisheries 
management because as Ostrom (1990) points out, the people, who are embedded in the existing 
social, political, cultural and economic institutions, are the core of fisheries management initiatives 
and not the fish.  
 
Political ecology defines the environment as an arena where different social actors with 
unequal political power are competing for access to and control of natural resources (Bryant and 
Bailey 1997). Following the framing of Ribot and Peluso (2003) about resource ‘access’, i.e., a 
bundle of powers that include the assemblage of means, relations, and processes that constrain or 
enable actors to benefit from the resource, Campling et al. (2012) explain that ‘access’ to resources 
is not only an area of political contestation in fisheries management, but also defined by many 
moving parts (such as access to capital, indigenous identity, or market access) that dictate fisheries 
use patterns and their socioeconomic and ecological outcomes.  
 
In their paper entitled ‘Political ecology and conservation policies: some theoretical 
genealogies’, Vacarro et al. (2013) make the case that the declaration and implementation of a 
conservation policy such as protected areas, is a classic example of competition for control over 
natural resources because establishment of conservation areas establish jurisdictions and borders 
that define exclusionary rights. Further, conservation policies are implemented by different social 
and institutional actors that are more powerful, which affect the less powerful social groups in the 
society; thus, these actors are entangled in an assemblage of contradictory social relationships. 
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Furthermore, the establishment of a protected area is not only an ecological project, but also a 
social process, with corresponding economic and political consequences wherein stakeholders’ 
managerial, and thus, cultural preferences and knowledge play critical roles (Vacarro et al. 2013). 
For example, a study by Holen (2004) shows how the Atna’, an Athabaskan people of south-central 
Alaska, who have no treaty rights to resources, use their traditional ecological knowledge as a tool 
to maintain their right to the subsistence fishery of the Copper River. According to him, access to 
resources is always an issue of a historical and political nature. These situations highlight how 
environmental issues become increasingly prominent in local struggles, national debates, and 
international policies, and the need for scholars to pay more particular attention to conventional 
politics and to more broadly defined relations of power, as well as the difference in interaction 
among human groups and their biophysical environments (Gezon and Paulson 2005). 
 
A study by Chapman (1989) recounts the shortfalls in Hardin’s (1986) conventional 
approach in the ‘tragedy of the commons’, to highlight the strength of a political ecology 
framework in analyzing causes of resource depletion in the context of the Amazon fisheries. The 
‘tragedy of the commons’ theory, according to Chapman (1989), overlooks two critical factors that 
affect decision-making in common property resource-use regions. First is the close relationship 
between common-property and private resource exploitation that exists in many Third World rural 
societies, and second, the many adaptations in traditional societies that mitigate the 
overexploitation of common-property resources. She argues that changes in these factors not only 
affect the status of the resources, but they are strongly influenced by political ideologies that 




Andreatta and Parlier (2010) use a political ecology framework to examine the lives of 
small-scale commercial fishers in Carteret County, North Carolina, citing the applicability of 
political ecology concepts in looking at complexities of the commercial fishing industry and its 
relationship with natural resources, local state, and international policies and power systems within 
a socio-economic framework. They posit that the power dynamics involved in a single sphere of 
access and sustainability requires daily interactions among multiple social, economic, and political 
levels, and this is the domain of political ecology. In another study, Menon et al. (2016) examine 
the fisheries crisis in the Park Bay using a political ecology lens, paying critical attention to 
processes of capital accumulation, which include the circuitous nature of capital accumulation and 
how fisher conflicts, ethnicity and the politics of the nation-state have shaped the spatial practices 
of accumulation.  
 
McCay and Finlayson (1996) examine the political ecology of crisis and institutional 
change in the context of the collapse of the northern cod of Newfoundland and Labrador, which 
has become the classic case of the failure of conventional science-based fisheries management. 
Contrary to what they had expected, the total collapse of the cod stock did not result in a parallel 
collapse of the paradigm of science-based fisheries management and its supported institutional 
structures, processes, and relationship. Instead, the social structure of the fishery collapsed along 
with the stock. Their analyses allowed them to reflect on the social and political authority of 
science and concluded that modernist science is firmly grounded in society’s consciousness that a 




Using a multi-scale approach that draws on anthropological critiques of common pool 
resources institutions and political ecology, Grace-McCaskey (2018) describes the historical, 
social, and political factors that influence how fishery management transpires at different scales, 
and how it is experienced by the different fisheries stakeholders in St. Croix, US Virgin Islands. 
Grace-McCaskey (2018) posits that as resources and resource users have become increasingly 
subjected to regulations and management regulations at multiple levels and scales, it is critical to 
examine how management institutions across scales impact one another and influence key 
elements of management, such as stakeholder participation. Her findings show that fishers’ and 
non-fishers’ knowledge of and perceptions toward fisheries management are linked to 
demographic differences (e.g., non-fishers’ educational backgrounds and economic livelihoods 
indicate likelihood of participation in the management process, staying informed about, and 
support for, fisheries regulations). In addition, factors such as real and perceived lack of 
enforcement, a highly technical and complex council process, the formal mechanisms through 
which stakeholder participation is encouraged, and participants’ perceptions about the non-
inclusive decision-making process of the Caribbean Fishery Management Council (CFMC), affect 
stakeholders’ participation.  
 
Greenberg (2006), in his study of the political ecology of fisheries in the upper Gulf of 
California, argues that the problems of the upper Gulf are embedded in complex processes that 
result from the way the upper gulf’s fishery and Mexico are integrated into the larger political and 
economic milieu. He contends that the real tragedy in this situation is the commoditization that 
often results from managing natural resources as individual commodities, instead of treating them 
as integral parts of particular ecologies. 
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Bush and Marschke (2016) explore the tension between governance and equity in 
Southeast Asian marine fisheries and aquaculture production by reviewing how social, economic 
and political relations influence the environmental outcomes associated with changing production 
practices. Using a political ecology lens, the authors consider both the material and discursive 
conflicts surrounding resource access, use and regulation at a variety of scales. According to them, 
the narrow managerial approaches (e.g., licensing, co-management, area-based and chain-based 
approaches) embodied in the ‘governance turn’ in the region do not address the complex human-
coastal environment interactions because such simplification tends to depoliticize the wider social 
and political relations which mediate environmental problems and potential solutions. Bush and 
Marschke (2016) posit that while these approaches are a step towards the right direction, greater 
analysis that would reveal the winners and losers produced from such governance mechanisms is 
imperative. 
 
The very essence of a political ecology framework ultimately lies in its ability to seek 
answers to difficult questions, specifically on ‘how and why particular interests and values 
predominate and how power circulates in ways that influence biophysical or social outcomes.’ 
Studying environmental problems in diverse spaces and on different scales, with methodological 
attention to unequal power relations within and among spheres, offers a great potential for deeper 
understanding of the causal connections and complex interactions of the factors at play (Paulson 
and Gezon 2005). The complex interactions and relationships of the different stakeholders 
involved in the SFC in the Visayan Sea demands an approach that encompasses the interactive 
effects of these stakeholders and the factors mediating their interactions at different levels. A 
political ecology framework provides the necessary lens to understanding these myriad factors, 
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especially in providing narratives on how this fishery policy is translated at the local level, and the 





CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
 
Study sites 
 The Visayan Sea is located in the central Philippines and covers an area of about 10,000 
km2 (Figure 2). It is surrounded by 3 regions (V-Bicol region, VI-Western Visayas and VII-Central 
Visayas) and shared by 22 coastal municipalities in 4 provinces, namely: Iloilo, Negros Occidental, 
Masbate, and Cebu (Guanco et al. 2009).   
 





 Nine (9) of the 18 municipalities that were initially included in the Visayan Sea SFC 
(shown in pink shade, Figure 1) were randomly selected to represent the study sites. These include 
4 municipalities in the province of Iloilo (Carles, Estancia, Concepcion, and Ajuy), 3 muncipalities 
in the province of Negros Occidental (Cadiz City, E.B. Magalona, and Escalante City), and 2 
municipalities in the province of Cebu (Bantayan and Madridejos). Two (2) municipalities in the 
province of Masbate (Milagros and Cawayan) and 1 municipality in the province of Capiz (Roxas 
City) were added to the study sites to make the study comprehensive in terms of geographical 
scope. These additional sites were included to ensure representativeness of the municipalities in 
the 4 provinces surrounding the Visayan Sea considering that previous studies focused heavily on 
municipalities in the provinces of Iloilo, Negros Occidental and Cebu. The additional 





I used mixed methods to achieve the objectives of this study, i.e., appropriate qualitative 
and quantitative research methods were employed in answering the research questions for each 





 Figure 3. Research framework of this study.  
 
 
Sampling strategy and respondents  
 A non-probability, purposive sampling strategy was used to select the interview 
respondents at the municipal level (Bernard 2017). This sampling strategy allows for selection of 
respondents that serve the purpose of this study. It also produces in-depth answers to questions of 
interest, and is more practical, considering the limited resources of this study. Research activities 
were coordinated with the local government units (LGUs) in the study sites; respondents were pre-
determined with the assistance of key informants and established contacts in each municipality. If 
the identified respondent was not available, a qualified substitute was interviewed as per 
recommendation of interviewed respondents. 
  
 This study focuses on the municipal fisheries stakeholders in the fishing communities 
surrounding the Visayan Sea primarily because the enclosed area is largely comprised by 
municipal waters (~75%), hence, it is assumed that municipal fisheries stakeholders are directly 
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impacted by the SFC. While the BFAR claims that there is not much effect of the SFC on municipal 
fishers because the SFC is only temporary and fishers can shift to other fisheries during the 3-
month fishing ban, there is no empirical study that supports these claims. It is important to 
understand the context of the SFC from the perspective of the municipal fisheries stakeholders 
who are experiencing it to inform and guide future decisions in the management of the Visayan 
Sea. Commercial fishers were not included in this study in consideration of the above, and also, 
due to limitations on financial resources, time, and access.  
 
 Respondents were selected purposely to represent the target stakeholders in the 
municipality, namely: municipal fishers,  fish dryers, fish vendors/fish traders/fish brokers, LGU 
representatives, fish wardens, and members of the Philippine National Police-Maritime Group 
(PNP-MG)/Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). The municipal fishers, fish dryers, fish vendors/fish 
traders/fish brokers comprise the regulated group, while the LGU representatives, fish wardens, 
and members of the PNP-MG/PCG comprise the regulators group. 
 
 
Data gathering methods and analysis 
Semi-structured interviews  
 The semi-structured interview (SSI) questionnaire was prepared initially in English, and 
then translated to the local dialects since the populations in the study sites speak different dialects 
(Appendix D). In the provinces of Iloilo and Negros Occidental for example, the primary spoken 
language is Hiligaynon, while in the province of Cebu, people speak Cebuano/Bisaya. In contrast, 
populations in the province of Masbate predominantly speak Minasbate that has mutual 
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intelligibility with Hiligaynon; Cebuano/Bisaya is also spoken in the southeastern part of Masbate. 
The SSI questionnaire was pre-tested in the municipality of Ajuy, Iloilo on February 27, 2019 to 
ensure that the instrument is comprehensive and that questions are clear and easy to understand. 
Revisions on the questions were made after the pre-test. Actual field interviews were conducted 
from March-April 2019. 
 
 For study objective #1. Knowledge and perceptions of municipal fisheries stakeholders 
about the SFC policy, questionnaires were administered to a total of 235 respondents composed of 
municipal fishers (117), fish dryers (35), fish vendors/fish traders/fish brokers (35), LGU 
representatives (27), fish wardens (10) and members of the PNP-MG/PCG (11).The questionnaire 
contains 2 sections. The first section focuses on the respondents’ knowledge and perceptions about 
the SFC. The respondents were asked 6 open-ended questions about their knowledge about the 
SFC, e.g., are they aware of the SFC implemented in the Visayan Sea; what is the purpose of the 
of the SFC; who is banned from fishing during the SFC; what species are banned from fishing 
during the SFC; when is the SFC period; and what are the penalaties for violation of the SFC. 
Some of these questions entail multiple answers, and scores may vary according to the number of 
correct answers provided by the respondent for a particular question. The highest possible score 
for each respondent for the knowledge section is 14 points. Table 1 shows the knowledge questions 





Table 1. Knowledge questions with the corresponding answers and equivalents points. 




Q8. Are you aware that 
an SFC is implemented 
in the Visayan Sea? 
 




Q9. What is the 
purpose of the SFC? 
• According to the Fisheries Administrative Order 
No. 167-3, s. 2013, the SFC is for the conservation 
of sardines, herrings, and mackerels in the Visayan 
Sea.  
• Since conservation is very specific, synonym 
words, concepts and vernacular translation of the 
policy (as per regional BFAR campaign materials) 
were considered. 
• Four (4) themes were identified based on 
respondents’ answers, namely: Conservation/ 
Preservation/ Sustainability; Increase the number 
and size of fish stocks; Egg development/Fish 
spawning/ Breeding/ Reproduction; and 
Management. 
• Each respondent can give multiple answers. A 
respondent whose answer falls in any of the 4 
themes identified gets a score of 1, otherwise 0. 
 
1 
Q10. Who are included 
in the SFC? 
• It is not specified in the Fisheries Administrative 
Order 167-3, s. 2013 who is banned from fishing 
during the SFC, but it is interpreted that both 
municipal and commercial fishers who target the 
prohibited species are banned during this period.  
• A respondent who answers municipal and 
commercial fishers gets 2 points, 1 point if the 
answer is either municipal or commercial fishers, 
and 0 for other answers. 
 
2 
Q11. What species are 
banned from fishing 
during the SFC? 
• The Fisheries Administrative Order No. 167-3, s. 
2013 specifies that sardines, herrings, and 




• A respondent who answers sardines/herrings and 
mackerels gets 2 points, 1 point if the answer is 
either sardines/herrings or mackerels, and 0 for 
other answers. 
 
Q12. What months of 
the year are covered by 
the SFC in the Visayan 
Sea? 
• The Fisheries Administrative Order No. 167-3, s. 
2013 states that the SFC is implemented from Nov 
15 to Feb 15 yearly.  
• A respondent gets 1 point for each correct month 
of the SFC identified. 
 
4 
Q13. What are the 
penalties for violation 
of the SFC? 
• The Fisheries Administrative Order No. 167-3, s. 
2013 states that offender of the SFC will be 
subjected to: 1) imprisonment of six (6) months 
and one (1) day to six (6) years;  and/or 2) fine of 
six thousand pesos (P6,000.00), and by 3) 
forfeiture of the catch; and 4) cancellation of 
fishing permit or license. 
 
• A respondent can give multiple answers. Each of 
the correct answers discussed above is equivalent 
to 1 point, hence, a perfect score of 4. The fines are 
simplified into key words such as Imprisonment, 
Fine, Forfeiture of catch and Cancellation of 




 Respondents’ knowledge about the SFC was evaluated using a 9-point Likert scale wherein 
overall mean scores are categorized into the following ratings: Very poor (below 7.0); Poor (7.0-
8.75); Fair (8.76-10.5); Good (10.51-12.25); Excellent (above 12.25). 
  
 To verify if there are differences in the level of knowledge among the regulated 
respondents (i.e., municipal fishers, fish dryers, fish vendors/fish traders/fish brokers) in the 
municipalities, I test the following hypotheses: 
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H1: There is no difference in the knowledge about the SFC of respondents in the regulated 
group in the different municipalities. 
H2: There is no relationship between regulated group’s knowledge about the SFC and 
compliance, therewith. 
  
 Compliance data is based on the respondents’ answer to the question on whether (or not) 
they follow or abide by the SFC implementation (see APPENDIX D, Q45).  
 
 For the perceptions component, respondents were asked how they perceive the 
implementation of the SFC in terms of accurateness of information, monitoring, opportunities for 
dialogue, fairness to stakeholders, compliance, and whether they are benifitting from it. Responses 
were measured using a Likert scale [e.g., a score of 5 means the respondent strongly agrees with 
the statement in the questionnaire; lowest score is 1 (strongly disagree)]. In addition, respondents 
were asked to give 5 words that they can think about or associate with the SFC to get an overview 
of how people perceive the SFC using their own words.  
 
 I hypothesize that:  
H3: There is no difference in the perceptions about the SFC of respondents in the regulated 
and regulator’s group. 
H4: There is no difference in the perceptions about the SFC of respondents in the regulated 
groups in the different municipalities. 
H5: There is no positive relationship between regulated group’s perceptions about the SFC 
and compliance, therewith. 
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 The second section of the SSI questionnaire contains questions about the impacts of the 
SFC, which address the study objective #2. Socio-economic and cultural impacts of the SFC. Only 
the regulated group (i.e., municipal fishers, fish dryers, fish vendors/fish traders/fish brokers; 
N=187) were asked to respond to the questions pertaining to the socio-economic impacts (e.g., 
whether their livelihood is affected by the SFC; changes in income, work hours, household 
dynamics; how they cope with the impacts they have identified; availaibility of alternative 
livelihoods, etc.) the SFC. All the 235 respondents answered the questions on cultural impacts. 
The Merriam-Webster (2020) defines culture as “the characteristic features of everyday existence 
(such as diversions or a way of life) shared by people in a place or time”. In this study, the 
analysis of cultural impacts of the SFC is limited to customary beliefs and practices that are 
identified by the respondents to be affected by the implementation of the SFC, as well as the shifts 
in their daily dealings (e.g., adjustments, coping mechanisms), as a result of the SFC. 
 
 The study objective #3 focuses on the political factors in the implementation of the SFC in 
the Visayan Sea. Here, all 235 respondents were asked to identify the different factors that they 
have observed that affect the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea. Responses were 
analyzed and grouped into emerging themes. 
  
 In addition to the specific questions designed for each study objective, information about 
the respondent’s age, gender, educational level, primary source of income, household size, number 




 Data collected from SSIs were encoded and translated using Microsoft applications such 
as Word and Excel, and analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) v.26, 
to come up with the necessary statistical and text analyses. Comparison of responses between 
respondent groups, i.e., the regulated (municipal fishers, fish dryers, fish vendors/fish traders/fish 
brokers) and the regulators (LGU representatives, fish wardens, PNP-MG/PCG), and among study 
sites, i.e., within Panay Island  (Carles, Estancia, Concepcion, Ajuy, and Roxas City) and outside 
Panay Island (Bantayan, Madridejos, Cadiz City, E.B. Magalona, Escalante City, Cawayan, 
Milagros) was done using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and correlations test. Panay 
Island is where the provinces of Capiz and Iloilo are located (Figure 1). I used this geographical 
location as a basis for comparing respondents’ knowledge and perceptions on the SFC because 
majority of the municipalities included in the SFC, and the BFAR regional office for Western 
Visayas, are within Panay Island. Thus, Panay Island is considered as a stronghold of the SFC. 
 
 The one-way ANOVA is used to determine whether there are statistically significant 
differences between the means of groups (i.e., respondents groups and municipalities). It tests the 
following null hypothesis: 
𝐻0: 𝜇1 = 𝜇2 = 𝜇3 = ⋯ = 𝜇𝑘  
where µ=group mean and k=number of groups. If the test returns a statistically significant result 
(i.e, p-value = ≤ 0.05), the alternative hypothesis (HA), i.e., at least 2 group means are statistically 
different from each other, is accepted (Laerd Statistics 2020a). 
  
 The correlations test measures the strength of association between 2 variables and the 
direction of the relationship. The value of the correlation coefficient varies between +1 and -1; a 
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positive sign indicates a positive relationship, while a negative sign indicates a negative 
relationship (Laerd Statistics 2020b). The correlation coefficient range and strength of relationship 
is categorized as follows: 0.01-0.20 (Very weak); 0.21-0.40 (Weak); 0.41-0.60 (Moderate); 0.61-
0.80 (Strong); 0.80-1.0 (Very strong) (Statstutor 2020). Since my data for the knowledge and 
perceptions are ordinal data, I used the Spearman rank correlation test (rs) to measure the degree 
of association between respondents’ knowledge and perceptions about the SFC and their 
compliance. 
 
 Further, I used descriptive statistics (e.g., mean, median, frequency) and presented my 
results in tables and figures. Furthermore, I used text analysis and Word cloud to identify emerging 
themes in the problems and challenges cited by the SFC in the implementation of the SFC in their 
respective municipalities.  
 
 
Focus Groups  
 To complement primary data collected from the SSIs,  focus groups (FGs) were conducted 
in every municipality from March-April of 2019. Nine (9) FGs were conducted in 9 municipalities 
in the provinces of Iloilo (Carles, Estancia, Concepcion, Ajuy), Cebu (Bantayan and Madridejos), 
and Negros Occidental (Cadiz City, E.B. Magalona and Escalante). A total of 77 individuals 
representing the different respondent groups participated in the FGs. 
 
The FG has 2 parts. In the first part, FG participants were asked about their views about 
the SFC, specifically on the following areas: whether they are in favor of the SFC; their knowledge 
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on the SFC; whether the SFC is achieving its purpose; points about the SFC that they agree and 
disagree with; whether their community is benefitting from the SFC; whether the SFC should be 
continued; and suggestions on improving the implementation of the SFC. 
 
The second part of the FG was a seasonal calendar activity wherein participants were asked 
to identify the lean, average and peak months in a year; types of fishes caught during the specified 
periods as well as the types of fishing gears used to catch these fish species. The last part of the 
activity focused on identifying the challenges and problems they experience in their respective 
communities in different months of the year. The data obtained from the FGs were encoded, 
translated in MS Word and MS Excel and analyzed in SPSS v.26. Results are presented in figures. 
Further, text analysis was used to gain valuable insights and identify emerging themes from the 
discussions with the different respondent groups. Quotes from interview transcripts were also used 
to support discussion of major points identified in the analysis. 
  
 
Key informant interviews  
 Twelve (12) key informants from government agencies (GAs) and non-government 
agencies (NGAs) were interviewed to triangulate results obtained from SSIs and FGs. These 
include personnel from the national BFAR in Manila, and regional offices in Iloilo and Cebu, who 
were/are directly involved in the SFC implementation; Iloilo Provincial Agriculture office; 
Oceana-Philippines; USAID-Fish Right Project; and PAMALAKAYA-Pilipinas (National 
Federation of Small Fisherfolk Organization in the Philippines). In addition, 25 members of the 
City or Municipal Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Management Councils (C/MFARMCs) in the 
44 
 
study sites were also interviewed between February to July of 2019. A total of 37 KIIs were 
conducted. 
 
 The KII questions explored the view of the informants about the SFC particularly on the 
objectives of the SFC; whether the SFC’s objectives are met; metrics of success/failure of the SFC;  
challenges in the implementation of the SFC; their recommendations to address the challenges 
they have identified; and whether they think there is a better alternative in managing the fisheries 
in the Visayan Sea. Interviews were recorded using Recorder plus application, transcribed and 




Before-after control-impact design analysis 
Limitations of the study 
For study objective #4, inasmuch as access to the National Stock Assessment Program 
(NSAP) data was not granted by the BFAR, fish catch data available in the Philippine Statistics 
Authority (PSA) website was used in the before-after control-impact (BACI) design analysis to 
achieve study objective 4, which verifies claims on increasing fish stock in the Visayan Sea as a 
result of the strict implementation of the SFC in 2012. It is also important to note that the provincial 
data from the PSA used for the treatment group is comprised of fish catch data from different 
municipalities, some of these are not included in the SFC implemented in the Visayan Sea. I argue 
that fish catch data at the provincial level can be used for this analysis primarily because the coastal 
municipalities included in SFC in the Visayan Sea are in these provinces. Hence, I assume that 
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any increase (or decrease) in fish catch in the participating municipalities will be observed at the 
provincial level. Further, studies have shown that sardines and mackerels are amongst the 
predominant catch in these provinces (Armada 1999; Guanco et al. 2009; DA-BFAR 2018). There 
is no available catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) data on municipal and commercial fishing in the 
Visayan Sea.  
 
Data 
Provincial level, longitudinal marine municipal and commercial fisheries catch data of the 
regulated fish species included in the annual SFC in the Visayan Sea, namely: Bali sardines 
(Tamban), Fimbriated sardines (Tunsoy), Indian mackerel (Alumahan), and Indo-pacific mackerel 
(Hasa-hasa) spanning the period of 2007-2018 were downloaded from the portal of the PSA  
(http://openstat.psa.gov.ph/) and used in the analysis. Although herrings are included in the 
regulated species specified in Fisheries Administrative Order No. 167-3, s. 2013, herrings are not 
included in the list of regulated species contained in the campaign materials for the SFC issued by 
the BFAR. Hence, herrings were excluded in the analysis.  
 
The PSA fish catch data used are collected through a Quarterly Municipal Fisheries Survey 
(QMFS) conducted by the PSA. Using a stratified simple random sampling method, the PSA 
selects sample traditional landing centers in 67 provinces. Five (5) key informants per landing 
center provide information on the average daily volume of unloading (in metric tons, or MT) and 
price per kilogram (PhP/kg) of the top 31 species and other fishes combined in ‘others’ category. 
Additional data are gathered from non-traditional landing centers that are managed by the 
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) and LGUs (PSA 2018). 
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Treatment and control groups 
The goal of this empirical work is to analyze the effect of SFC policy on sardines and 
mackerels catch. The literature indicates that a study of this sort requires data from groups (e.g., 
municipality, etc.) enforcing the SFC, popularly known as implementing or treatment group, and 
those not implementing the SFC, also known as control group. Ideally, for a comparative analysis 
like this, it is preferred that the treatment group and the control group share similar characteristics. 
In this case, the enclosed area during the SFC in the Visayan Sea is surrounded by the provinces 
of Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Cebu and Masbate, hence, these areas are assigned as the 
treatment group (also referred to as the Participating group).  
 
I included all other provinces in the Philippines that have reported catch for sardines and 
mackerels for at least 7 years of the inclusive period (2007-2018) as control group, i.e., Non-
participating group. I used 2012 as the base year in my analysis because strict implementation of 
the SFC policy in the Visayan Sea started around this time. I excluded the provinces wherein an 
SFC for similar species is implemented.  
 
The correlated data summary and categorical variable information for sardines and 
mackerels are provided in the following tables. There are 61 provinces analyzed for sardines (Table 
2) and 61 provinces for mackerels (Table 3). Since there are 12 within subject-effect (i.e., years 






Table 2. Correlated data summary for sardines. 
Correlated Data Summary  
Number of Levels Subject Effect Province 61 
Within-Subject Effect Year 12 
Number of Subjects 61 




Correlation Matrix Dimension 12 
 
 
Table 3. Correlated data summary for mackerels. 
Correlated Data Summary 
Number of Levels Subject Effect ID 61 
Within-Subject Effect Year 12 
Number of Subjects 61 




Correlation Matrix Dimension 12 
 
 
Table 4. Categorical variable information for sardines. 
Categorical Variable Information  
 N Percent 
Factor Group Non-participating 672 91.8% 
Participating 60 8.2% 
Total 732 100.0% 
Policy Before Policy 366 50.0% 
After Policy 366 50.0% 





Table 5. Categorical variable information for mackerels. 
Categorical Variable Information 
 N Percent 
Factor Group Non-participating 672 91.8% 
Participating 60 8.2% 
Total 732 100.0% 
Policy 0 366 50.0% 
1 366 50.0% 




Table 6 provides the list of provinces in the Philippines that are included in the control and 
treatment groups.  
 
Table 6. List of provinces in the control and treatment groups for the BACI design analysis. 
 Sardines Mackerels 









5. Negros Occidental 












18. Camarines Norte  
19. Camarines Sur  
20. Camiguin  
21. Catanduanes  













19. Camarines Norte 





23.  Compostela Valley 
24. Davao del Norte 
25. Davao del Sur 
26. Davao Oriental 
27. Eastern Samar 
28. Guimaras  
29. Ilocos Norte  
30. Ilocos Sur  
31. Isabela 
32. La Union  
33. Lanao del Norte  
34. Lanao del Sur  
35. Leyte  
36. Maguindanao  
37. Marinduque  
38. Misamis Occidental  
39. Misamis Oriental  
40. Negros Oriental  
41. Northern Samar  
42. Occidental Mindoro  
43. Oriental Mindoro  
44. Palawan  
45. Pampanga  
46. Pangasinan  
47. Quezon  
48. Romblon  
49. Samar 
50. Sarangani  
51. Siquijor  
52. Sorsogon  
53. South Cotabato  
54. Southern Leyte  
55. Sultan Kudarat  
56. Sulu  
57. Surigao del Norte  
58. Surigao del Sur  
59. Tawi-tawi  
60. Zambales  
61. Zamboanga del Sur 
22. Catanduanes  
23. Compostela Valley  
24. Eastern Samar  
25. Guimaras  
26. Ilocos Norte 
27. Ilocos Sur  
28. Isabela  
29. La Union  
30. Lanao del Norte  
31. Lanao del Sur  
32. Leyte  
33. Maguindanao  
34. Marinduque  
35. Misamis Occidental  
36. Misamis Oriental  
37. Negros Oriental  
38. Northern Samar  
39. Occidental Mindoro  
40. Oriental Mindoro  
41. Palawan  
42. Pampanga  
43. Pangasinan  
44. Quezon  
45. Romblon  
46. Samar  
47. Sarangani  
48. Siquijor  
49. Sorsogon  
50. South Cotabato  
51. Southern  
52. Leyte  
53. Sultan Kudarat  
54. Sulu  
55. Surigao del Norte  
56. Surigao del Sur  
57. Tawi-tawi  
58. Zambales  
59. Zamboanga del Norte  
60. Zamboanga del Sur  





To isolate the impact of the SFC on sardines and mackerels catch landings, I adopt the 
difference-in-difference (DID) estimator, which is a variation of the BACI design analysis (Smith 
2002). BACI designs are an effective method to evaluate natural and human-induced perturbations 
on ecological variables when treatment sites cannot be randomly chosen (Conner et al. 2016). It is 
a widely accepted method of directly assessing the effects of area closures (Claudet and Guidetti 
2010; Ojeda-Martinez et al. 2011; Osenberg et al. 2011; Fenberg et al. 2012; Cheung et al. 2015; 
Clarke et al. 2015). By analyzing the differences before and after the implementation of the SFC 
policy in the treatment area along with differences in the control area during corresponding years, 
the effect of the SFC is isolated.  The assumption here is that, in the absence of the SFC policy 
intervention, unobserved differences between treatment and control groups are the same over time.  
We verify this by testing the difference in means of the outputs (sardines and mackerels) between 
the treatment group and control group using catch data prior to-and -after the strict enforcement of 
the SFC in 2012.  
 
Customarily, the DID framework is specified as, 
 
DID 1, 1 E 1, 0 0, 1 E 0, 0i i i i i i i ii iY G T Y G T Y G T Y G T
      =  = = −  = =  −  = = −  = =          
   (1)         
 
where E is the mean or expected, Y is the outcome, G is the group (=1 if SFC is enforced in the 
province, 0 if otherwise), and T is the year (=1 years after 2012, 0 for years 2012 and below),  is 
the average effect of the SFC on outcome.  However, for a longitudinal data with more than two 
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time periods, a DID regression framework is preferred. This framework also allows for controlling 
for other covariates. For this study, I specify the DID regression framework as,  
 
𝑌 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏(𝑇𝑥𝐺)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀         (2) 
 
where Y, T, and G are as defined in equation 1, wherein:  i is province; t is year, α,  , and τ  are 
parameters to be estimated and ε is error term.  Similar to equation 1, the parameter τ in equation 
2 indicates the average effect of the SFC on outcome.  
 
To estimate the parameters in equation 2, several models are considered. First, I considered 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) which estimates the model as pooled OLS, thus, does not account 
for the panel nature of our data. To account for the panel data, the random effect and fixed effect 
models are preferred. However, these models are not capable of handling potential correlation of 
errors across time which is the case for panel data (Fitzmaurice and Ravichandran 2008; Wilson 
and Lorenz 2015). The Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) is the known model that can 
handle panel data and the potential correlation of errors across time. The GEE focuses on 
estimating the ‘population-averaged’ effects. The GEE approach was introduced by Liang and 
Zeger (1986) and is an extension of generalized linear models (GLMs). It allows for obtaining 
coefficient estimates when analyzing correlated data without relying on a joint distribution of the 
responses which is usually unknown (Wilson and Lorenz 2015). Further, it uses quasi-likelihood 
estimation rather than maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) or OLS which are more sensitive to 
variance structure specification (PSU 2018), thus, it is a popular alternative to likelihood-based 
generalized linear mixed model which is mor sensitive to variance structure specification. The 
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GEE estimation routine in SPSS v.26 was used in this study. I specified the link function as 
identity, and the covariance matrix as exchangeable.  
 
 
Secondary data gathering 
 Secondary data such as municipal profiles, reports, fisheries administrative orders, 
memorandum circulars, news articles, campaign ads, were collected and analyzed to complement 
primary data. I also attended the following activities conducted by GAs and NGAs that are actively 
involved in the fishery management in the Visayan Sea, to keep abreast with the current initiatives 
done in this topic : 
 
1. Consultative Meeting with Region 6 National Agencies with programs on Sustainable 
Livelihood, May 27, 2019, Iloilo City; 
2. Stakeholder’s Forum on Fishery Management Area, Sulo Riviera Hotel, Quezon City, June 
18, 2019; and 
3. Visayan Sea Judges and Prosecutor’s Training, SEDA Hotel, Iloilo City, July 31, 2019. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Respondent groups 
 A total of 235 municipal fisheries stakeholders composed of municipal fishers, fish dryers, 
fish vendors/fish traders/fish brokers, LGU representatives who are directly iinvolved in the SFC 
implementation in their respective municipalities, fish wardens, and members of the PNP-
MG/PCG were interviewed for this study (Table 7).  
 




The municipal fishers operate within the municipal waters, i.e. from shoreline to 15 kms 
seaward, using fishing gears that catch either of the regulated species (i.e., sardines or mackerels). 
These include seine nets, gill nets, ring nets, small trawl, among others. Majority of them are males 
(91%), married (91%), and use a motorized boat (87%). Forty-three percent (43%) of them have 
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attained elementary level of education, while 25% of them reached high school level. Majority of 
them have been residing in their respective municipalities for at least 36 years. 
 
Fish dryers 
Only the fish dryers who dry sardines or mackerels are included in this study. Fish dryers 
earn their living by drying variety of fishes. Majority of them claim that at least 80% of their 
income comes from fish drying. Further, majority of them are females, married, and at least 50 
years old. The fishes that they dry are either caught by their husbands or other household members 
or bought or loaned from fishers within their communities or neighboring municipalities. They 
process the fishes by soaking them in a brine solution, sun-drying them, and selling the dried fishes 
themselves or a comprador (wholesaler) buys the dried fish in crates. Some of these fish dryers 
work for big fishing boat operators by processing and drying their fish catch, on a contract basis 
(e.g., per bañera9 or per drying panel made of bamboo slats), while others have their own fishing 
boats that target sardines or mackerels which they used as raw material for their fish drying 
business. Fish dryers who have bigger financial capital finance fishing boat operators who target 
sardines or mackerels and get their catch as payment.  
 
Fish vendors/fish traders/fish brokers 
Majority of the fish vendors/fish traders/fish brokers interviewed are females (54%), 
married (83%), at least 40 years old (80%), and have reached at least high school level of education 
(77%). They have been residents of their respective municipalities for 39 years, on the average.  In 
this study, fish vendors are defined as individuals who buys fresh fish from fish traders and sell 
 
9 Bañera is a bucket made of plastic or steel which fishers use to haul their fish catch. One (1) bañera can contain 
approximately 40 kgs of fish. 
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them in market stalls, locally called as pwesto. Fish vendors usually sell a couple of bañera of 
fishes in a day, depending on the size of their market stall and financial capital. Fish traders are 
individuals who buy fishes in bulk from fish brokers (for fresh fish) and fish dryers (dried fish), 
and resell them to fish vendors, retailers, and buyers in other areas. Fish brokers acquire catch from 
fishers in bigger volumes, usually in bañeras or boxes. They set the pricing of the fishes landed in 
fishing ports and distribute them to different fish traders and retailers. Sometimes, fish traders can 
also be fish brokers at the same time, depending on the expanse of their business operations. Some 
fish traders/fish brokers also finance fishers by providing them loan to cover for their daily 
subsistence and fishing operations and wait for the fisher’s catch as form of payment based on 
agreed terms. 
 
Local government unit representatives 
These are the LGU personnel who are involved in the fisheries management in their 
respective municipalities. Majority of them are males (78%), married (78%), at least 40 years old 
(85%), have attained college of level of education (85%), and have been residents of their 
municipalities for an average of 39 years. 
 
Fish wardens 
Fish wardens are deputized individuals, locally known as Bantay-dagat, who are tasked to 
help in the MCS of fishing activities in their respective municipal waters. They normally do patrol 
to deter illegal fishing activities and they also aid during rescue operations at sea. Fish wardens 
are residents of these municipalities; some of them are also fishers or members of a fishing 
household. Fish wardens in certain municipalities receive allowances from their constituent LGU, 
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while others serve as volunteers. All the fish wardens interviewed are males; with a median age of 
42. They have been residing in their respective municipalities for 42 years, on the average. 
 
Philippine National Police-Maritime Group /Philippine Coast Guard  
These are members of the PNP-MG10 and PCG11 stationed in the municipalities included 
in the study sites. They are part of the composite team (together with the LGU representatives, fish 
wardens, BFAR personnel) that conduct MCS activities and enforce laws at sea. Respondents 
under this group are all males. Majority of them are between 31-50 years old (73), married (81%), 





10 The PNP-MG is one of the National Operational Support Units of the Philippine National Police mandated to 
perform police functions over the country’s territorial waters, i.e., lakes, rivers, coastal areas, including ports, harbors, 
and small islands (PNP-MG 2020). 
11 The PCG is mandated and responsible to perform maritime search and rescue, maritime law enforcement, maritime 
safety, marine environmental protection, and maritime security (PCG 2020).  
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Knowledge and perceptions of municipal fisheries stakeholders                                                         
about the SFC in the Visayan Sea 
 
Introduction 
Stakeholders have varying perceptions about the SFC policy in the Philippines. While the 
BFAR management is claiming success of the SFC policy implemented in the Visayan Sea, interest 
groups strongly oppose its implementation because it lacks general fisheries assessment, failing to 
consider the biogeographic characteristics of the fish species being regulated. Further, it failed to 
conduct a socio-economic impacts study prior to implementation. Finally, it is not only affecting 
the municipal fishers but also, it is not addressing the overfishing problem in the country. While 
perspectives about the SFC of observers outside the managed area are presented in news articles, 
social media, and fora, there is no information about the perspectives of the local people who are 
experiencing the SFC implemented in the Visayan Sea. 
 
Several studies emphasize that while fishery management strategies are designed to 
conserve important aquatic resources, compliance with set regulations entail local acceptance and 
cooperation, and people’s perception about a fishery influence their use patterns and fishery 
management at the local level (Castillo and Saysel 2005; Beddington et al. 2007; Bavinck and 
Johnson 2008; Pramatisari et al. 2015). A study by Acheson (2010) describes the varying support 
for different management goals between lobster fishermen and biologists in New England that is 
attributed to their conflicting beliefs on what controls the lobster boom and bust experience. The 
lobster fishermen distrust the scientific information offered by the federal and state fisheries 
agencies. The different background and orientation of the user groups and the management 
institutions contribute to group biases which add to the challenge of attaining sustainability. Grace-
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McCaskey’s (2018) study also describes factors that influence participation in the multi-scale 
fisheries management in St. Croix, US Virgin Islands, which include real and perceived lack of 
enforcement, a highly technical and complex council process, the formal mechanisms for 
stakeholder’s participation and stakeholder’s perception of the non-inclusive decision-making 
process of the Caribbean Fishery Management Council (CFMC).  
 
Analysis of knowledge and perceptions in managing coastal resources in Fiji by Kitolelei 
and Sato (2016) shows how diverse knowledge on coastal resources and environments influence 
perceptions among people in a complex way, and transformation of perceptions promote collective 
action that provide opportunities for social learning for different stakeholders. Kitolelei and Sato 
(2016) posit that sustainable management of coastal resources depends on human knowledge and 
perceptions of natural resources and coastal environments.  
 
The study by Karnad et al. (2013) about the influence of fishermen’s perceptions on the 
sustainability of Indian fisheries shows that fishermen increase their fishing area and time spent, 
change their gear, and overlap fishing zones, in response to their perceived decline in catch and 
bycatch. Karnad et al. (2013) reports that the convoluted interactions between ineffective 
community and state regulations that guide the fishermen’s actions inhibited them from developing 
successful fisheries management. Smith (2010) reports similar observation in the European 
countries’ attempt to manage their common fisheries resources which resulted in a precarious 
situation because of the overlapping jurisdictions and competing interests of the member states. In 
Thailand, local people perceive national marine parks (NMPs) to have either limited or negative 
impacts to fisheries and agricultural livelihoods and negligible benefits for tourism livelihoods, 
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which they attribute to the NMPs undermining access to or lacking support for development of 
cultural, social, political, financial, natural, human, physical, and political capital assets (Benneth 
and Dearden 2014).  
 
The importance of understanding time and space from the perspective of the people being 
studied cannot be overemphasized. This chapter draws from this rich literature and incorporates 
the views of both the ‘outsiders’ (regulators) implementing the SFC policy, and the ‘insiders’ 
(regulated) who are actually experiencing the SFC. It evaluates the knowldege and perceptions of 
these different municipal fisheries stakeholders about the SFC in the Visayan Sea and explores 
how these factors differ across respondent groups and municipalities, and affect compliance.  
 
 
Knowledge of municipal fisheries stakeholders about the SFC 
 The majority of the respondents (97%) are aware of the SFC implemented in the Visayan 
Sea. The 7 individuals who said they are not aware about the SFC are from the study sites in 
Masbate province, namely Milagros and Cawayan. These findings are not surprising especially 
since the data shows that  94% of the respondents from these areas (N=70) said the SFC is not 
implemented in their respective municipalities.  
  
 Respondents were asked about the purpose of the SFC. Predominant responses across the 
respondent groups for the purpose of the SFC are Egg development/Fish 
spawning/Breeding/Reproduction (60.9%) and Increase the number and size of fish stocks (39.1%) 
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(Figure 4). At least 85% of the respondents in the respective respondent groups are knowledgeable 
about the purpose of the SFC with the regulators group predominantly getting the answers. 
 
 
Figure 4. Respondents’ answers to the question 'What is the purpose of the SFC?'. 
 
 
 Majority of the respondents (75.3%) are aware that both municipal and commercial fishers 
are banned from fishing during the SFC, while the other 20% of the respondents have a split answer 
between municipal and commercial fishers (Figure 5). Some respondents also specified that if the 
fishing gear used is targeting the regulated fish species then it is prohibited, regardless if it is a 














Figure 5. Respondents’ answers to the question 'Who are included in the SFC?'. 
 
 Responses by respondent group show that while 74.4% of the municipal fishers answered 
both municipal and commercial fishers are banned from fishing during the SFC, 11.1% believe 
that only commercial fishers are not allowed to fish during this period. On the contrary, 25.7% of 
the fish dryers think that only municipal fishers are included in the SFC. There is also confusion 
among LGU representatives and the PNP-MG/PCG on who are included in the SFC; 85.2% of the 
LGU representatives interviewed got the correct answer, but the remaining 15% have split answers 
between municipal and commercial fishers. Apparently, some LGUs are lenient on municipal 
fishers as far as implementation of the SFC is concerned. On the other hand, 54.5% of the PNP-
MG/PCG respondents got the correct answer (Figure 6).  
  
 This confusion is not surprising since it is not explicitly stated in the Fisheries 
Administrative Order No. 167-3, s. 2013 who or what fishing gears are banned during the SFC. A 


































“The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Regional Office 6 is strictly 
enforcing Fisheries Administrative Order No. 167-3, declaring the period between 
November 15 to February 15 of every year as the closed season for sardines, 
herrings and mackerels. Offender will be subject to imprisonment of six (6) 
months and one (1) day to six (6) years and/or fine of six thousand pesos 
(P6,000.00), and by forfeiture of the catch and cancellation of fishing permit or 
license. FAO 167-3 prohibits the catching, killing, selling or possessing the 
sexually mature sardines, herrings and mackerels or their larvae, fry or young 
known locally as ‘lupoy’, ‘silinyasi’, ‘linatsay’ or ‘manansi’ in the portion of the 
Visayan Sea and adjoining waters enclosed by line drawn through following 
points and coastlines: from the mouth of Danac River on the northeastern tip of 
the Bantayan Island to Madridejos, thru the lighthouse on Gigantes Island, to 
Clutaya Island, to Culasi Point in Capiz province, eastward along the northern 
coast of Capiz to Bulacaue Point in Carles, Iloilo, southward along the eastern 
coast of Iloilo to the mouth of Talisay River, westward across the Guimaras Strait 
to Tomonton Point in Occidental Negros, eastward along the northern Coast of 
the Island of Negros and back to the mouth of Danao River in Escalante, Negros 
Occidental.” 
 
 However, it is interpreted that both municipal and commercial fishers who target the 
prohibited species are banned during this period. As per the comment of one LGU representative:  
“(The) FAO (Fisheries Administrative Order) 167 is very broad; there is no law 






Figure 6. Responses to the question 'Who are included in the SFC?', by respondent group. 
 
 
 The BFAR management at the regional and national levels also have varying views on who 
are included in the fishing ban as shown in the interview transcripts below: 
“We are always asked about that…regarding the law ... because it does not 
mention there that it is only for commercial (fishers). My take there is it should 
not be because in terms of production or catch, they (commercial and municipal 
fishers) have an equal contribution. Meaning, it has a significant effect if we will 
allow the municipal fishers to fish during the closed season. ...…… So, what’s in 
the law should be implemented although we do not elaborate more whether they 
(municipal fishers) are exempted or not.” [Regional BFAR] 
 
“The municipal fishers are not prohibited from fishing during the closed season 
because in the operationalization of the closed season, they are not supposed to be 
restricted…… But it is just right not to include everyone (excluding municipal 
fishers from the closed season) because that was the original intent of the law also 
when it started.” [National BFAR] 
  
These findings have implications for the implementation of the SFC in the different 























Municipal fishers Commercial fishers Municipal and commercial fishers No answer/No idea
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“You can find your way around (the law) because the Implementing Rules and 
Regulations are not specific.” [LGU representative, Estancia, Iloilo] 
 
It is important to clarify whether municipal fishers are part of the SFC because it is difficult 
to implement a policy that is vague. As one key informant explains: 
“The closure is about space and fishing gear (plus the specified fish species). 
Even if you allow the municipal (fishers) but you only allow specific fishing gears 
like hook and line, then it is fine. But since you do not have specific provision for 
allowing and disallowing, then it is vague.” [Key informant, Fisheries expert] 
 
According to another key informant:  
“Ideally for the closed season, the implementing guidelines should be clear in the 
ordinance. The local (government) should have an ordinance.” [Key informant, 
NGA Environmental lawyer] 
 
  
The problem is some municipalities do not even have their coastal resource management 
plans, let alone a fishery ordinance on the implementing rules and regulations of the SFC in their 
municipality.  
 
When respondents were asked what species are banned from fishing during the SFC, 71.5% 
of the respondents answered sardines and mackerels while 9.4% said sardines only. Other 
respondent groups have different responses as to what species are not allowed to catch during the 





Figure 7. Respondents’ answers to the question 'What species are banned from fishing during 
SFC in the Visayan Sea?'. 
 
According to a BFAR key informant, both species are given priority in the conservation 
effort, however, sardines are usually highlighted because it ranks number one in terms of 
production. 
 
Analysis of responses between respondent groups show that most of the municipal fishers 
(80.3%) and LGU representatives (96.3%) know which fish species are banned during the SFC 
(Figure 8). 
 













Figure 8. Responses to the question 'What species are banned from fishing during SFC in the 
Visayan Sea?', by respondent group. 
 
Respondents were also asked what months of the year are covered by the SFC in the 
Visayan Sea. Figure 9 shows that majority of the respondents are knowledgeable about the specific 
months when the SFC is implemented (i.e., November-February).  
 
Figure 9. Responses to the question 'What months of the year are covered by the SFC in the 
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For the penalties for violation of the SFC, Figure 10 shows that respondents are more aware 
of penalties such as fines (78%), forfeiture of catch (36%), and imprisonment (33%), but not so 
much about cancellation of fishing permit or license (1%). Twelve percent  (12%) the respondents 
have either No answer/No idea about the penalties for the violation of the SFC because they said 
they have never been apprehended, or they have other answers such as impoundment of fishing 
gears and/or fishing boats, issuance of warning depending on the number offenses (e.g., first, 
second, third warning), or their municipality has no fishery ordinance in place. 
  
 
Figure 10. Respondents’ answers to the question 'What are the penalties                                    
for violation of the SFC?’. 
 
 
Figure 11 shows how respondent groups fared in the knowledge questions, with LGU 
representatives at the top spot (mean score of 11.37), while the PNP-MG/PCG and Fish dryers are 
the bottom 2 with mean scores of 9.27 and 9.43, respectively.  
 











Figure 11. Mean scores for knowledge about the SFC, by respondent group. 
 
 
Overall, respondent groups scored low on the penalties for violation of the SFC (Figure 
12). The fish dryers, fish vendors/fish traders/fish brokers, and members of the PNP-MG/PCG also 
scored low on the question on the inclusive months of the SFC period (mean score=2.8). 
Respondents from the PNP-MG/PCG also scored low on questions on who are included in the 
SFC (mean score=1.5) and species banned during the SFC (mean score=1.4). These results 
highlight the need for members of the authority to brush up their knowledge on the provisions of 
the SFC policy, especially that they are part of the MCS team. They are also the one apprehending 





Figure 12. Mean scores for individual knowledge questions about the SFC, by respondent group. 
 
Figure 13 shows how the different municipalities fared in the knowledge questions. The 
municipalities of Carles (mean score=12.05), Ajuy (mean score=12.05), and Estancia (mean 
score=11.77) in the province of Iloilo, and Roxas City (mean score=11.35), in the province of 
Capiz, got the highest mean scores, while the municipalities of Cawayan (mean score=4.94) and 
Milagros (mean score=6.24) in the province of Masbate got the lowest mean scores. These results 
are reflective of the varying priorities and capacities of the different municipalities. A more 
thorough discussion of these factors is provided in the results under political challenges that affect 



































Figure 133. Mean scores for knowledge questions about the SFC, by municipality. 
 
 
The municipalities at the bottom 4 struggled with the questions on fish species banned 
during the SFC and inclusive months of the SFC. Knowledge about the types of fishes banned and 
the specific months when the SFC is implemented are important in ensuring compliance among 
the regulated groups. These findings can direct the efforts of the BFAR management and the 
LGUs, specifically on areas which they need to work in terms of IEC campaign about the SFC.  
 
Table 8 shows the overall ratings of the respondents by respondent group and by 
municipality for the knowledge questions.  Only the LGU representatives got a Good rating 
(11.37), while the rest of the respondent groups got a Fair rating. These results are indicative of 
the poor transfer of information about the SFC policy from the LGU levels to the municipal 
fisheries stakeholders involved in the SFC. 
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Table 8. Respondent's overall ratings for knowledge questions about the SFC, by respondent 
group, and by municipality. 
By respondent group Mean Rating* 
Municipal fisher 9.85 Fair 
Fish dryer 9.43 Fair 
Fish vendor/fish trader/fish broker 9.54 Fair 
LGU rep 11.37 Good 
Fish warden 10.30 Fair 
PNP-MG/PCG 9.27 Fair 
   
By municipality   
Carles 12.05 Good 
Estancia 11.77 Good 
Concepcion 10.95 Good 
Ajuy 12.05 Good 
Bantayan 10.52 Good 
Madridejos 10.20 Fair 
Cadiz City 8.55 Poor 
E.B. Magalona 10.30 Fair 
Escalante City 8.65 Poor 
Milagros 6.24 Very poor 
Cawayan 4.94 Very poor 
Roxas City 11.35 Good 
 
*Rating: Very poor (below 7.0); Poor (7.0-8.75); Fair (8.76-10.5); Good (10.51-12.25); Excellent (above 12.25) 
 
Respondents’ overall ratings by municipality show that all the study sites in Panay Island 
(Carles, Estancia, Concepcion, Ajuy, and Roxas City) have consistently earned Good ratings on 
the knowledge questions, while 2 of the study sites in the neighboring island of Negros have earned 
Poor ratings. The very poor ratings earned by the municipalities of Milagros and Cawayan in 
Masbate Island are rather expected since the enclosed area during the SFC is largely comprised by 
the municipal waters of the study sites in the provinces of Iloilo, Negros Occidental, and Cebu.  
 
Figure 14 shows the estimated marginal means of the regulated group’s overall knowledge 
about the SFC in the Visayan Sea (N=187). In general, regulated groups in the municipalities in 
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Panay Island namely: Carles, Estancia, Concepcion, Ajuy and Roxas City are more knowledgeable 
about the SFC in the Visayan Sea compared to their counterparts.  
 
 
Figure 14. Estimated marginal means of the regulated groups' overall knowledge about the SFC. 
 
Analysis of variance shows statistically significant differences in the regulated groups’ 
knowledge about the SFC in the Visayan Sea in the different municipalities (p<.05) (Table 9).  
 
 
Table 9. Analysis of variance of respondent's knowledge about the SFC in the regulated group in 
the different municipalities. 
ANOVA 
Knowledge_scores   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1018.930 11 92.630 32.716 .000 
Within Groups 495.477 175 2.831   
Total 1514.406 186    
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These findings can be attributed to the proximity of the study sites in Panay Island to the 
BFAR regional office which is located in the same island hence, these municipalities are more 
accessible to BFAR personnel when they conduct information drive on the SFC, compared to the 
municipalities in the provinces of Negros Occidental, Cebu, and Masbate. The municipalities with 
the top 4 highest scores for example, belong to the Iloilo province, while Roxas City is in the 
neighboring province of Capiz. Although some of these municipalities have island barangays 
which can only be reached by boat, most of these coastal towns are accessible by land 
transportation. The other study sites are in the islands of Negros Occidental, Cebu and Masbate. 
This might have affected BFAR’s campaign due to the distance and remoteness of these areas. It 
can also be attributed to the leadership and more vigorous fishery law enforcement in the 
municipalities in Panay Island. 
 
A non-parametric correlations test shows a positive and statistically significant correlation 
(p<.05) in the regulated groups’ knowledge about the SFC and their compliance therewith (Table 
10). However, the strength of the correlation12 is weak (rs=.269). The weak correlation between 
knowledge and compliance among the regulated respondents may be attributed to socio-economic, 
cultural and political factors which are largely influencing respondents’ decision to comply with 





12Correlation coefficient range and strength of relationship: 0.01-0.20 (Very weak); 0.21-0.40 (Weak); 0.41-0.60 
(Moderate); 0.61-0.80 (Strong); 0.80-0.99 (Very strong). 
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Spearman's rho Knowledge_scores Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .269** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .001 
N 187 156 
Compliance Correlation Coefficient .269** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 . 
N 156 156 




Perceptions of fisheries stakeholders about the SFC 
Figure 15 shows that ~65% of the respondents (N=235) agree that there is sufficient and 
accurate information in support of the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea. However, 
about 20% of the respondents do not agree with this statement. 
 
 
Figure 15. Respondents' perceptions on whether there is sufficient and accurate information in 
support of the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea. 
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At least 60% of the respondents agree that there are opportunities for consultation and 
dialogue with different stakeholders about the SFC, while 20% of them think otherwise (Figure 
16).  
 
 Figure 16. Respondents' perceptions on whether there are opportunities for consultation and 









While 30% of the respondents strongly agree that the SFC is strictly implemented in their 
respective municipalities, about 15% (N=35) said they strongly disagree with this statement 
(Figure 17). Majority of the of the 35 respondents who ‘strongly disagree’ that the SFC is 
implemented in their municipality are municipal fishers (Figure 18a) and are from the 
municipalities of Milagros and Cawayan in the province of Masbate (Figure 18b). Several 
respondents report that illegal fishing activities are still rampant in these areas, thus, the 




































Figure 18. Strongly disagree response re 'The SFC is strictly implemented in our municipality', 
a) by respondent group (top); and b) by municipality (bottom). 
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Forty percent (40%) of the respondents have a neutral stand on whether the SFC is strictly 
implemented in other municipalities, while ~20% said they strongly disagree with this statement 
(Figure 19).  
 





Figure 20. Respondents' perceptions on whether the implementation of the SFC is necessary for 




Interestingly, there is a strong agreement among respondents that the implementation of 
the SFC is necessary for the conservation of fisheries in the Visayan Sea (Figure 20). This is very 
important especially that the main purpose of the SFC is to conserve sardines, herrings and 
mackerels in the area that has been observed to be declining over the years (Armada 1999). 
 
Respondents were also asked if there is an observed increase in the catch of sardines in the 
last 5 years and at least 50% of the respondents confirmed that catch for sardines has been 
increasing in their respective municipalities (Figure 21). However, such observation may only be 
referring to the increase in catch at the end of each SFC, which is an expected trend at the beginning 
of an open season. Further, the perceived increase in the catch for sardines does not coincide with 
the results of the BACI analysis conducted to determine the effect of the SFC before and after its 
strict implementation in 2012. Results show a significant decline in the catch for sardines in the 
provinces participating in the SFC (discussed in detail in the following section). Respondents also 
note an increase in catch for S. lemuru (locally called as tuloy or Bali sardines), but not S. gibbosa 
(locally called as tabagak or Gold stripe sardines). 
 
Figure 21. Respondents' perceptions on whether there is an observed increase in the catch for 
sardines in the last 5 years. 
80 
 
In contrast, 40% of the respondents have a neutral stand when asked if there is an observed 
increase in the catch of mackerels in the last 5 years (Figure 22). Some respondents claim they do 
not catch mackerels in their areas (e.g., Milagros, E. B. Magalona, Roxas City). Also, results of 
the BACI analysis (in the following section) show an insignificant effect of the SFC on catch for 
mackerels after the strict implementation of the SFC in 2012.  
 
Figure 22. Respondents' perceptions on whether there is an observed increase in the catch for 
mackerels in the last 5 years. 
 
Although many of the respondents believe that they are benefitting from the SFC (~60%) 
(Figure 23), analysis of the socio-economic and cultural impacts of the SFC show adverse impacts, 
specifically on the regulated group’s livelihoods. The contradiction between the respondents’ 
perceptions about the SFC and the reality of its impact suggests a cognitive dissonance, which may 










Figure 24. Respondents' perceptions on whether the SFC should be continued. 
 
 
Although a majority of the respondents strongly agree that the SFC should be continued 
(Figure 24), 27% think that the SFC’s provisions should be revised. On the other hand, more than 





Figure 25. Respondents' perceptions on whether the provisions of the SFC should be revised. 
 
 
Figure 26 shows that in general, the regulated groups have relatively similar perceptions 
about the SFC in the Visayan Sea, except for respondents in Escalante City, in Negros Occidental 
and municipalities of Cawayan and Milagros, in Masbate, wherein perception scores are below 





Figure 26. Estimated marginal means of regulated group's perceptions about the SFC. 
  
Analysis of variance shows a statistically significant difference in the perceptions of 
respondents in the regulated and regulator’s group (p<.05; Table 11). The respondents int 
regulator’s group have significantly higher level of perceptions about the SFC compared to the 
respondents in the regulated group. This is rather expected because the regulated stakeholders are 
the ones affected by the SFC implemented in the Visayan Sea. 
 
Table 11. Analysis of variance in the regulated and regulator groups’                                  
perceptions about the SFC. 
ANOVA 
Perceptions   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 205.459 1 205.459 4.502 .035 
Within Groups 10588.425 232 45.640   




Interestingly, analysis of variance also shows a statistically significant difference in the 
perceptions of the regulated groups in the different municipalities (p<.05) (Table 12). These results 
are consistent with the results from the knowledge section, i.e., municipalities that earned low 
mean scores in knowledge questions about the SFC also have lower level of perceptions about the 
SFC policy. 
 
Table 12. Analysis of variance of regulated group's perceptions about the SFC. 
ANOVA 
Perceptions   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3834.067 11 348.552 11.506 .000 
Within Groups 5270.879 174 30.292   
Total 9104.946 185    
 
 
Furthermore, there is a moderate correlation between the regulated groups’ perceptions 
about, and compliance with, the SFC in the Visayan Sea (rs=.511). The correlation is statistically 
significant at 0.01 level (p=.000; Table 13). Similar to the findings in the knowledge and 
compliance analysis, the weak correlation between the regulated group’s perceptions about the 
SFC and their compliance therewith, is affected by myriad factors that have a more direct impact 





Table 13. Correlations test on the regulated group's perceptions about,                                         
and compliance with, the SFC. 
Correlations 
 Perceptions Compliance 
Spearman's rho Perceptions Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .511** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 186 156 
Compliance Correlation Coefficient .511** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 156 156 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Figure 27 shows the words that most respondents associate with the SFC in the Visayan 
Sea. While respondents think about the SFC in a positive light because they associate it with 
increase in fish stocks (11%) and fish spawning (5%), respondents cited more words that have 
negative connotations such as poor (12%), less fish supply (5%), limited/scarcity (8%), loan (4%), 
arrest (4%), arrest (4%), no fishing (4%), high fish price (3%), no/less income (4%), hunger (3%), 
limitation (4%), and ban/prohibited (2%). Some respondents also associate the SFC in the Visayan 
Sea with neutral words such as livelihood/alternative livelihood (5%), abide (3%), budget (2%) 
















































Others (less income, fish growth, rest, protection, 




Socio-economic and cultural impacts of the SFC in the Visayan Sea 
 
Introduction 
Resource managers are often under extreme time pressure to implement regulations and 
political pressure to satisfy diverse constituents, causing them to focus on a specific management 
element even though the problem may require a multi-faceted approach (Degnbol et al. 2005). 
This can be attributed to the great variety of types of information they deal with in their work and 
their frequently having to rely on incomplete data when making decisions affecting the livelihoods 
of many people. In the process, they become instrumental not only in instituting and legitimizing 
certain conditions that lead to inequality in the society, but also in causing conflict over natural 
resources (Johnston 1995; Bennett et al. 2001; Tan-Mullins 2007; Fabinyi 2015) 
 
Several anthropological studies that focus on fisheries and environmental management 
highlight how socio-economic, cultural, and political systems affect resource management and 
development outcomes and vice versa (Johnston 1995; McCay et al. 1995; Griffith 1999; 
Polioudakis and Polioudakis 2000; Russell and Alexander 2000; Griffith and Valdés-Pizzini 2002; 
Acheson 2006; Pinkerton and Edwards 2009; Cruz-Torres 2012; Eder 2012; Fabinyi 2012; Fabinyi 
et al. 2015; Grace-McCaskey 2018; Griffith 2018). For example, Johnston (1995) explains that 
efforts to protect a ‘healthy environment’ may in some cases result in human rights abuse and may 
ultimately fail to meet original environmental integrity objectives if there is adverse social 
response. Conversely, focusing on human rights needs alone, including the right to development, 
while ignoring the environmental context may serve as a temporary intervention rather than a long-
term solution. According to Johnston (1995), this conundrum underscores the need for analyses 
that consider the political, economic, and cultural factors shaping and at times distorting efforts to 
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respond to human environmental crises. In his book entitled “The Estuary’s Gift’, Griffith (1999) 
discusses how development along the Mid-Atlantic Coast not only affects watermen lifeways and 
fishing families but also reduces the cultural and biological diversity in the area because 
development disturbs the environmental balance and erodes the most intimate understandings of 
coastal ecosystems. 
 
In fisheries management, the recognition and appreciation of the importance of these 
critical factors are part of what McCay (2000) refers to as ‘sea changes’, which are represented 
through the concepts of co-management (e.g., democratization of fisheries management), 
community (e.g., place, interest, shared identities, histories and futures, etc.), chaos (e.g., problem 
of knowledge and uncertainty about the environment), and commodification (e.g., changes in 
property rights and other institutions that enable open market forces to operate towards improved 
efficiency). Most of the anthropological scholarship in fisheries, if not all,  share a common goal 
of gaining deeper understanding of the relationship of local people with their coastal environment 
(e.g., access, control, and utilization of resources, among others) as this relationship gets entangled 
in the larger web of cultural, socio-economic and political systems, and the outcomes of such 
interactions (Acheson 1979, 1981, 1987; McCay1980; Durrenberger 1992; McCay et al. 1995).  
 
Despite the recognition of the importance of balancing social and ecological goals, a 
biocentric approach to fishery management is still apparent in the Philippines. The current fishery 
management framework is not cognizant of the varying needs and capacities of different 
stakeholders in the fisheries sector, resulting in differential effects of the SFC implemented in the 
Visayan Sea. While the BFAR is optimistic about the beneficial effects of this conservation 
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measure (DA-BFAR 2013; Ramos 2014), there are varying perceptions about such a claim because 
empirical evidence is lacking. The consequences of resource management policy on communities 
are not usually included explicitly under the rubric of resource management and while economists 
are quick to suggest positive multiplier effects, they seldom discuss the negative multiplier effects 
of policies that have measurable costs (King and Durrenberger 2000). It is important to address 
the uncertainty in the projected impacts of a closure not only to reliably compare alternatives, but 
also to illuminate the impacts of a closure (Farmer et al. 2016). Further, understanding the 
intricacies of regulations is necessary in achieving that, particularly in determining their 
cumulative effects (Cheuvront et al. 2005). Effective fishery management entails understanding 
of its diverse, complex and dynamic features, hence the motivation for this study. 
 
 
Socio-economic impacts of the SFC 
Livelihood 
The livelihoods of 59.1% of the respondents (N=235) are affected by the SFC implemented 
in the Visayan Sea.  Analysis per respondent group shows that the livelihood of 71.8% of the 
municipal fishers (N=117), 80% of the fish dryers (N=35), and 74.3% of the fish vendors/fish 





Figure 28. Responses re ‘Is your livelihood affected by the SFC?’, by respondent group. 
 
 
When respondents were asked how the SFC affects their livelihoods, predominant answers 
include: no/limited/low fish catch or fish supply (N=63); no/scarce income, scarcity, no 
livelihood/alternative livelihood (N=76); and stop/limited fishing (N=38) (Figure 29). These 
responses are interrelated. Since the majority of the affected respondents rely on fishing or fishing-
related activities for their livelihood, a 3-month fishing ban evidently restricts their fishing 
activities and thus, results in lower fish catch or sales, especially for those whose target species are 
sardines and mackerels and do not have resources to shift to other fishing gears. This has a ripple 
effect on their income and can often result in scarcity. For example, sardines are the target species 
of fishers in Barangays Nasidman and Barrido in Ajuy, in Iloilo Province. There are reports of 
food shortage in these fishing communities during the 3-month fishing ban because they abide by 
the SFC religiously. It is important to note that small pelagic fishes, such sardines and mackerels, 
serve as a main source of inexpensive animal protein, especially for the poor and lower-income 























in the Philippines is 40 kg/year or 109 grams/day; fish and fishery products constitute 12.8% of 
the total food intake of Filipinos (Lamarca 2017). 
 
Figure 29. Cited effects of the SFC on respondents’ livelihoods; N=139. 
  
The regulated groups were also asked to identify lean and peak months in a year to see 
periods of stress. The municipal fishers have a 100% response rate to this question, but only 37% 
of the Fish dryers (N=13) and 60% of the fish vendors/fish traders/fish brokers (N=21) responded. 
Hence, some of the analyses in this chapter focuses mainly on the Municipal fishers.  
 
Figure 30 shows that lean months for the municipal fishers are January, February, and 
December which coincide with the SFC. For the fish vendors/fish traders/fish brokers, lean months 
are March, April, and May which coincide with the end of school year and start of summer. Unlike 
the municipal fishers who are directly impacted by the fishing ban during the identified lean 
months, the fish vendors/fish dryers/fish brokers have other variety of fish which they can sell 
during this period. Also, fish vendors/fish dryers/fish brokers respondents report that the high 
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temperature during summer months affects the overall fish catch from the sea, resulting in lower 
volumes of fish landed. This might explain the difference in the lean period identified by the 2 
groups. 
 




On the other hand, peak months are August, September and October for municipal fishers 
and October, November and December for fish vendors/fish traders/fish brokers (Figure 31). 
According to the fish vendors/fish traders/fish brokers, although there is a low supply of fishing 
during this period, they can command a better price for the fishes they sell which is favorable to 
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Figure 31. Identified peak months by the regulated group. 
 
On the average, municipal fishers go fishing for 15 days during the lean months while 
during peak season, they fish for an average of 26 days. Some respondents report that they only 
stop fishing during full moon and when the weather conditions are not favorable. In terms of 
volume of catch, 76.1% of the municipal fishers (N=117) catch between 1-10 kgs per day only 
during the lean season (Figure 32). Further analysis shows that the median catch for municipal 
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Figure 32. Municipal fisher’s catch estimates (kg/day) during lean and peak months. 
 
While municipal fishers’ catch (i.e., fishers catching over 100 kgs/day) dramatically 
increases during the peak season, 36.5% of the municipal fishers remain at the 1-10 kgs/day catch 
range (Figure 32). These findings can be attributed to the small boat capacity of the municipal 
fishers. Data shows that while 87.2% of the municipal fishers have motorized boats, the majority 
of these boats have a 1-3-person capacity which indicates the limited capacity of municipal fishers. 
A key informant explains the big difference between commercial and municipal fishers’ 
operations: 
“The catch of commercial fishers is automatically canned in canning factories, 
while the small fishers only have 10 pcs of ice. It is very sad. Small (municipal) 
fishers only aim for a small catch and goes home. They cannot catch more than 
their gear capacity because their nets will be damaged. Hence, it is sustainable 
fishing.” [Key informant, NGA] 
 
 
Municipal fishers have smaller boats that do not have on-board refrigeration; hence, they 
cannot stay out fishing for longer periods of time and are compelled to do ‘day trips’ so that they 



















Municipal fishers' catch estimates (kg/day) during lean 
(Jan, Feb, Dec) and peak (Aug, Sep, Oct) months
Jan, Feb, Dec Aug, Sep, Oct
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compared to the commercial fishers, who have the resources to stay at sea. McGoodwin (2001) 
reports that the prevailing fishing technologies used in traditional small-scale fishing communities 
emerge from extensive cumulative experience that is mediated by limitations in what they can 




Median income for the municipal fishers during lean months is PhP 475.00/day ($9.5) and 
PhP 6,400/day ($128/day) during peak months. Analysis also shows that during the lean months, 
36.8% (N=43) of the municipal fishers are earning below the PhP 275.00 (~$5.5) minimum wage 
set by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE 2019) for Agriculture/Non-plantation 
category for Regions V-Bicol and VI-Western Visayas (Figure 33). The other 31.6% of the 
municipal fishers are earning between PhP 276-1,000 ($5-20) per day.  
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Municipal fishers' estimated income (PhP/day) 
during Lean months; N=117.
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According to the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), a family of 5 needs no less than 
PhP 7,337 ($146.74) per month [or PhP 245 (~$5) per day], on the average, to meet the family’s 
basic food needs. But to meet both basic food and non-food needs, a family of 5 needs no less than 
PhP 10,481 ($209.62) per month [or PhP 349 (~$7) per day], on the average (PSA 2019). Analysis 
shows that 30 of the 43 municipal fishers who are earning below the minimum wage (~$5.5/day) 
during lean months have a family of 4-6, and 24 of them have no secondary source of livelihood. 
During peak season, 62.4 % of the municipal fishers in general, earn more than PhP 3,000 (~$60) 
per day, while the rest of the respondents reported that their daily income comparatively increases 
during this period (Figure 34). This peak income can clearly compensate for the poor income of 
municipal fishers during the lean months. Some municipal fishers are accustomed with the 
seasonality of fishing and save in anticipation of the lean months.  
 
 
Figure 34. Municipal fisher’s estimated income (PhP/day) during peak months. 
 
McGoodwin (2001) underscores the importance of maintaining occupational pluralism in 
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associated with fishing activities. Because of the unpredictability of the sea, small-scale fishers 
need other means of livelihood which they can they turn to when fishing activities are not 




Eighty percent (80%) of the respondents whose livelihoods are affected by the SFC 
(N=139) said they get less income during the SFC period which has negative implications on their 
household budget. This results in a shortage not only in terms of basic needs like food, but their 
children’s schooling is affected as well, because they do not have enough money for school fees, 
allowance, and fare. Respondents who reported no or minimal effect of the SFC on their household 
(8%) either have other sources of livelihood, savings, or are receiving financial assistance from 
their working children (Figure 35).  
 
 
Figure 35. Cited effects of the SFC in the households. 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
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How does the SFC affect your household?, N=139.
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Since small-scale fishers and others working in fisheries activities often experience periods 
without incomes, they are more likely to find temporary support from their close kinsmen than 
from more socially distant persons (McGoodwin 2001), a practice that is commonplace in the 
Filipino culture because of close-knit family ties. In addition, respondents reported frequent fights 
in the household because there is no money and household members easily get irritated because 
there is no food. 
 
Cultural impacts of the SFC 
A majority of the respondents (80.9%) said there are no cultural beliefs and practices in 
their municipality that are affected by the SFC. Some respondents said people have got used to the 
SFC that they regard it as part of the norm, and thus, embedded in the local culture. On the other 
hand, 16.6% of the respondents said that traditional holidays (e.g., Barangay and Town Fiesta, 
Christmas and New Year), and events (e.g., birthday) are affected because they coincide with the 
SFC period (Figure 36).  
 
 






















CULTURAL BELIEFS AND PRACTICES
Cultural beliefs and practices affected by the SFC; N=39.
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Almost every province and city/municipality in the Philippines celebrates different kinds 
of Fiesta, a practice inherited from the Spaniards after more than 300 years of colonization under 
Spain and has since been embedded in the Filipino tradition. Most of these festivities have religious 
origin, i.e., honoring the patron saint of a city/municipality or province, and are comprised of a 
series of activities such as holding a mass, novena, grand parade, beauty pageants, processions, 
and other activities that bring the members of the community together to express gratitude to God 
(Ethnic Groups of the Philippines 2019). Filipinos, especially those living in provincial areas, go 
out to celebrate this festivity to ensure comfort in the coming year, believing that the more they 
spend, the more returns they will obtain. Filipinos living abroad come home to celebrate this 
momentous event with their families whom they have not seen for a long time. The religious 
content of a festival (e.g., praying to St. Peter and St. Nicholas who are the patron saints of 
fishermen and seafarers) also recognizes the risks, uncertainties, and dangers that accompany 
fishing activities, thereby helping seafarers cope with the adversities they often face (McGoodwin 
2001). Hence, Fiesta is an important traditional activity to many Filipinos because it reflects 
Filipino religions and faith which are essential part of the Filipino society owing to Spanish 
influence. The Philippines is the only Christian country in Asia; at least 80% of its population 
practice Roman Catholic.  
 
Similarly, Christmas and New Year’s Eve are some of the biggest yearly traditions that 
many Filipinos look forward to celebrating. In fact, Christmas season in the Philippines starts as 
early as September 1st, which marks the start of decorating houses and plazas with many Parol 
(Christmas lanterns) and Christmas lights. Filipinos also celebrate a midnight meal called Media 
Noche on the eve of the New Year. Households prepare a sumptuous meal to share with their 
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families; others prepare 12 different kinds of fruits with circular shapes and wear clothes with 
polka dots which symbolize money. Since celebration of these events coincide with the 
implementation period of the SFC, some of the affected fisheries stakeholders are not able to 
participate in these traditional events due to budget shortage.  
 
Respondents also mentioned that activities like beach seining, ring net fishing, drift gillnet, 
and fish aggregating device (locally called as payao), which they consider as traditional fishing 
practices, are affected by the SFC. Despite these claims, the temporary nature of the SFC allows 
these traditional fishing practices to persist, especially that some of these fishing methods are very 
efficient in catching fishes such that the promise of a bountiful catch during the open season can 
offset the losses incurred during the SFC.  
 
According to McGoodwin (2001), fisheries activities in most small-scale fishing 
communities support a significant portion of the local population. Thus, the many fishing 
occupations that many community members pursue are interwoven through the whole fabric of the 
community’s local culture. Further, fishing technologies (and practices) that have been long used 
in highly traditional fishing communities encode the community’s accumulated experience in 
fisheries in a similar way that an organism’s genes encode its evolutionary development and 
adaptive success. In this light, fishing technology requires not only the material items, but also the 
technical knowledge on how such materials are acquired, used and maintained, which ultimately 




Furthermore, fishing technologies (and associated items) used in small-scale fishing 
communities are often important cultural symbols which figure importantly in the fishers’ and 
community’s cultural identity (McGoodwin 2001). For example, the Tikab-tikab Festival 
recognizes and celebrates the importance of scallops to the people of Carles, Iloilo. Another 
example is the Panagat Festival in Estancia, Iloilo which showcases the living creatures under the 
sea through a tribal dance. In their book entitled ‘Fishers at Work, Workers at Sea’, Griffith and 
Valdés Pizzini (2002) explain that people who rely on natural resources for some or most of their 
survival (e.g., fishers, hunters, gatherers, etc.) gain much satisfaction from these activities beyond 
the tangible benefits (i.e., cash, food) they provide. Most importantly, these activities often lie at 
the core of small-scale producer’s identities such that they deliberately strive to maintain and 
reproduce these ways of life to preserve and reproduce their cultural heritage (Griffith and Valdés 
Pizzini 2002). In recent years, fisheries managers have begun to focus more on the social aspects 
and functions of fisheries because of the realization that the viability of fisheries management 
systems, and fishers’ adherence to the rules, depend largely on social and cultural aspects and to a 
lesser degree on biological and economic aspects of fishing (Schmidt 2003).  
 
Respondents also expressed that their access to their traditional fishing areas are restricted, 
forcing them to fish farther out to the sea and increasing their fuel expenses and fishing time. Some 
respondents said some of the neighboring municipalities allow them to fish in their municipal 
waters, depending on certain arrangements such as acquisition of fishing permit from the LGU or 




Small-scale fishers usually assert their rights to certain marine resources based on locally 
developed beliefs and practices which they have established for managing the fisheries they utilize 
(McGoodwin 2001).  As one key informant expressed: 
“We (small fishers) are the true protectors of our fisheries because since then, we 
do sustainable fishing through our simple fishing gears and methods. We only 
catch based on our capacity; we do not have surplus catch.  We only get just 
enough to have a decent living. The problem is our fishing ground is becoming 
smaller and smaller…” [Municipal fisher, NGA] 
 
Going out far to the sea poses additional risks to municipal fishers because of the significant 
hazards that the marine environment presents not only to their success but also safety. According 
to McGoodwin (2001), small-scale fishers are seldom equipped with modern lifesaving gear such 
as life jackets or survival suits, and many do not have access to timely weather advisories or 
effective communications, nor they can count on rescue services should they run into danger while 
at sea. This holds true with most of the municipal fishers in the Visayan Sea (and in the rest of the 
country) as they are not required by the government to equip their boats with life vests and global 
positioning system (GPS) device. While technologies that provide weather advisories and rescue 
services have become a common commodity, such as smart phones, municipal fishers are generally 
poor, thus, most them do not have access to such sophisticated technologies.   
 
 
Coping mechanisms of affected stakeholders 
Figure 37 shows the different mechanisms employed by the affected fisheries stakeholders 
(N=139) to cope with the impacts of the SFC. Thirty-eight percent (38%) of the affected 
respondents look for land-based alternative livelihoods such as farm work (e.g., cutting, weeding, 
planting and harvesting); selling fruits, vegetables and root crops; service-oriented occupations 
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(e.g., labor in fishponds, construction, carpentry, laundry, cleaning, baby-sitting, fetching water 
for other people); livestock farming; small-scale business ventures (selling different goods, 
cafeteria, vending cooked food, convenience store, operating a computer shop); and transport 
services (operating a pump boat, pedicab, tricycle), among others.  
 
 
Figure 37. Cited coping strategies to impacts of SFC. 
 
Thirty-seven percent (37%) of the respondents said they shift to using other fishing gears, 
or to catching or selling of other fish species. This is very typical of small-scale fishers in tropical 
regions like the Philippines due to the multi-species fishery and variety of fishing gears they use; 
a certain fishing gear may lay idle for certain period when the target species is not available. 
Affected respondents also reported adjusting to the situation by strategizing, budgeting, being 
thrift, and preparing for the SFC by saving some money and investing in other ventures like poultry 
(23%). Below are some of the interview excerpts on the respondents’ coping strategies in response 
to the impacts of the SFC in the Visayan Sea:  
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104 
 
“If catch is good in other areas, we transfer there.” [Fish dryer, Carles, Iloilo] 
 
“Since prohibited fishes cannot be sold (in the market), we barter them with other 
variety of fish or with rice or vegetables in the mountains.” [Municipal fisher, 
Concepcion, Iloilo] 
 
According to Spoehr (1984), the symbiotic relationship between fishers and farmers 
bartering their produce has a respectable antiquity in the Philippines and in Southeast Asia. This 
historical relationship between fishers and farmers stems from the monsoon climatic pattern that 
is characteristic of Southeast Asia. Fishing may be impossible during certain periods of the year 
and fishers may turn to other economic activities like farming. Similarly, farmers who lack 
irrigation and rely solely on rainfall for their crops, or during off-season in the farm, may turn to 
fishing if they are close to the coast. 
  
Municipal fishers also target other species during the SFC, thus shifting fishing pressure to 
other aquatic species (e.g., seashells, crabs and squids). While some of these species have higher 
market value (e.g., crabs and squids), catch for these species are relatively lower compared to catch 
for sardines and mackerels because municipal fishers claim that their operations are small, and 
they only catch them as an alternative source of income and food. In the case of the fish 
vendors/fish traders/fish brokers, they said they buy fish from other areas and sell these in their 
municipality.  
 
In a study by Guanco et al. (2009) in the Visayan Sea, they note overfishing in the area as 
shown in the catch of Danish seine and otter trawl that was comprised predominantly by squids, 
indicating a shift in species composition in the Visayan Sea, thus, a shift in fishing pressure to 
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other species.  In his book, Robbins (2012) discusses how enclosures commonly force fishing 
effort into less productive areas or displace groups that fish in different areas into shared 
management areas, causing competition in reduced ranges and exacerbating rather than reducing 
overfishing. For seasonal closures, like the SFC in the Visayan Sea, another possible effect could 
be a change in fishing seasonality in a way that does not lower the fishing effort when integrated 
across the year. One sure effect of the SFC in the Visayan Sea though, is its contribution to the 
marginalization of the municipal fishers. Robbins (2012) defines marginalization as a process 
whereby politically and socially (disempowered) people are pushed into ecologically marginal 
(vulnerable and unstable) spaces and economically marginal (dependent and narrowly adaptable) 
social positions, resulting in their increasing demands on the marginal (increasingly limited) 
productivity of ecosystems. As a result, the marginalized fishers tend to increase their efforts on 
the resource-base, in this case, either by racing to fish before or after the SFC as observed by the 
BFAR management in the last couple of years:  
“But these last few years (2016-2017), we encountered problems again with the 
closed season implementation. This time, it is the LGUs that became our problem 




This was corroborated by a key informant from an NGA: 
“What appears to be happening now is after the closed season, it is like being on 
diet, 1 or 2 days after opening, they double or triple their effort’….’Even the 
fishers admit that. One way of getting ahead is to use powerful gears.”  [Key 
informant, NGA] 
 
In some cases, household dynamics also change when the wife or other members of the 
household take the lead in generating income for the family. Eder (2012) notes that households in 
the coastal zone are accustomed to exploiting different economic activities simultaneously and in 
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ways that involve a complex interdependence of the labor of the male and female coheads. But 
women in small-scale fishing communities generally spend more of their time in the community 
compared to their male counterparts, who are always at sea to work; thus, women often develop 
more richly ramified local socio-economic networks (McGoodwin 2001). As such, the different 
activities of women have a more direct bearing on the welfare of the family as they generally look 
after all the members of the household as well (Bagsit and Jimenez 2012). For example, Eder 
(2012) highlights that whereas the income-generating activities of men in coastal Philippine 
communities mostly involve fishing (and other supplemental livelihoods), women may pursue a 
wide variety of activities in addition to their housekeeping and childrearing responsibilities, to 
generate income for the household. The multiple roles which women usually play in small-scale 
fishing communities underscore their fundamental importance not only in their communities’ 
social and economic spheres (McGoodwin 2001). This is evident in some of the households 
affected by the SFC.  
“(My) wife looks for a job to augment income then stops working again when 
fishing season starts.”  [Municipal fisher, Carles, Iloilo] 
 
 
“Wife sells different goods to add to income.” [Municipal fisher, Estancia, Iloilo] 
 
“Wife works on the side as babysitter.” [Municipal fisher, Concepcion, Iloilo] 
 
“Wife helps in the household expenses.” [Fish trader, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental] 
 




Griffith and Valdés Pizzini (2002) call these odd jobs described above as chiripas, which 
is a colloquial term for casual, varied and temporary work that is characterized by varying work 
schedules and pay. But like Griffith and Valdés Pizzini’s (2002) observations, these odd jobs are 
not ‘odd’ at all but are central to many working households’ strategies to survive. In addition, 
respondents report that other members of fishing households are expected to work together 
cooperatively to make ends meet and for the mutual benefit of the rest of the household members. 
According to a Fish dryer: 
“Household members who have work opportunity in a farm can work.” [Fish 
dryer, Carles, Iloilo] 
 
“We receive financial support from our children.” [Municipal fisher, Estancia, 
Iloilo] 
 
“Children with work give financial assistance for our medicine and household 
expenses.” [Fish dryer, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental] 
 
“We ask for financial assistance from our children.” [Fish dryer, Carles, Iloilo] 
 
According to respondents, they also resort to loans to cover for their families’ basic needs 
during periods of scarcity. 
“Take loans even if the interest is very high.” [Fish dryer, Escalante City, Negros 
Occidental] 
 
“Take loans to pay for school fees and food.” [Fish trader, Escalante City, Negros 
Occidental] 
 
“Loan rice and viand at a convenience store and pay when there is fishing again.” 




“Take loans from financer and lending entities and pay on open season.”  
[Municipal fisher, E.B. Magalona, Negros Occidental] 
 
In general, fishers and farmers have the highest registered incidence of poverty in the 
Philippines at 34% among the basic sectors (PSA 2017). Most of the poor engaged in fishing and 
farming live in rural areas (Dy-Liacco 2014; IFAD 2016), which are not only lagging in terms of 
economic growth, but also have higher rates of underemployment. This can be partly attributed to 
limited access to productive capital, knowledge, technology, and markets of rural people (IFAD 
2016). In a typical fishing community, for example, a municipal fisher’s catch ends up either 
peddled within or in the neighboring community by the fisher’s wife and/or children or bought by 
a known buyer in the community at a low price. Idemne et al. (unp.) describes the fisheries value 
chain in coastal communities in Antique, Philippines, wherein the local traders serve as the primary 
financiers and buyers at the same time, while municipal fishers with non-motorized boats (banca) 
serve as the “captured” supplier of the fish. These financiers practically pay for everything from 
the mortgage of the fishing boat, fuel costs, and fishing gears to the purchase of fresh bait for the 
target pelagic and demersal species. The fisher’s daily catch goes directly to financiers and they 
handle the marketing of the catch, which is usually sold in the public market or the neighboring 
towns. The fisher, who takes care of the maintenance of the fishing boat and fishing gears, and 
who goes out to the sea every day to fish, receives only a percentage of his catch value from the 
financier. These practices are in some way reflected in the relationship between the regulated 
groups in the Visayan Sea wherein fishing boat operators reported supporting their workers and 
their families so that they will not leave them. A fish broker describes a special relationship that 
exists between loyal fisher clients and fish traders and fish brokers: 
“Loyal fishers take loans from us to buy rice and fuel for their fishing boats.”  
[Fish broker, Madridejos, Cebu] 
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A study by Andriesse (2017) emphasizes the importance of global value chain governance 
in the Philippine agriculture and aquaculture business to ensure cooperation among actors within 
a node (e.g., farmers and fishers) and actors at different nodes (e.g., farmers and fishers, 
intermediaries, processors), especially that intermediaries, who are often the dominant players, are 
not inclined to respond to impoverished smallholders. This situation becomes more difficult in the 
municipalities included in the SFC in the Visayan Sea as findings of this study show lack of 
alternative livelihoods for the affected fisheries stakeholders during the 3-month SFC in the 
Visayan Sea. In a study which looks at the role of gender in the reduction of fishing effort in the 
coastal Philippines, Eder (2012) reports that one important reason for project failure has been the 
lack of alternative income-generating activities for fishers whose fishing incomes suffer due to 
coastal resource management project measures and who are consequently reluctant to cooperate 
with project implementers and their goals. 
 
What is remarkable in this case, however, is that some respondents rise to the occasion and 
help their workers and their families tread through the SFC until the open season begins by 
providing loans or temporary work (e.g., net and boat repair, including meals during work). In 
many small-scale fishing communities, affluent community members such as food merchants, boat 
owners, fish brokers, middlemen, and businessmen, often extend economic protections which are 
analogous to business insurance (McGoodwin 2001). However, because of the high risks and 
uncertainty associated with fishing activities, such protection often comes with a hefty price and 
normally requires the fishers to sell their catches at predetermined prices and only to certain buyers. 
This situation traps the marginal fishers in a vicious cycle of dependency, and thus, economic 
marginality. A municipal fisher explains: 
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“During open season, the fishers can no longer return to fishing because they have 
sold everything they own, and they have incurred debts during the closed season. 
The open season is a time for them to pay for their debts and when the closed 
season comes again, the same cycle happens.” [Municipal fisher, Estancia, Iloilo] 
 
Interestingly, 10.8% of the affected respondents said they take their chance and continue 
to fish or sell prohibited fish species covertly because they need to survive (Figure 37). This is 
rather expected especially that ~79% the respondents in the regulated group (N=187) reported that 
at least 80% of their income is generated from fishing or fishing related activity (Figure 38). Fifty-
one percent of the affected fisheries stakeholders (N=139) have secondary source of livelihood.  
 
 
Figure 38. Percent (%) of income of regulated group from fishing or fishing-related activity. 
 
Only 87 of the 187 regulated respondents (~47%) have secondary livelihoods. Figure 39 
shows that fishery-related activities are the most common secondary source of income cited by 
these respondents (36%). These include hook and line fishing, crab and squid fishing, shrimping, 

















interesting finding of this is study is that municipal fishers consider participation in trawling or 
purse seining operations as secondary livelihoods, when their primary fishing activity is 
constrained. This suggests a change in the composition of the municipal and commercial fishing 
sectors in certain times of the year.  
 
 
Figure 39. Secondary livelihoods of respondents. 
 
In a study by Salayo et al. (2008) that examines various approaches in managing excess 
fishing capacity in small-scale fisheries in Southeast Asia, they have found that fishers choose to 
remain fishing as this activity is a way of life for them and any other job will not be as 
psychologically gratifying (Salayo et al. 2008). According to Thomson (1984), to be a fisherman 
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Secondary livelihoods of respondents; N=87.
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is not just for the sake of earning money, but to commence a life career - and not just a life career, 
but for him the only logical career in life. Thereafter his experiences and companionships within 
the industry will further cement him into the fishing fraternity. Findings of a study led by the 
University of East Anglia (2012) also show that fishers are unwilling to stop fishing even when it 
would be an economically rational decision because they often find occupational attachment, job 
satisfaction, family tradition, culture, and a sense of identity with this vocation. Thomson (1984) 
further stated that for a fisherman to leave the industry is a traumatic step, and most traditional 
fishermen will leave the sea only if obliged to do so by reasons of ill health or severe economic 
hardship. For other fishers, new livelihoods should provide an income that is at least equal to what 
they are getting from fishing for them to consider that as an option (Salayo et al. 2008; Slater et 
al. 2013). In the Philippines, government funding for livelihoods is limited and opportunities 
outside the fishery are lacking (Muallil et al. 2013). Interview results corroborate the findings of 
Muallil et al. (2013); regulated respondents report the lack of opportunities for other livelihoods. 
Further, the majority of the respondents in the regulated group are between 41-60 years old, and 
have attained High school level of education, which further limits their occupational prospects 
outside the fishing industry. 
 
Other secondary livelihoods cited by the respondents are business (e.g., convenience store, 
food vending, eatery, buy and sell of salt, computer shop, etc.); farming-related activities (e.g., 
farming of corn, rice and sugarcane, milling, rice trading, harvesting of coconut, spraying 
pesticides on a mango farm, etc.); livestock farming (e.g., hog, duck and poultry, tends cows); 
transport services (e.g., drive passenger vehicles, motorcycle, pedicab; others use their boats for 
tourism activities); services (e.g., carpentry, construction, labor, glasswork, work for other people). 
113 
 
The other respondents either receive financial support from their family members from domestic 
and abroad or receive salary as a Barangay Captain, Barangay Secretary or Barangay Councilor. 
 
These results are similar to the findings of Eder’s 2003 study in the Philippines wherein he 
observed that fishing is alternated with farming in many net-fishing oriented households in the 
Visayas region. According to Eder (2003), while some fishing households continue to fish year-
round and experience reduced catch and thus, income, many others seek alternative employment 
in the agricultural economy. Further, Muallil et al. (2013) makes the case that food security is a 
critical consideration when introducing more traditional fishing controls, such as closed seasons 
and no-take areas.  The type of alternative livelihood is the most important factor influencing 
fishing effort, and employment in alternative occupations that can provide for immediate food or 
cash needs are to be preferred above those that require longer-term investments to realize benefits 
(Muallil et al. 2012). Similar concerns were raised by many respondents as SFC is synonymous to 
scarcity, especially to the marginal fishers. As one of respondents expressed: 
“While fishers appreciate livelihood programs, they also appeal that they would 
be given more immediate assistance like rice allowance for the 3-month period. 
Livelihood projects like hog-raising does not only takes time to reap the benefits 
but also entails cost on feeds.” [Key informant, NGA] 
 
Respondents were asked if there are alternative livelihoods provided by GAs or NGAs 
during the SFC; of the 235 respondents, 88.5% said ‘No’ and only 8.9% said ‘Yes’.  However, 
none of the alternative livelihood identified by the respondents were specific to the SFC; they were 
either given as aid after a calamity or generic programs of the LGU. The other respondents were 
either not sure about the kind of livelihoods given or they have no answer (Table 14). Despite this, 
9 of the 21 respondents said these livelihoods help augment their income. 
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Table 14. Cited alternative livelihood programs by the respondents. 
Livelihood N 
Milkfish (Bangus) fishpond (cannot identify the organization) 1 
Fish drying 1 
Fish processing, banana cracker, seaweeds farming (ADRA); Seaweeds 
farming (I-Code) 
1 
Fishing net (for mackerels) from LGU 1 
Fishing supply through Association (Save the Children); fish net from 
(Christian Aid; after Yolanda) 
1 
Floating oyster (talabahan) raft given after Yolanda (FAO) 1 
Gear swapping of Danish seine (hulbot-hulbot) to other gears (BFAR 
program through LGUs)  
1 
Assistance in the form of food packs (LGU in collaboration with DSWD); 
Projects to fisherfolk associations (e.g. oyster culture) (DA); Assistance to 
those affected (usually sugarcane workers) by the dead season "tiempos 
muertos’ (LGU) 
1 
Mangrove planting (LGU-DA) 1 
Not sure what livelihood (LGU) 1 
Pedicab distribution in barangay (LGU) 1 
Rice distribution 1 
Seaweeds farming, abalone shells culture, scallop (BFAR and LGU) 1 
Seaweeds planting (LGU-DA) 1 
Seaweeds, mariculture (ZSL) 1 
Swap/change from fine mesh net (e.g., ‘pangbulao’ at least 3cm) (LGU) 1 
Tourism (tour guide, floating cottage) (LGU) 1 
Unspecified livelihood related to shifting to other gears (BFAR) 1 




In developing and promoting alternative livelihood options for the community, Pomeroy 
and Carlos (1997) emphasize the importance of consultation with the community members on their 
preferred types of projects, and training of fishers and household members on cooperatives and 
entrepreneurship for alternative livelihoods to ensure that alternative programs match with the site 
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where they will be introduced and the preferences and skills of the recipients. This concern was 
brought up by participants of the FGs conducted in Bantayan, Cebu, and Carles, Iloilo: 
“They gave seaweeds (‘Guso’) for farming, but it is not feasible here because of 
the southwest monsoon (‘Habagat’) and because of the (strong) current.  The 
ocean is hot; the seaweed got ‘ice-ice’ (disease). In the islands, it (seaweeds 
farming) is possible…...We prefer different fishing nets and fishing gears (as 




“Make sure that the alternative (livelihood) being given are also used; because 
what happens is, they sell the gears, e.g. for seaweeds projects, they sell the gears 
and declare them as losses. They sell it because they do not like that livelihood.” 
[Focus Group, Carles, Iloilo] 
 
  
 According to Bisack and Das (2015), a closure may be the preferred policy instrument for 
the regulator while the individual being regulated may prefer gear modifications allowing them 
continued fishing in the enclosed area. This has been constantly expressed by the respondents 
during the interviews and FGs; they said they are fine with the SFC implementation as long as 
they are provided with alternative fishing gears so that they can continue fishing and support their 
families. The SFC in the Visayan Sea is particularly tricky because it is temporary, i.e., the 3-
month fishing ban is too long to persist without income but not too long enough for fishers to 
become resettled in a new livelihood before fishing re-opens again. This situation could cause 























































































































































































































































































































Figure 40 shows the top 10 problems identified by the respondents during different months 
of the year. Interestingly, while the SFC is one of the major problems identified by the respondents 
from November to February, illegal fishing is a consistent problem faced by coastal communities 
all year long. 
 
Respondents expressed that conservation efforts by the government are futile if illegal 
fishing practices persist. FG participants identified illegal fishing as an obstacle in achieving the 
objectives of the SFC. Illegal fishing was a recurring topic discussed by the participants during the 
FGs: 
“We do not think the objectives of the closed season are met because there are 
still illegal fishing gears operating within municipal waters like ‘sensoro’ (seine 
net) and ‘tangkal’ (stationary lift nets) which use fine mesh nets. Why do they 
allow these fishing gears to continue operating?” [FG, Estancia, Iloilo] 
 
“Yes (the objectives of the SFC will be met), if the illegal fishers do not catch 
them (prohibited species).” [FG, Ajuy, Iloilo] 
 
“During closed season, illegal fishers do not stop their operations.” 
 [FG, Bantayan, Cebu] 
 
According to the respondents, some of these illegal fishers are also members of their 
communities but are in the island barangays. The other illegal fishers are commercial fishers from 
other municipalities who poach in their municipal waters. 
 
In addition, respondents experience weather disturbances such as typhoons, strong winds 
and monsoons from June-December, while shortage in water and low fish supply are also a 
problem among respondents during summer. Unanticipated changes in water supply, weather 
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conditions, and fish behavior in response to natural variations in the marine environment may 
undermine fisher’s success (McGoodwin 2001). And unlike farmers who have access to crop 
insurance, fishers in general, have difficulty obtaining the same services primarily because of the 
high risks associated with fishing activities and the high cost of insurance. This situation makes 
fishers highly vulnerable especially during periods of stress.   
 
As per interview with a BFAR representative, the informant mentioned that the BFAR is 
exploring ways of helping the affected fisheries stakeholders by tapping partners who can 
potentially provide them assistance: 
“With the creation of Visayan Sea Ecosystems and Fisheries Management (EFM) 
Workplan, one of the components of this is really to give them (fishers) alternative 
livelihoods during closed season. This is relatively new (less than 1 year) and 
everything is still in the process. BFAR will tie up with LGUs and other government 
agencies and other partners that can help them (fishers). It is the only way for them 
to be compliant to the policy.” [BFAR Region VI] 
 
Results of this study show the overlapping challenges that municipal fisheries stakeholders 
must deal with in their daily subsistence. These findings are valuable information to the LGUs and 
other GAs and NGAs when thinking about potential programs that will be introduced to coastal 




Political factors that affect the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea 
 
Introduction 
Most often, development projects treat development as a technical and non-political 
process, ignoring the concerns among development recipients about ‘political realities’ that greatly 
affect the development process (Fabinyi et al. 2015). The multi-scalar nature of the issues 
associated with the SFC in the Visayan Sea offers a very good opportunity to advance knowledge 
in political ecology, particularly in thinking about ‘framing, carrying out and analyzing research 
that stretches across different spaces, scales, and social groups’; and ‘in better conceptualizing the 
political in studies of environmental changes, problems, and issues’ (Paulson et al. 2005). 
Situations like the SFC in the Visayan Sea, increases prominence of environmental issues in local 
struggles, national debates, and international policies, and attracts more attention to conventional 
politics and to more broadly defined relations of power, as well as the difference in interaction 
among human groups and their biophysical environments (Gezon and Paulson 2005). The creation 
of a conservation area is as much as a social process that has political and economic consequences 
as it is an ecological project in which stakeholders’ managerial, and consequently, cultural 
preferences and knowledge, play a fundamental role (Vaccaro et al. 2013).  
 
According to FAO (2016), fishery governance creates the governing principles and 
objectives of the fisheries sector by developing policy and regulatory frameworks. It not only links 
government with civil society, harmonizing myriad perspectives and maintaining social order and 
productive socio-ecological systems, but also legitimizes and balances stakeholders' interactions, 
enforces rules and conventions and maintains coherence across jurisdictional, space and time 
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scales. Finally, it conditions the allocation of power, resources, and benefits and maintains the 
governance system capacity to learn and change. In practice, however, challenges related to fishery 
governance, particularly in policy implementation, abound that need to be unraveled and 
contextualized, creating a need for more holistic studies such as this. This chapter presents the 
political factors that affect the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea. It explores how 
these factors affect the relationship among fisheries stakeholders, as well as their implications for 
the environment, livelihoods of stakeholders and policy outcomes. 
 
Political landscape, power relations, and the SFC 
For the purpose of this study, I adopt Foucault’s (1982) definition of power as the ability 
of an individual to influence and modify the actions of other individuals in order to realize certain 
goals. Hamilton and Sharma (1996) relate power to similar concepts such as authority (i.e.,  the 
power of the acting agent to enforce obedience, whose right to do so is assumed and acknowledged 
by the acted-on agent); domination (i.e., which includes having commanding influence over a 
certain territory, aspect, or person); control (i.e., directing or constraining action or right of 
supervision or a means of verification); rule (i.e., a principle, norm, or standard to which action 
conforms or should conform); influence (i.e., a conforming pressure visibly or invisibly exercised 
or an ascendancy or moral power); and force (i.e., strength, energy, impetus, violence, and 
coercion). The government, through the BFAR, deploys the SFC policy as a form of access control 
in the Visayan Sea. The SFC is implemented at the local level by appointed authorities (e.g., LGUs, 
Fish wardens, PNP-MG/PCG) that are backed by the laws of the land. These concepts are 
important in understanding the fishery governance and the complex interactions among the 
fisheries stakeholders involved in the SFC in the Visayan Sea. 
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National and local government  
The local governments comprised of the provinces, municipalities, cities, and barangays, 
form the backbone of the Philippine government. While these political subdivisions are under the 
general supervision of the President through the Secretary of the DILG, they enjoy autonomy. 
These local governments are agencies of the national government in the matter of collection of 
taxes, law enforcement, and other governmental functions, which may be delegated by the national 
government to local governments. Since an average citizen has more interface with the LGUs than 
with the national or provincial government, the acts of the LGUs affect the ordinary citizen more 
directly (DILG 2019a). 
 
Bottleneck in the legal frameworks for fisheries management in the Philippines 
The implementation of the SFC is in line with the provisions of the R.A. 8550, also known 
as the Philippine Fisheries Code (as amended by R.A. 10654), which provides the legal framework 
and guiding principles for the development, management, protection and conservation of fisheries 
and aquatic resources in the country under the leadership of the BFAR. Under Section 9 of R.A. 
8550, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (D.A.) may declare a closed season in any 
or all Philippine waters outside the boundary of municipal waters and in bays, for conservation 
and ecological purposes. The Act further states that it is unlawful to fish in overfished areas during 
the closed season (Section 95). However, it also stipulated in the Section 9 that: 
“The closed season may be extended to waters under the jurisdiction of special 
agencies, municipal waters and bays reserved for the use of the municipal 
fisherfolk…., provided that there is concurrence and approval or recommendation 
of such special agency and the concerned Local Government Unit (LGU) and 




The LGUs also have the exclusive authority to grant municipal fishery privileges in 
municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges thereof (Section 149 of the R.A. 7160 1991).  
Further, Section 16 of the R.A. 8550 (as amended by R.A. 10654) states that: 
“The municipal/city government shall have jurisdiction over municipal waters as 
defined in this Code. The municipal/city government, in consultation with the 
FARMCs shall be responsible for the management, conservation, development, 
protection, utilization and disposition of all fish and fishery/aquatic resources 
within their respective waters respective municipality/city waters in the areas to 
be covered by the closed season.”  
 
Furthermore,  
“The LGUs shall have authority over municipal waters to enforce all fishery laws, 
rules and regulations and valid fisheries ordinances enacted by the 
city/municipality council.”   
 
In simple terms, while the SFC technically applies to both commercial and municipal 
fishing boats, the LGUs surrounding the Visayan Sea have the prerogative whether to implement 
it or not in their respective municipal waters. This is corroborated by key informants from the 
regional and national BFAR offices: 
“The commercial sector is regulated by BFAR. But for the municipal, for as long 
as the local executives will not implement (the SFC), the BFAR cannot do 
anything.” [BFAR Region VI] 
 
 
“Because for us (BFAR), we do not have jurisdiction over the small, municipal 
fishers. On the regulation, we have to say that the closed season is intended for 




“We do not have jurisdiction over municipal waters.” [National BFAR] 
 
This alone can serve as a major obstacle in the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan 
Sea because this situation makes the MCS activities quite challenging for both the LGUs and the 
BFAR because most often, there is no clear demarcation between the municipal and commercial 
waters.  Further, the implementation of the SFC does not make sense if only a few municipalities 
surrounding the Visayan Sea support it. Although uneven support from the municipalities may still 
lower the net fishing effort and lead to some, albeit more limited, conservation benefits, a uniform 
implementation across the municipalities should be preferred to see the maximum effect of this 
policy.  
 
According to Vacarro et al. (2013), the declaration and implementation of a conservation 
policy is a standard example of competition for environmental control because conservation areas 
have established jurisdictions and borders that define exclusionary rights which are implemented 
by different social and institutional actors (often powerful), experienced by other social groups 
(often not so powerful), and enjoyed by yet another set of players (tourists and scientists), 
ultimately resulting in contradictory social relationships. These actors define the nature, 
legitimacy, rights, or use of the conservation measure in very different, and culturally dependent, 
ways. Further, the relationship between actors, and the links between actors and the physical 
environment, are conditioned by power relations (Bryant 1997). This is evident in the different 
levels of management of the Visayan Sea (e.g., among members of the regulatory group, and 




The administrative arrangements in the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea have 
critical implications not only in the SFC implemented in the Visayan Sea, but also in the fisheries 
management of the entire country. This situation contradicts the principles of ecosystem approach 
to fisheries management which has recently gained momentum after realizing the mistakes of past 
management schemes. The ecosystem approach to fisheries management highlights the 
importance of an integrated management approach across coastal and marine areas and their 
natural resources for the conservation and sustainable use of the whole ecosystem (SEAFDEC 
2019). However, the autonomy given to each LGU has resulted in a fragmented approach to 
managing their adjacent waters. According to a Fisheries expert:  
“The government’s move from a national scale to a local government unit (LGU) 
scale has somehow affected the ecosystems scale because each LGU treats its 
body of water as its own without thinking about the interconnectivity of the 
ecosystems. The inter-LGU arrangement is still a very big factor.” [Key 
informant, NGA Fisheries Expert] 
 
He further added:  
“Now, we have about 4 existing inter-LGU arrangements: Banate Bay, 2 in 
Northern Negros, and on paper, there is also one in Masbate. But that is only in 
paper, it is not really functioning. That’s the challenge.” 
 
 Recently however, the BFAR has adopted the ecosystem approach to fisheries management 
in implementing its plans, programs, projects, and activities (BFAR FOO-164, s. 2016, as cited by 
Guzman 2019). With this new development, the BFAR is expected to shift its focus from 
sustainable harvest of target species only, to systems and decision-making process that balance 
ecological well-being with human and societal well-being, within improved governance 
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frameworks. Following this, the BFAR issued the Fisheries Administrative Order No. 263, s. 2019, 
which provides for the establishment of fisheries management areas (FMA) for the conservation 
and management of fisheries in Philippine waters (DA-BFAR 2019). The BFAR and LGUs shall 
endeavor to work together synergistically to manage the straddling and shared fish stocks within 
the FMAs (Guzman 2019). Similar to current management arrangements, the LGUs retain their 
jurisdiction over municipal waters, while the BFAR has jurisdiction in areas beyond the municipal 
waters. But the Fisheries Administrative Order No. 263, s. 2019 also brought new concepts to the 
fishery management in the Philippines such as harvest control rules, shared and straddling fish 
stocks, and reference point, as well as governance mechanisms that pin responsibilities and 
accountability to the parties involved (DA-BFAR 2019). These developments indicate progress 
and a desire for an improved fishery management in the country. 
 
The regulators and the regulated  
A study by Tan-Mullins (2007) which evaluates how key agents in state agencies at 
provincial and district levels translate Thai political and legal systems at the local level, shows that 
access to environmental resources is highly regulated by unequal power relations between actors 
at various levels. In political ecology theory, according to Tan-Mullins (2007), the state through 
national agencies, serves as the ‘steward’ of the ‘common resources’ and is responsible for 
regulating acess to these ‘common resources’. However, when such broad authority is coupled by 
administrative inefficiency, unequal power relations between agencies at various levels (e.g., 
national, provincial and local) and the varying willingness of stakeholders to participate in the 
management of resources, it empowers local state agencies and individual officials to interpret 
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policies and regulations according to their own interests (Tan-Mullins 2007). These are evident in 
the SFC in the Visayan Sea. Respondents and key informants have repeteadly expressed their 
dismay over the system of fishery governance in their respective municipalities: 
“No initiative from the Local Chief Executive.” [Municipal fisher, Milagros, 
Masbate] 
 
“The regulation of the activities at sea is not yet a priority of the law 
enforcement.” [PNP-MG, Milagros, Masbate] 
 
“They do not restrict the big fishing operators because they have connections.” 
[Municipal fisher, Roxas City, Capiz] 
 
“The LGU does not uphold all recommendations of the MFARMC which 
sometimes become the cause of conflicts.” [MFARMC representative, Ajuy, 
Iloilo] 
 
“Politics has a big influence (in fisheries management) because the politicians are 
the ones recognized in local governments. If you think about it, whose interests 
are served by the laws that are implemented. For example, in the Fisheries Code, 
the municipal waters should be from shoreline to 15 kms, but small- and medium-
scale commercial fishing vessels are allowed from 10.1 kms. Then commercial 
fishing vessels can also fish in waters deeper than 7 fathoms. These are boats 
weighing more than 3 GT. In effect, the 15 kms municipal waters rule is non-
existent.” [Key informant, NGA] 
 
 
Notably, the R.A. 7160 provides LGUs with broad governmental powers to manage 
fisheries and aquatic resources within municipal waters (The World Bank 2005). Although its 
intent is to provide Mayors with a set of basic service functions and regulatory powers to meet 
area-specific needs and concerns, it could also serve to reinforce the dominance of local kingpins 
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and warlords (Pagsanghan 1993), or in some cases, results in inefficient governance as per account 
of several respondents. 
 
“One which goes near to your subject is the politics part. Who are the 
commercials? If you profile who are the owners of commercial (boats), these are 
the middle to upper class who can afford to buy politics.” [Key informant, NGA] 
 
“Most of the owners of commercial fishing boats are politicians. If not the Mayor 
or Governor, their siblings, relatives, friends or benefactors during election.” [Key 
informant, NGA] 
 
“When the local government (i.e., Mayor and Governor) is not involved in 
commercial fishing, they are strict in the implementation of the closed season. Or, 
they can also be lenient.” [Key informant, NGA] 
 
“They give consideration to violators who are caught; instead of PhP 2,500/crew 
fine, others just fine 2 crews so that it will not be too much of a burden.” [PNP-
MG, Concepcion, Iloilo] 
 
“Municipal fishers are warned only because they appeal to the Mayor.” 
[Municipal fisher, E.B. Magalona, Negros Occidental] 
 
“The municipal government is not strict.” [Municipal fisher, Escalante City, 
Negros Occidental] 
 
“Because of poverty, people continue fishing; the Mayor allows them (to fish).” 
[Fish dryer, Madridejos, Cebu] 
 
“People appeal to the Mayor so it’s (SFC implementation) not strict. They 
(fishers) are advised to limit their catch.” [Municipal fisher, E.B. Magalona, 
Negros Occidental] 
 
“We try to understand those who continue fishing that is why it (SFC) cannot be 




“The City (government) is not serious in implementing the SFC.” [LGU 
representative, Roxas City, Capiz] 
 
 “The Mayor allows us to buy prohibited fishes because of scarcity, but only a 
small amount (maximum of 10 kgs only).” [LGU representative, Madridejos, 
Cebu] 
 
According to the BFAR management, some municipalities do not even know that they are 
implementing the SFC. The BFAR should use this an indicator to gauge their performance as far 
as raising awareness among LGUs surrounding the Visayan Sea and engaging them to support the 
SFC implemented therein. 
“Other municipalities do not mind. It depends on the level of awareness and the 
leadership.” [BFAR Region VI] 
 
In response to this, key informants said that LGUs themselves are not clear on their role in 
the SFC implementation: 
“Inasmuch as they are engaging LGUs, one thing that even our LGUs were saying 
was that, they really did not know their part in this one (the SFC).” [Key 
informant, NGA] 
 
“The role of the LGUs is not properly spelled-out. And that is the richest part 




Rola et al. (2018) report similar results in their study on the SFC implemented for sardines 
in Zamboanga Peninsula, in the southwestern Philippines. The LGUs in Zamboanga Peninsula 
reported lack of clarity, consistency, and coherence in the SFC policy’s provisions and 




In other cases, social relationships get in the way of enforcing the fishery policy. For 
example, one respondent said: 
“Sometimes, the apprehending person is their ‘kumpare’ (Godfather of his child 
or vice versa).” [FGD participant, Estancia, Iloilo] 
 
A study by Russell and Alexander (2000) in south central Luzon, Philippines shows that 
even when access is restricted (e.g., municipal waters, exclusive economic zone), informal 
exchanges and rights affect the utilization of resources because people put more premium on their 
relationships with one another (that is built on sharing system) rather than upholding legal fishing 
practices and conservation efforts that can ensure the sustainable supply of the fishery resources 
on which they depend. Russell and Alexander (2000) capture the dynamics that contribute to poor 
law enforcement and proliferation of illegal fishing activities in the area by showing how these 
things are deeply rooted in the intertwined interactions and relationships (blood relations, political 
clans, social relationships, etc.) of the people at the local level. In general, the catch sharing 
practice in many fishing communities in the Philippines extends a long way because it ensures an 
eventual reciprocal act from those people who benefit from it, including those with social and 
economic positions. This becomes a cycle of give-and-take relationship that transcends beyond 
fishing activity because of ‘utang na loob’ (‘I owe you’) culture, which greatly influences future 
dealings of people within the community and beyond.  
 
While interview results show that 83.8% of the respondents (N=235) said the SFC is 
implemented in their respective municipalities, analysis of responses by municipality reveals that 
94% of the respondents (N=70) in Milagros and Cawayan, in the province of Masbate, claimed 
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that the SFC is not yet implemented in their municipalities (Figure 41). However, as per interview 
with the BFAR representatives, Masbate province is included in the SFC in the Visayan Sea.  
 
 
Figure 41. Responses re ‘Is the SFC implemented in your municipality?’, by municipality. 
 
Further, results show that while majority of the respondent groups said that the SFC is 
implemented in their respective areas, there is not a single respondent group that has a solid 
agreement on this, which suggest that some fisheries stakeholders are either unaware of the SFC 
or are not restricted from fishing during the SFC (Figure 42). 


















Figure 42. Responses re ‘Is the SFC implemented in your municipality?’, by respondent group. 
 
In an earlier study conducted by Szanton (1971) in Estancia, Iloilo, he notes that because 
of the weak enforcement of the SFC (locally referred to as limitasyon), its existence hardly affects 
the local economy in the area. Instead, it merely marks the natural low point of the fishing cycle 
with an official designation. 
 
Recently, the DILG have issued the Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2018-59 which 
contains the Policies and Guidelines on the Regulation and Monitoring of Fishery Activities in 
Municipal Waters (DILG 2018a). This is a conscious effort by the government to improve the 
current state of fisheries management at the local level. However, such issuance has a delicate tone 
to it because it only enjoins to LGUs to act on it. Section 2 of MC No. 2018-59 stipulates: 
“The purpose of this policy is to ensure that LGUs play an active role and hold 
them accountable to their action/inaction towards monitoring and regulation of 
fishery activities in municipal waters as part of their territorial jurisdiction. This 
policy issuance shall serve as a reminder to LGUs to exercise their powers in 
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issuance intends to enjoin LGUs to undertake the responsibility of improving the 
management of water resources.” 
 
Realizing the lack of an accountability element in the MC No. 2018-59, the DILG issued 
another memorandum, the MC 2018-147, which provides the Guidelines on the Implementation 
of the Fisheries Compliance Audit (FishCA) to monitor compliance of LGUs to MC 2018-59 and 
to R.A. 8550 (as amended by R.A. 10654) (DILG 2018b). The FishCA is a tool that contains a list 
of 95 indicators which the LGUs can use to gauge their performance as far as regulation and 
monitoring of fishery activities is concerned. However, one of the weak points of the FishCA is 
that LGUs are the ones rating themselves which can be biased. According to a key informant from 
an NGA: 
“It’s self-assessment; local governments can always lie. It needs to be verified. 
That is its weakness. It needs a third- party verification. And the law or 
memorandum circular did not provide for that one.” 
 
 
In general, the Philippine fisheries industry is comprised of multiple actors that are 
involved in a complex multitude of activities hence, it is important to think about fisheries 
stakeholders as a heterogenous group and be mindful of the unequal power relations and 
constraints to equity. The classification of municipal and commercial fishing activities for 
example, shows important distinctions between (and within) these groups in terms of capacity, 
fishing objectives and practices, which may require more specific management approaches rather 
than a blanket regulatory solution like the SFC. This was confirmed during an interview with a 
BFAR representative from Region VI:  
“Unlike other closed seasons where you would see specific gears being restricted, 




When a fisheries expert was asked about his opinion about this, he said:  
“Commercial fishers will still be banned from fishing in the enclosed area during 
the SFC. But for the municipal fishers, LGUs can still allow them to operate 
provided there is differentiation because some of them have a very low fishing 
effort which may not even dent the closure.” [Key informant, Fisheries Expert] 
 
 
Hence, it is not surprising that municipal fishers push their luck and take chances in order 
to survive. The allure of immediate gains to a hungry man is unquestionable. As one respondent 
said: 
“Despite the risk of getting fined, small-scale (municipal) fishers do not have a 
choice but to continue fishing covertly for their family’s survival. With the 
passage of the R.A. 10654 (with bigger fines), small fishers argue that 
commercial fishers remain cocky in violating the law because they have the 
money for bail. Unlike the small fishers, when they get caught and imprisoned, 





Varying capacities and priorities of the LGUs 
In the Philippines, LGUs namely provinces, cities, and municipalities are classified into 6 
income classes (Table 15) based on their annual income for the last 4 years (Executive Order No. 





Table 15. Income classification of provinces, cities, municipalities                                                        
in the Philippines (DOF 2008). 
 
 
This serves as the basis for determining the financial capability of LGUs to provide in part 
or in full, the funding requirements of developmental projects and other priority needs in their 
respective locality. Table 16 presents the study sites’ income classification and FishCA ratings. 
 
Income classification of Provinces and Cities 
First class  Average annual income of PhP450 M (Provinces)/PhP400 M (Cities) 
or more 
 
Second class Average annual income of PhP360 M (Provinces)/PhP320 M (Cities) 
but less than PhP450 M (Provinces)/ PhP400 M (Cities) 
 
Third class Average annual income of PhP270 M (Provinces)/PhP240 M (Cities) 
but less than PhP360 M (Provinces)/ PhP320 M (Cities) 
 
Fourth class Average annual income of PhP180 M (Provinces)/PhP160 M (Cities) 
but less than PhP270 M (Provinces)/ PhP240 M (Cities) 
 
Fifth class Average annual income of PhP90 M (Provinces)/PhP80 M (Cities) 
but less than PhP180 M (Provinces)/ PhP160 M (Cities) 
 
Sixth class Average annual income of less than PhP90 M (Provinces)/ PhP80 M 
(Cities) 
 
Income classification of Municipalities 
First class  Average annual income of PhP55 M or more 
 
Second class Average annual income of PhP45 M or more, but less than PhP55 M 
 
Third class Average annual income of PhP35 M or more, but less than PhP45 M 
 
Fourth class Average annual income of PhP25 M or more, but less than PhP35 M 
 
Fifth class Average annual income of PhP15 M or more, but less than PhP25 M 
 
Sixth class Average annual income of less than PhP15 M  
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Table 16. Income classification and FishCA ratings of the study sites. 
Region Province Municipality Classa FishCA ratingb 
V Masbate Cawayan 2nd Failed 
V Masbate Milagros 1st Medium compliance 
VI Capiz Roxas City 3rd High compliance 
VI Iloilo Ajuy 2nd Medium compliance 
VI Iloilo Carles 2nd Low compliance 
VI Iloilo Concepcion 3rd High compliance 
VI Iloilo Estancia 2nd High compliance  
VI Negros Occidental Cadiz City 2nd Medium compliance 
VI Negros Occidental Escalante City 4th Low compliance 
VI Negros Occidental E. B. Magalona 2nd Low compliance 
VII Cebu Bantayan 1st Medium compliance 
VII Cebu Madridejos 4th Medium compliance 
aBLGF. Retrieved from http://blgf.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/updated-reclass-CY-2008-4-27-16.pdf, 11/16/2019; 
http://blgf.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/updated-reclass-CY-2008-4-27-16.pdf, 11/16/2019 
bDILG (2019b). Retrieved from https://www.dilg.gov.ph/reports-and-resources/resources-and-downloads/3/, 11/2/2019  
 
The disparity among the LGUs’ income classification can give a better picture of the 
financial capacities of LGUs and therefore, their ability to direct development efforts (Diokno-
Sicat 2018). However, it is also important to note that while financial capacity is an essential 
component in accomplishing development goals at any level of government, other factors such as 
leadership priorities is just as important because it determines which programs will be given 
critical attention and funded. For example, Milagros in Masbate province, and Bantayan in Cebu 
province, are the only municipalities among the study sites that have a 1st class income 
classification [average annual income of PhP 55 M (~US$ 1.1.M) or more] yet, they have a 
‘Medium compliance’ rating in the FishCA. In contrast, the municipalities of Concepcion (3rd 
class), and Estancia in the province of Iloilo (2nd class), have comparatively lower income 
classification, but have high compliance ratings in the FishCA. Overall, the study sites in Panay 
Island have comparatively high compliance in terms of regulating and monitoring of fishing 
activities within their municipal waters compared to their other LGU counterparts in other islands. 
136 
 
The varying capacities of the municipalities in the study sites can be observed in their 
activities and accomplishments in relation to fishery management (e.g., fishery ordinances passed, 
presence or absence of a coastal resource management plan, record keeping, etc.). For example, 
the municipalities of Carles, in Iloilo, and Madridejos, in Cebu, have yet to come up with their 
coastal resource management plans. Other municipalities do not have a fish catch monitoring 
system (e.g., Ajuy). Further, they do not have an updated registry of fishers and fishing boats in 
their municipality even though they comply with the ongoing fisher registration (FishR) and boat 
registration (BoatR) programs of the BFAR.  
 
Results show that 88% of the municipal fishers (N=117) interviewed are registered in their 
respective municipalities. While this figure seems to be high, it shows that not all municipal fishers 
are accounted at the LGU level due to various reasons such as tedious registration process and 
remoteness of the islands where some of these fishers reside, among others. Several respondents 
highlight the lack of capacity of the LGUs in implementing the SFC in their respective 
municipalities: 
“Fish wardens are still waiting for their budget since June 2018.” [Fish warden, 
Ajuy, Iloilo] 
 
“The PNP has no patrol boat thus, they only rent. There used to be a patrol boat, 
but you have to request it from the LGU.” [PNP-MG, Bantayan, Cebu] 
 
“Fish wardens lack faster patrol boats; they do not have insurance as well.”  [LGU 
representative, Madridejos, Cebu] 
 





“It (SFC) has a very wide scope. When the sea is rough, it is difficult to do roving 
because they (authorities) have small pump boats.” [PNP-MG, Cadiz City, Negros 
Occidental] 
 
“Lack of coordination, sometimes there is no Police during the operation.” [LGU 
representative, E.B. Magalona, Negros Occidental] 
 
“Lack of personnel who will focus on information drive in other coastal 
barangays.” [LGU representative, Escalante City] 
 
“No floating assets, they (enforcers) sometimes rent a pump boat.” [PNP-MG, 
Roxas City, Capiz] 
 
‘We need support like manpower; the ‘Bantay Dagat’ should be stationed in 
specific areas so response will be faster.’ [LGU representative, Estancia, Iloilo] 
 
Availability of manpower and logistical support are just some of the basic elements in 
fisheries MCS, which are generally lacking at the municipal level. Support in terms of finances, 
manpower, technical assistance from the LGUs is a vital element in the implementation of fisheries 
laws in any community (Catedrilla et al. 2012).  According to a key informant from an NGA: 
“When you start to close an area, there must be some degree of control over the 
area in terms of vessels coming in and out. The problem is, we have very, very little 
control of this.” [Key informant, NGA] 
 
Further, respondents expressed their sentiments towards national agencies, particularly the 
BFAR: 
“BFAR’s presence in not felt; BFAR’s implementation seems to be purely 
theory.” [Fish broker, Estancia, Iloilo] 
 
“Gaps in the monitoring of the BFAR especially that some islands are not easily 




“Lack of counterpart from the national government (e.g., Navy, PNP, BFAR); no 
presence of BFAR.” [LGU representative, Escalante City, Negros Occidental] 
 
The BFAR management acknowledges that even at their level, they are just starting to gain 
momentum: 
“It is only (recently) when we have the manpower complement, as well as floating 
assets. And we program already the effective implementation of the closed season 
where we work together with the local government units.” [BFAR Region VI] 
 
 
The shortfalls in the SFC implementation are readily understood considering the lack of 
accountability and sense of responsibility, especially when regulators point fingers at their 
counterparts. On the part of the BFAR regional management, key informants from this agency 
highlight the pivotal roles that LGUs play in fisheries management. 
“We only started having the intervention for the implementation of the closed 
season because closed season is in the municipal waters and it is within the 
jurisdiction of the LGUs.”  
 
“BFAR is still facing the (lack of) manpower complement from the LGUs 
because one of our mandates is to capacitate them. But there are LGUs who do 
not have the manpower.” 
 
But according to a key informant from an NGA: 
“The delineation of the municipal waters became the grey area because what is 
happening is, it can be used by the LGU or the BFAR, for not doing anything. So, 
what is happening is, that particular part of the law that delineates the BFAR or 
municipality to intervene is being used by both sides for not doing their jobs. Both 
(BFAR and LGU) are trading their laments. So, what happens is that the LGU has 




The LGUs and BFAR are also going back and forth on whose responsibility is the provision 
of assistance to affected fisheries stakeholders.  
“Fishers ask for alternative livelihood or fishing gear, but we do not have 
anything to give them.” [LGU representative, Ajuy, Iloilo] 
 
When this issue was brought to the BFAR’s attention during an interview, the key 
informant from the agency said: 
“That depends on LGUs. They should know that they can tap other agencies for 
that particular concern. For example, DWSD (Department of Social Welfare and 
Development), DOLE (Department of Labor and Employment) … So, there are 
available immediate ____. Because we from BFAR are only limited to fishery 
projects, we cannot provide for basic needs like medicine, rice, food, etc.” [BFAR 
Region VI] 
 
Despite their limitations, the BFAR recognizes that providing alternative livelihood (i.e., 
different livelihood or source of income that is not restricted by fishery regulations) to affected 
fisheries stakeholders is necessary for the successful implementation of the SFC in the Visayan 
Sea.  
“We understand that if we are to regulate them (fishers), we must give them 
alternative livelihood. The only way we will be able to let them comply is if they 
have income. Even if you tell them to stop, they will not comply because their 
main consideration are their families. This remains a challenge on the part of the 
BFAR because we are limited in terms of livelihood programs.”  
 
 
Livelihood enhancement programs of the BFAR include distribution of environment-
friendly fishing gears and paraphernalia such as ‘payao’ or fish aggregating device, fish pots and 
motor engines. The BFAR also provides incentives to coastal municipalities/cities in recognition 
of their outstanding initiatives and contributions to sustainable fisheries development, through a 
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program called Malinis at Masaganang Karagatan (MMK) Search for the Most Outstanding 
Coastal Community in Western Visayas, that comes with a prize of PhP 2 million worth of fisheries 
livelihood projects. 
 
Recognizing the need to provide alternative livelihood is very important because results of 
this study show that this is a primary concern among respondents (Figure 43).  
 
 
Figure 43. Problems and challenges in the implementation of the SFC                                                   
in the Visayan Sea, N=235. 
 
Results show that the majority of the municipal fishers rely heavily on fishing for their 
livelihood, hence many of them tenaciously adhere to this occupation and continue to fish covertly 
despite of the uncertain economic rewards, while others do so because they see their fellow fishers 
continue fishing without getting arrested. Apparently, the deterrent effect of law enforcement in 
























































Other challenges identified by the respondents include scarcity/poverty/survival (25%), 
implementation/monitoring (24%), and compliance/Illegal fishing (20%). 
 
Fabinyi (2012) makes the case that unless we understand the narratives and meanings that 
different sets of actors attach to political or environmental initiatives, the effective design of 
conservation projects is likely to fail especially if effective alternative livelihood projects are not 
implemented. In the case of the SFC in the Visayan Sea, initially resource managers were largely 
concerned with conservation and resource use control during the 3-month period without much 
regard to its economic implications, especially on the municipal fishers. While there are indications 
that the BFAR is addressing the gaps in its decisions and trying to improve the way it is doing 
things (e.g., establishing harvest controls, reference points, etc.), municipal fisheries stakeholders 
continue to suffer from the inefficiencies in the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea.   
 
For example, it is not very clear how the BFAR is evaluating the success of the SFC. During 
the interviews, key personnel from the BFAR management who are engaged in the SFC were asked 
how they are measuring the effectiveness of the SFC implemented in the Visayan Sea (e.g., 
indicators of success, etc.). Elicited responses were inconsistent considering that this fishery policy 
has been in effect for 8 decades now, although its active enforcement is much more recent. 
“The measurement of success is first, in terms of governance, the cooperation, 
coordination among partners and the LGUs who are now really on board in terms 
of implementing the closed season. And then, the data shows, I cannot tell you the 
exact figure, but it shows that based on reports, there was an increase in harvest or 
catch of sardines. There is an increase compared to before when we do not have 
100% intervention in the closed season……For long as there is an increase. We 
really do not have definite measurement or real target in terms of quantity. But it 
is shown, based on our monitoring, that there is an increase. It does not matter 
whether it is 10% or 15%. So far, there is an increase of production…..So, it is in 
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the production and on the governance of the local government units and other 
agencies who are helping us in the law enforcement.” [ _____, BFAR VI] 
 
 
“Other than market observations, the BFAR have metrics. The National Stock 
Assessment Program (NSAP) has catch and market monitoring component. …… 
We do not just monitor the catch. Our primary indicator in the success of the 
closure is the catch rates of the fishing gears that target sardines. The catch data 
alone is not a good measure. Even if the catches are high if the number of 
frequency or intensity of the fishing activity of vessels is also high, then it is just a 
dummy. We zeroed-in that in the catch rates and we noticed the increase in the 
effort after the declaration of the fishing season.” [ _____, Region VI] 
 
 
“The NSAP presents their findings every year. In terms of enforcement, we also 
have reporting in terms of compliance.” [ _____, BFAR VI] 
 
 
“I think our scientific authority can… the National Fisheries Research and 
Development Institute (NFRDI), they are doing the research. They can attest to 
this, the abundance of fish after the closed season.” [ _____, BFAR VII] 
 
Interestingly, there is no published comprehensive report about this and the NSAP and 
BFAR are hesitant to share the data they have, which could support their claim about the success 
of the SFC in the Visayan Sea. There are also divided views among the BFAR personnel about the 
claimed success on the SFC, as evident in the following excerpts: 
“For me, I do not think the objective of the closed season is met if the objective is 
to improve the fish stocks. Based on the studies of NSAP, although it shows a 
positive result, but after the closure, fishers are racing to fish. In addition, the 
closed season is not implemented in all coastal municipalities surrounding the 
Visayan Sea.” [ _____, BFAR VI] 
 
 
“Yes. After the implementation (2013-2015) when there was very good 





“As of this point, I think, we are not yet 100% in terms of attaining the objectives 
for reducing the overfishing of these species and increasing the catch of the 
fisherfolks in Visayan Sea.” [ _____, BFAR VI] 
 
 
“The closed season is very successful based on our observation and anecdotal 
evidence from fishers, people on the local level.” [ _____, BFAR VII] 
 
 
“During closed season, there is no commercial fishing there. So practically, I do 
not see why it will not be effective because the commercial fishers catch at least 
50 tons per day, which is substantial. So, if that is not caught, of course they can 
lay eggs. So, if there is still doubt if it is going to be effective or not, that is very 
unlikely. It is not possible that there is no effect. The question is, are we able to 
measure it properly. …… Can you imagine every night you save at least 100 tons 
and these 100 tons of fish are about to lay eggs? Can you imagine if it was not 
saved and not allowed to lay eggs? Do we still need science there? That will tell 
you there is (positive effect) but as to metrics how you are going to capture that, 
that is it, in my opinion. Now, is it important for me to capture the metrics? In a 
way yes, but what is important for me is I’m able to save them and allow them to 
lay eggs. Whether you are able to identify little or ___ (huge success), it does not 
matter to me as long as it happens. For me, that is the idea behind. That is why I 
am not really concerned about showing what it is because I know what happened 
and I know what could have happened without that. It (fisheries) could have 
collapsed.” [ _____, National BFAR] 
 
 
The NSAP, which is administered by the National Fisheries Research and Development 
Institute (NFRDI), should be providing the evidence for the success or failure of the SFC. 
According to the NFDRI website, the agency shall serve as the primary research arm of the BFAR 
and under the law, the NFRDI shall have a separate budget specific to its manpower requirements 
and operations to ensure the independent and objective implementation of its research activities 
(NFRDI 2019). Essentially, the NFRDI should be functioning as an independent entity. In fact, 
their research output should serve as the audit for BFAR’s performance as far as conservation 
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efforts are concerned. But as stated, NFRDI serves as the research arm of the BFAR and this has 
a conflict of interest. 
 
Despite these challenges identified by the respondents, 90.2% of them claimed they are in 
favor of the SFC. However, while majority of the respondents are in favor of the SFC, when asked 
if they follow the SFC, only 66.8% of the 235 respondents said yes; 12.3% answered sometimes 
and the 15.7% who answered  NA are the respondents who said that SFC is not implemented in 
their municipality (Figure 44).  
 
Figure 44. Responses re ‘Do you follow the SFC?’. 
 
This shows that while majority of the respondents have definite ideas and positive opinions 
regarding the SFC in the Visayan Sea, this does not mean they always put these into practice. 
Further analysis shows that only 70.8% of the respondents who said they are in favor of the SFC 



























Even though majority of the respondents said both municipal (76.2%) and commercial 
(80.9%) fishing boats are included in the SFC, most of them gave a moderately low rating for 
compliance for both municipal (32.8%) and commercial (29.4%) fishers (Figures 45-46).  
 
 
Figure 45. Respondent groups’ ratings for compliance of municipal fishers with                                

























Figure 46. Respondent groups’ ratings for compliance of commercial fishers                                   
with the SFC in the Visayan Sea. 
 
The above findings can be attributed to the lack of alternative livelihoods for the affected 
fisheries stakeholders at the municipal level. For the commercial fishers, with their capacity to pay 
the fines, continue to violate the SFC policy and other fishery regulations (e.g., use of illegal 
fishing gears are still rampant in the study sites). Power plays between commercial and municipal 
fishers can also be observed in their behavior at sea. Conflicts between municipal- and 
commercial- scale fishers were noted during interviews wherein respondents reported destruction 
of their fishing gears by active fishing gears such as Danish seine and trawls (operated by the 
commercial-scale fishers). These gears are some of the most efficient fishing devices used by 
mankind and their adoption in the Philippines has resulted in intense competition between 
commercial fishers who use them, and the municipal fishers using other types of gears. Danish 
seine vessels fish along the seabed using a herding principle to catch fish mainly on the continental 
shelf. The net is similar to a trawl net but has wings and is attached halfway along a seine rope 






















bottom-set gears of municipal fishers. Further, the non-selective nature of these gears can 
adversely affect a wide range of species, to the detriment of the marine environment on which 
small-scale fishers depend (Spoehr 1984). This creates animosity between municipal and 
commercial fishers and the municipal fishers are at the losing end because they cannot do anything 
to rectify the situation. Such conflict also reveals overlap in the fishing grounds where these groups 
are operating, and poor monitoring and control of fishing activities in municipal waters. According 
to Spoehr (1984), in the absence of strictly enforced regulatory measures, resource competition 
between small-scale fishers and more highly capitalized levels of fishing inevitably leads to the 
marginalization of small-scale fishers. 
 
Catedrilla et al. (2012) highlight the importance of having an understanding of how the 
fisheries laws are being enforced, as well as the fishers' reasons for compliance and non-
compliance with fisheries laws, by coastal resource management program implementers especially 
in planning for effective dissemination and implementation as well as in increasing participation 
of stakeholders in the management of a particular resource. When respondents were asked about 
people’s biggest motivation for not complying with the SFC, predominant responses include 















Figure 47. Cited motivations for not complying with the SFC in the Visayan Sea. 
 
During the FG in Estancia, Iloilo, one municipal fisher suggested:  
“The government should really study what is appropriate for the people because the 
reason why some fishers violate the closed season is because 60% of the population in 
Estancia are fisherfolks, majority of them are small-scale. The government should think 
about alternative livelihood programs for areas that are affected by the closed season. 
That is the best solution so that people will no longer violate the closed season. It is not 
possible for them not to fish for 3 months because fishing is their livelihood and that is 
how they support their families.” 
 
Non-compliance with regulations can derail resource management objectives thus, 
understanding the underlying motivation of behavioral responses to regulations is crucial and may 





Patronage system and corruption 
One of the recurring responses from the respondents when asked about problems and 
challenges in the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea is the existing patronage system. 
A succinct description of a patronage system is provided by Encyclopedia.com (2019): “Patron–
client systems are organized by people of power, both men and women, who build and keep the 
loyalty of people of more humble position. Both patrons and clients regard the link between them 
as a personal attachment similar to the bond of affection holding members of a family or kin group 
together. However, unlike families, where the linkage is regarded as permanent and often is taken 
for granted, a patron–client relationship must be renewed constantly and renegotiated 
continuously.” This situation is captured in the following statements by the respondents:  
“One of the things we want is alternative livelihood so that during closed season, 
people will have other sources of income. This is usually the problem because 
once you stop their illegal activities, they do not have other means of livelihood. 
How will they earn? The LGU gives assistance but sometimes, only those with 
connection to politicians can receive the assistance.” [MFARMC representative, 
Estancia, Iloilo] 
 
“Some (commercial fishers) are confident to violate the SFC because they get 
protection.” [LGU representative, Estancia, Iloilo] 
 
“Big fishing operators have the money and the connection.” [Municipal fisher, 
E.B. Magalona, Negros Occidental] 
 
“BFAR itself does not strictly implement (the SFC) especially if the fishers know 
‘someone.” [LGU representative, Estancia, Iloilo] 
 
 





“People (fishers) appeal to the Mayor. They are advised to limit their catch.” 
[Municipal fisher, E.B. Magalona, Negros Occidental] 
 
 
“During operation, there is an informant who warns illegal fishers ahead of time.” 
[LGU representative, Bantayan, Cebu] 
 
“It (implementation of the SFC) should be fair; no favors.” [Municipal fisher, 
Madridejos, Cebu] 
 
“(The lack of) political will is the main reason, it is difficult to fight that; 
patronage system.” [LGU representative, Milagros, Masbate] 
 
“Patron system was noted in the apprehension report.” [LGU representative, 
Roxas City, Capiz] 
 
“This has been a perennial problem here in Carles because those in the position 
who use their power can do that. No matter how the fisherfolks or the Bantay-
Dagat (Fish wardens) monitor these activities, they persist because of payments at 
the higher level. For example, at the PNP level, they have their problem within 
their organization because some of their members apprehend violators, but they 
end up releasing them because someone at their rank called and advised them to 
do so. These are real accounts of what is happening on the ground.” [Key 
informant, MFARMC, Carles, Iloilo]. 
 
 
In the above situations, the clients (i.e., violators) gain protection, access to the resources 
and information, as well as opportunities for advancement of their personal interests, from their 
patrons (i.e., fish wardens, LGU representatives and officials, BFAR) who are the higher ranks of 
government. In return, the patrons receive allegiance, electoral votes, and sometimes payments, 
from their clients which ultimately results in corruption. According to some members of the 
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regulatory group, settlement of cases involving apprehended illegal fishers is not uncommon and 
although they do not condone such practice, it is beyond their pay grade. 
 
Sumaila et al. (2017) interpret corruption in fisheries to comprise other acts of ‘cheating’ 
whereby individuals or larger entities act in illegal manner that undermines both the fishery 
resources and efforts to manage those resources.  For the purpose of this study, the definition of 
corruption by Transparency International (2019) is adopted, which is the abuse of entrusted power 
for private gain. Both sides involved in the corrupt act benefit, either in terms of money or undue 
advantage. Normally, bribe-takers receive an advantage (i.e., in cash, in kind, or favors) for looking 
the other way, or for carrying out functions that are anyway their duty to perform. Mbaku (1996) 
makes the case that when bureaucrats realize that they can earn more income from providing 
services to groups seeking state favors than from their regular jobs, they are likely to pay more 
attention to the demands of such interest groups than to the proper enforcement of state laws and 
regulations and the effective implementation of national development plans. 
 
Results of this study reveal that the SFC in the Visayan Sea has become an avenue for 
corruption for the regulators (i.e., LGU representatives and officials, Fish wardens, PNP-
MG/PCG, and BFAR) as per account of several municipal fisheries stakeholders interviewed: 
“One thing that is difficult to stop is the acceptance of ‘payola’ or bribe (from 
fishers within and outside Carles) by a Carles official. Usually, the commercial 
boat operators are from outside Carles and they give ~PhP 50,000/month 
(~$1,000).” [FARMC representative, Carles, Iloilo]  
 
“They do not really test the effect of the policy at the ground level; there is a 




“(The) people who implement the closed season accept payments; corruption, 
those who do the roving are corrupt.” [Municipal fisher, Bantayan, Cebu] 
 
“The authorities are corrupt; they take money from the big fishing operators.” 
[Municipal fisher, Madridejos, Cebu] 
 
“BFAR is accepting money from commercial (fishers).” [PNP-MG/PCG, 
Bantayan, Cebu] 
 
“Violators give to the Fish wardens hence they do not get caught.” [Fish broker, 
Madridejos, Cebu] 
 
“Big fishing operators give politicians monthly payments so that people will 
survive.” [Fish dryer, Roxas City, Capiz]. 
 
“Illegal fishing continues because of corruption; the small-scale (municipal) 
fishers who do not have the money to pay are hapless especially those who have 
children and students.” [Fish broker, Roxas City, Capiz] 
 
  
The same sentiment was expressed by participants of the FG conducted in Estancia, Iloilo: 
“We use ‘likos’ (ring net) in our operation which targets ‘tabagak’ (sardines) 
hence, we are the ones prohibited to operate during closed season. However, other 
fishing gears like ‘zipper’ or ‘hulbot-hulbot’ (Danish seine), which are illegal 
fishing gears, are not prohibited. We follow the law and wait for 3 months before 
we operate again. Yet, these fishing gears operate year-round. It is a money game; 
anything is possible if you have money.” 
 
This situation can be ascribed to many factors that were discussed previously (e.g., unequal 
power relations, patronage system, etc.). Another factor that contributes to corruption is the lack 
of appropriate compensation for the regulators, especially the Fish wardens.  
“In terms of monitoring, there are lapses because you cannot really police all the 
coastal barangays. The Fish wardens in _____ are not really into full 
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implementation. The fish wardens have their own reasons why they cannot be 
obliged to apprehend violators because they do not have the resources/capacity to 
do so and they do not have compensation. They do voluntary work. There is no 
salary given by the LGU. It is okay for the Police because they have salary.……. 
Every barangay designates Fish wardens. If you are the Fish warden, you wake up 
at night to do patrolling and if something happens to you at sea, what will happen 
to your family? That is why they cannot oblige the fish wardens to work.” 
[MFARMC representative, Ajuy, Iloilo]” 
 
 
“There is no honorarium for the Fish wardens (Bantay-dagat) in the barangay 
that's why they also slack at work; they also have to find another means of income 
for their family.” [LGU representative, Madridejos, Cebu] 
 
Interview results show that some of the Fish wardens serve as volunteers, while others 
receive allowances. In Cadiz City, Negros Occidental for example, the team leader of the fish 
wardens receives PhP 2,000 ($40) per month, while his members receive PhP 1,200 ($24) per 
month. But according to some fish wardens, they normally sell their salary in advance to regular 
LGU employees for their daily subsistence, thus, this meager amount becomes much smaller 
because of interest. Some LGU personnel are employed on a contractual basis (i.e., renewable 
every 6 months) and are receiving a very low salary. Illegal fishers are aware of the plight of some 
of these regulators, hence, they take advantage of this situation and tend to pay them off.  
According to Mbaku (1991), in societies where civil service compensation levels are relatively 
low, a significant part of the public employee's total compensation may be derived from 
engagement in outside activities, resulting in a significant increase in bureaucratic corruption.  
 
According to a civil society representative:  
“What happens is that, the law is used for corruption among law enforcers and the 
small-scale (municipal) fishers are at the losing end. Even the small fishers are 
forced to pay protection money so that they can continue fishing for survival 
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because they do not have other source of livelihood. Imagine the effect on one 
person who depends solely on fishing.” [Key informant, NGA] 
 
A study by Polioudakis and Polioudakis (2010) about the resource management system in 
a local Muslim community in Southern Thailand shows how informal management arrangements 
are influenced and constrained by local political structures.  The relationship between the state and 
local people affect the dynamics of the resource management that resulted in stratification and in 
turn, affected management of the fishery resources and relationships between the local people and 
the state. Similar circumstances can be observed in the SFC in the Visayan Sea wherein the 
regulators who control the access to fisheries, are sometimes the ones perpetuating illegal 
activities therein.  
“There are LGUs that would be happy with PhP 10,000/week (~$200/week). For 
big bosses, that would be PhP 25,000 (~$500). On the average, a Chief of Police 
is PhP 5,000 (~$100). So that is weekly. So, they (fishers) have to produce (catch) 
more to gain some profit. And that still depends on how many (enforcers) boarded 
their vessel that day. They also give bañeras of fishes (1 bañera=40 kgs). 
Sometimes, because they do not have cash on hand, they give their (fish) catch in 
bañeras. So, there are current prices. The ones that are asking for premiums are 
the Masbate police and local government. With the closed season, that area 
(Masbate) is the only area where they can fish because it is not guarded. And we 
know for a fact after our enforcement summit in the Visayan Sea that the Masbate 
area is not patrolled that much. So that is where they (fishers) are going. And 
since local governments know that, they are asking for something like a rental of 
their municipal waters. And we are talking about commercial fishing so there is 
no enabling law that will give the local government the power to have an area 
rented out. That is what is being practiced right now.” [Key informant, NGA] 
 
“In their municipal waters in Iloilo, they have this secret zoning wherein they have 
areas where they allow commercial fishers to enter. The boat gives a bond to the 
LGU personnel, but this is among themselves; it is not written. That bond will give 
the commercial fisher access to that area and he is also given power to act as fish 
warden so that no other commercial boats can enter. So that is exclusive fishing 
zone. He (commercial fisher) gives out bañeras of fish.” [Key informant, NGA] 
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The above situation facilitates illegal practices that undermine the purpose of the SFC in 
the Visayan Sea. It further creates distrust among people, resulting in poor implementation on the 
side of the regulators and thus, poor compliance on the side of the regulated group. According to 
the Transparency International (2019), corruption corrodes the fabric of the society by 
undermining people’s trust in political and economic systems, institutions, and leaders. Further, 
corruption constitutes a significant threat to the marine environment, global food security, national 
economies, and local livelihoods in coastal communities (Sumaila et al. 2017). 
 
The on-going corruption related to the SFC implementation in the Visayan Sea can be 
described as both grand (it involves large sums of money) and petty or administrative (everyday 
corruption at the interface between public institutions and citizens or clients, such as bribery, 
linked to the implementation of existing laws, rules, and regulations). While petty corruption is 
considered minor, it can result in great costs when it is prevalent. Sumaila et al. (2017) argues that 
corruption has likely worsened in the fisheries as wild-caught fish have become scarcer due to 
overexploitation and increasingly demand for fish by an increasing human population. As fishery 
resources becomes scarcer, access to them becomes more valuable. Thus, this situation provides 
an enabling environment for corrupt practices to become more prevalent. This shows that even 
when fisheries management measures are in place to help address overfishing and rebuild the fish 
stocks, corrupt practices can negate efforts toward achieving these ends.  
 
These above findings reflect results of Sithirith’s (2014) study wherein the existing 
disproportionate degree of influence, political and economic power among a relatively small 
fishery elite with established connections with relevant state agencies in Cambodia has resulted in 
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many smaller scale fishers becoming trapped in cycles of debt and relational dependency, 
insecurity, and ever diminishing returns from overexploited fish stocks.   
 
The patronage system and corruption that exist in the SFC in the Visayan Sea results in 
uneven implementation of the fishery policy which the respondents find unfair. Respondents have 
expressed their dismay over this situation: 
“There is no problem here (referring to Barangay Nasidman); there should be 
strict implementation in other areas.” [Municipal fisher, Ajuy, Iloilo] 
 
“Unfair implementation (of the SFC) here in Ajuy.” [Municipal fisher, Ajuy, 
Iloilo] 
 
“It is unfair that implementation (of the SFC) is not uniform.’ [LGU 
representative, Bantayan, Cebu] 
 
‘Unfair because sometimes small fishers get caught, but not the big fishing 
operators.” [LGU representative, Estancia, Iloilo] 
 
“They do not arrest the fish dryers.” [Fish dryer, Madridejos, Cebu] 
 
“They do not conduct arrest in the markets during closed season.” [Fish vendor, Cadiz 
City, Negros Occidental] 
 
 
According to Robbins (2012), contemporary conservation not only drives traditional 
residents and users to the margins, it often fails on its own terms, producing unsustainable results 
while perpetuating injustices and conflict. The importance of criteria of fairness in designing social 
institutions, which emphasizes that social allocation of rules should not injure those who are the 
most disadvantaged in the society, has been recognized and applied to natural resource 
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management (Rawl 1971). In an article that calls for a modified approach to fisheries improvement 
projects (FIPs and small-scale fisheries (SSF), Barr et al. (2019) discuss that perceived fairness, 
equity and legitimate benefit-sharing mechanisms will be key to long-term success of FIPs within 
SSF, which ultimately determines compliance with the fishery reform rules. 
 
In fisheries, the valuable resources and high level of human activity that characterize 
coastal areas lead to inevitably competing and conflicting claims over the allocation and use of 
such resources (FAO 2014). Disputes arise regularly from conflicts over allocation of scarce 
fisheries resources, over the division of fishery benefits among stakeholders and over short-term 
management arrangements between fishers and government/resource managers (Charles 1992). 
For example, a study by Matlock et al. (1988) shows how the rule prohibiting retention of the red 
drum and spotted seatrout on a permanent basis set by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Commission 
in response to a fish kill was adamantly opposed by the fishermen in East Matagorda Bay, Texas. 
The fishermen found the rule unnecessary, discriminatory and without basis, and devastating to 
their economic welfare. Moreover, the implementation of the Atlantic Groundfish Plan in 1977, 
recommended by the New England Regional Fishery Management Council, pushed for the 
regulation of the annual landings of haddock, cod, and yellowtail, and this resulted in opposition 
from fishermen in Gloucester as the decisions favored certain fishing groups like the greasers (a 
derogatory term for new immigrants) and mid-sized boats. The groundfish closure pitted fishermen 
against fishermen based on different economic considerations associated with inshore and offshore 
fishing. In effect, Gloucester fishermen were disorganized, demoralized, and thoroughly 





Effects of the SFC on the sardine and mackerel catch in the Visayan Sea 
 
Introduction 
Seasonal fishery closures (SFCs) have been widely used in fisheries management to 
prevent overfishing and reduce bycatch of protected species.  In other cases, SFCs are imposed 
during the breeding or spawning period of species with the belief that this will reduce fishing 
mortality directly, thus, achieving greater annual reproductive output (Murawski 2000; Arendse et 
al. 2007).  Clarke et al. (2015) make the case that for a spawning closure to have a net benefit to 
population growth, there should be a reduction in the annual fishing mortality. However, experts 
also underscore that if the spawning fishes are not particularly susceptible to capture during 
spawning or there is a change in fishing effort that negates the seasonal reduction in mortality, a 
spawning closure may have no effect (Gruss et al. 2014a; Gruss and Robinson 2015). Further, 
Everson (1986) argues that even though banning fishing during spawning periods is a worthy 
objective in principle,  it is unlikely that it will have any real effect on future stocks given the 
enormous number of eggs that are produced by an individual fish; additional catching capacity 
will likely to be introduced if the SFC is successful in building up a stock, and unless the open 
season is shortened, fishing mortality may ultimately tend to return to its original level. 
 
Despite the potential benefits from SFCs, there are varying reviews about this management 
strategy (Arendse et al. 2007; Jiang et al. 2009; Mendoça and Sobrinho 2013; Wang et al. 2015). 
In particular, the implementation of spawning area closures remains controversial due to the 
frequent lack of clear objectives, monitoring and empirical evidence (Sadovy and Domeier 2005; 
Beets and Manuel 2007; Gruss et al. 2014b; Clarke et al. 2015). Further, the effectiveness of SFCs 
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is not consistently tested (Clarke et al. 2015). In a paper that reviews the temporal and seasonal 
closures used in fisheries management in tropical and subtropical regions and important species 
groups for Hawaii, Beets and Manuel (2007) report that although quantitative analyses of the 
specific value of this fishery management strategy have not been conducted, managers who 
evaluated SFCs concluded that they have been useful and beneficial based on perceived benefits 
and stock effects. Furthermore, the design of SFCs presents a challenge because the net benefits 
to the fishery or other resources are often unknown (Sanchirico and Wilen 2001; Sanchirico 2005).  
 
This study is conducted to empirically test the anecdotal claims about the increasing fish 
catch in the Visayan Sea as a result of the SFC implemented in this area annually, from November 
15-February 15. This period is identified by the BFAR as the spawning season for sardines, 
herrings, and mackerels. The implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea received varying 
perceptions about its impacts. Although the BFAR, the agency that is mandated to manage the 
fisheries and aquatic resources in the Philippines, is very optimistic about the positive effects of 
this conservation strategy, there is no published empirical evidence that supports this claim. To 
better inform policy makers, managers, and stakeholders on the impact of the current SFC policy 
in the Visayan Sea, this study is conceptualized to verify anecdotal claims about the increasing 
catch in the Visayan Sea as a result of the SFC. This is particularly important especially since 
people’s livelihoods are at stake, and the government is allocating scarce resources for the 
implementation of this fishery policy. Farmer et al. (2016) emphasize the importance of addressing 
the uncertainty in the projected impacts of a closure not only to reliably compare alternatives, but 
also to illuminate the impacts of a fishery closure. Hence, this study aims to empirically test the 
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hypothesis that the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea has increased the catch for 
sardines and mackerels.  
 
Catch trends for sardines and mackerels 
Figures 48 and 49 present the mean catch for sardines and mackerels compared between 
the participating (treatment) and non-participating (control) groups, both before and after the strict 
implementation of the SFC in 2012.  The catch for sardines in the participating group has been 
declining since 2009, but a sharp drop is observed in 2013, particularly in the participating group 
(Figure 48). This decrease in the catch for sardines coincides with the period when strict 
implementation of the SFC in the Visayan took effect. The non-participating group shows a 
relatively decreasing catch trend for sardines.  
 
Figure 48. Catch trends for sardines (in MT) in the non-participating  (left) and participating 




Catch landings for mackerels in the non-participating group show a relatively decreasing 




Figure 49. Catch trends for mackerels (in MT) in the non-participating  (top) and participating 
groups (bottom) within the period 2007-2018. 
 
Paired samples test shows significant differences in the catch for sardines in the 
participating and non-participating groups before (p<.05) and after (p<.05) the strict 
implementation of the SFC policy. Both groups experienced significant declines in sardines’ catch 




Table 17. Paired samples test for the catch for sardines in the participating and non-participating 




In comparison, there is a significant difference in the catch for mackerels in the non-
participating group after the strict implementation of the SFC policy in the Visayan Sea (p<.05), 
but not in the participating group (Table 18). 
 
Table 18. Paired samples test for the catch for mackerels in the participating and non-







DID estimation results show a statistically significant effect of both the Group (p<.05) and 
Policy (p<.05) parameters on the catch for sardines (Table 19). The interaction between the Group 
and Policy (i.e., 𝜏 in the DID regression framework in equation 2) shows ~2,000 MT decline in 
the catch for sardines after the strict implementation of the SFC policy in 2012. The decline is 
statistically significant (p<.05).  
 




The parameter estimates in Table 13 can be better interpreted visually in Figure 50. There 
is a significantly higher catch for sardines in the participating group compared to the non-
participating group, before and after the strict implementation of the SFC Policy. Although there 
is an observed decline in the catch for sardines in the non-participating group after the SFC Policy 
(by ~383 MT), the drop is not as drastic as in the participating group, wherein a dramatic decrease 
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Figure 50. Estimated marginal means of catch for sardines (in MT) between the non-participating 
group and participating groups, before and after the strict implementation of the SFC policy in 




DID estimation results show a statistically significant effect of the Group on the catch for 
mackerels (p<.05), but not the Policy (p>.05) (Table 20). There is a statistically significant 
decrease in the catch for mackerels in the non-participating group (~3,000 MT; p<.05). While the 
interaction between the Group and Policy suggests an increase in the catch for mackerels in the 





Table 20. DID estimates for catch for mackerels. 
 
 
Figure 51 shows the estimated marginal means of catch for mackerels between the 
participating and non-participating group, before and after the strict implementation of the SFC 
policy. In general, the participating group has higher catch for mackerels compared to the non-
participating group. The figure also shows the significant decrease in the catch for mackerels in 







Figure 51. Estimated marginal means of catch for mackerels (in MT) between the non-
participating group and participating groups, before and after the strict implementation of the 
SFC policy in the Visayan Sea. 
 
 
The above findings are contrary to the report of the BFAR which highlights the success of 
the implementation of the SFC policy in the recovery of the regulated fish species. For example, 
the BFAR reported that sardines catch has increased in 2013, as shown in Figure 52 (DA-BFAR 
2013; Mesa 2014; DA-BFAR 2018). This increase is attributed to the BFAR’s intensive IEC and 





Figure 52. Graph showing landed catch (MT) of sardines observed on 2 succeeding closed 
season (CS) from C.Y. 2011-2012 and C.Y. 2012-2013 (Mesa 2014). 
 
However, this study argues that mere comparison of fish catches before and after the 
implementation of the SFC program in a normal seasonal cycle is misleading because fishers race 
to fish as soon as the open season begins, thus, the reported increase. This has been confirmed by 
the BFAR representatives during an interview wherein key informants report that fishers indeed, 
tend to ‘race to fish’ as soon as the SFC is declared, and immediately after the fishing ban is lifted. 
Further, the graph by the BFAR (Figure 52) is not convincing because fishing effort is indeed 
expected to decline during the SFC and increase afterwards, producing a catch pattern exactly as 
shown in the graph above. Furthermore, the reported increase in the catch for sardines by the BFAR 
may not be conclusive that the SFC program is successful because 2 years of implementation is a 
very short period to observe a meaningful impact of the SFC policy especially that previous studies 
on sardine populations in the Philippines indicate that these species reach sexual maturity in 2-3 
years (Willette et al. 2011). Although other authors note that sardine species such as the Indian oil 
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sardines becomes sexually mature at age 1 year old (Hornell and Nayudu 1924, as cited by Nair 
1959). Interview with BFAR key informants also reveals that the agency has no clear metrics for 
evaluating the success or failure of the SFC policy, hence, no solid basis for the reported increase 
in the catch of the regulated fish species.  
 
In general, an SFC (or closed season) management strategy is primarily based on effort 
control; it aims to reduce fishing mortality by limiting the fishing activity to an appropriate level 
thereby increasing the stock size. However, Beets and Manuel (2007) argues that predicting fishing 
mortality based on effort control may be difficult because that would depend on how fishers 
respond to set regulations. Fishing effort may be diverted to other resources that may be overfished 
or nearing an overfished condition or at a higher level than before during open season (Anderson 
1977).  A key informant from an NGA that is involved in ocean conservation in the Philippines 
also confirmed that fishers try to compensate for their losses by using more powerful fishing gears 
and by doubling or tripling their fishing effort when the fishing ban is lifted. According to the 
President of the PAMALAKAYA-Pilipinas (National Federation of Small Fisherfolk Organization 
in the Philippines), the SFC policy is futile because it is business-as-usual for commercial fishers 
after the closed season (Mayuga 2017). Hence, whatever gains accrued during the 3-month SFC 
is readily lost to commercial fishing operations especially that some LGUs allow commercial 
fishing within municipal waters. This has serious implications to the small-scale fishers because 
their livelihood is greatly affected.  
 
Further, studies have shown that the design of SFCs presents a challenge because the net 
benefits to the fishery or other resources are often unknown (Sanchirico and Wilen 2001; 
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Sanchirico 2005). Clearly, the implementation of the SFC alone is not enough to effect positive 
results in the management of sardines and mackerels in the Visayan Sea, particularly in increasing 
fish catch. Although there might be positive effects on the overall population size of these species, 
this remains unknown. The BFAR management should consider adopting a more direct and 
effective method of controlling fishing mortality other than SFCs, such as controlling for catch 
levels or landings, and controlling access to the resource (Caddy 1984), although these strategies 
may also have associated challenges such as funding requirement, among other things. Given the 
limited resources of the BFAR and the LGUs, strict monitoring in the market and landing sites is 
a more feasible strategy. 
 
Despite being in effect for 8 decades now, it is not surprising that concerns on the rationale 
of SFC policy linger. During an interview with the President of the PAMALAKAYA-Pilipinas, he 
expressed that their organization is not totally against the SFC, but there is a need for a careful 
study on why implementing a fishing ban in a particular area is necessary. He further said that the 
declaration of the fishing ban is useless if the reason behind the decline in the fisheries production 
is unknown. This is particularly important for sardines and mackerels because studies in other 
areas indicate that their populations are sensitive to ocean climate and productivity (Checkley et 
al. 2017; Spijkers and Boonstra 2017; Das et al. 2020). Thus, a careful study on the SFC is 
imperative to ensure that management efforts, and thus, government expenditure, translate to 
measurable outcomes towards sustainable fisheries in the Visayan Sea.  
 
Various studies have shown that fish abundance fluctuates as a result of fishing activity, 
and productivity shifts between high and low regimes unrelated to abundance (Gilbert 1997; 
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Mantua and Hare 2002; Axenrot and Sture 2003; MacKenzie et al. 2007; Vert-pre et al., 2013).  
For example, the collapse of stocks of Peruvian anchoveta (Engraulis ringens), the Alaskan 
Pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) and the ‘northern’ cod (Gadus morhua) off eastern Canada 
have been attributed to the combined effects of changing ecosystems and overfishing (Alheit and 
Niquen 2004; Bailey 2011; Lilly et al. 2013; Skern-Mauritzen et al. 2015).  
 
In a study that looks at the relationship of climate and populations of anchovy and sardine, 
Checkley et al. (2017) conclude that anchovy and sardine populations vary primarily in response 
to climate, and while fishing may change the fluctuations in anchovy and sardine stocks, it neither 
causes nor prevents these fluctuations. Several studies have also pointed out the wide changes in 
the production levels of sardine and anchovy fisheries, which has sustained periods of high and 
low catch occurring almost simultaneously during the same years in different systems, suggesting 
some global interdecadal phenomenon than links these events, rather than just the effect of 
independent fishing pressure (Kawasaki and Omori 1998; Kawasaki et al. 1991; Lluch-Belda et 
al. 1989; Lluch-Cota et al. 1997).  
 
For example, Kawasaki and Omori (1988) observe that the high sardine and low anchovy 
abundances in Japan, California, and Peru-Chile Systems are associated with globally sustained 
warm periods, while the high anchovy high and low sardine abundances are associated with 
sustained cold periods. On the contrary, Crawford et al. (1987) report an opposite pattern for 
sardine-anchovy abundances in the Benguela System. This led to the concept of ‘regimes’, which 
refer to this scale of small pelagic variability (Lluch-Cota et al. 1997).  
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Some studies point to the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO13) events as the cause of 
the high-low patterns in the pelagic fisheries around the world (Caviedes and Fik 1992; Miller and 
Fluharty 1992; Cubillos and Arcos 2002; Cushing 2013; Shetye et al. 2019). However, Lluch-Cota 
et al. (1997) explain that ENSO changes are often regarded as high frequency, year-to-year 
variations, whereas the most significant changes of the pelagic stocks and their environment are 
believed to occur over the interdecadal-regime-time scale. 
 
In another study which evaluates the proportion of fish stocks (where productivity is 
primarily related to abundance versus those that appear to manifest regimes of high or low 
productivity), Vert-pre et al. (2013) examine the harvest and abundance of 230 fish stocks and 
tested 4 hypotheses, namely: abundance (i.e., production is always related to population 
abundance), regimes (i.e., production shifts irregularly between regimes not related to abundance), 
mixed (i.e., even though production is related to abundance, there are irregular changes in this 
relationship), and random (i.e., production in random from year to year). Their results reveal that 
the regimes hypothesis best explains 38.6% of the stocks; the mixed hypothesis, 30.5%; the 
abundance hypothesis, 18.3%; and the random hypothesis, 12.6%.  
 
There are also accounts of observed variability in the fish migration at the local setting. For 
example, in a study that looks at the economic growth in the rural fishing community of Estancia 
(one of the study sites), Szanton (1971) reports that the annual fish migration in the area is highly 
 
13 ENSO is a recurring climate pattern, ranging from about 3-7 years, that involve changes in the temperature of 
waters in the central and eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. The surface waters across a large swath of the tropical Pacific 
Ocean warm or cool by anywhere from 1°C to 3°C, compared to normal (NWS 2020). According to Cai et al. (2015), 
ENSO is the most important year-to-year fluctuation in our climate system on the planet1, varying between 
anomalously cold (La Niña) and warm (El Niño) conditions. 
172 
 
variable, i.e., particular species may arrive a month or 2 before or after their usual schedule such 
that in 1 year, all the species may be unusually plentiful; the next year, only 1 species will be 
abundant, and the following year, total quantity of fish suddenly declines. 
 
Notwithstanding the current debate on the causes of these variabilities in the environment, 
fisheries management agencies need to acknowledge that irregular changes in productivity are 
common and that harvest regulation and management targets need to be flexible to productivity 
changes (Vert-pre et al. 2013). In the case of the SFC in the Visayan Sea, in addition to monitoring 
fish catch landings, it will be valuable for resource managers to understand the ecosystem drivers 
of fish stock productivity in the area because fish stock production is dependent on the physical 
and biological conditions of the ecosystem (Skern-Mauritzen et al. 2015; Fowler et al. 2018; 
Kurota et al. 2020). This is fundamental for the BFAR management especially that the agency has 
recently adopted the ecosystem approach to fisheries management to managing the Visayan Sea 
(DA-BFAR 2018), and one of the main pillars of this approach is the inclusion of the impacts of 
ecosystem processes on fish stock production (Skern-Mauritzen et al. 2015). 
 
 
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Having an understanding of the interrelationships of different factors that help shape the 
success or failure of the SFC policy is critical. This study demonstrates how the interplay of 
different factors at different levels, i.e., the stakeholders’ knowledge and perceptions about the 
SFC policy, the stakeholders’ interactions and social relationships at different levels, their socio-
economic circumstances, and the cultural and political environment in the different municipalities 




Knowledge and perceptions of municipal fisheries stakeholders about the SFC in the Visayan Sea 
This study shows that while municipal fisheries stakeholders in the Visayan Sea have 
relatively fair knowledge about the SFC, there are differences in the level of knowledge, not only 
among stakeholders, but also among municipalities. Analysis by respondent group shows that only 
the LGU representatives have a good level of knowledge about the SFC, while analysis by 
municipality shows that all municipalities in Panay Island have a good level of knowledge about 
the SFC. On the other hand, the municipalities of Milagros and Cawayan in Masbate Island have 
very poor knowledge about the SFC. These findings can be attributed to the fact that the enclosed 
area is largely comprised by the municipal waters of the study sites in the Panay Island and the 
neighboring islands of Negros and Cebu. Hence, municipal fisheries stakeholders in these areas 




There is a statistically significant difference in the level of knowledge of respondents about 
the SFC in the regulated groups in the different municipalities. Regulated groups in the 
municipalities in Panay Island are more knowledgeable about the SFC compared to the 
respondents in other areas. Although there is a positive and significant correlation between the 
regulated group’s knowledge about, and compliance, with the SFC, the correlation is weak. These 
results may be driven by socio-economic and cultural factors, which have a more direct influence 
on the regulated group’s compliance with the SFC. 
  
Majority of the respondents think that: 1) There is sufficient and accurate information in 
support of the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea (67.7%); 2) There are opportunities 
for consultation and dialogue with different stakeholders about the SFC (61.7%); 3) The SFC is 
strictly implemented in their respective municipalities (52.8%); 3) There is an observed increase 
in the catch of sardines in the last 5 years (56.2%); and that 4) They are benefitting from the SFC 
(60.4%). Further, respondents believe that the implementation of the SFC 5) is necessary for the 
conservation of fisheries (91.5%); and 6) should be continued (84.7%). Furthermore, 7) majority 
of the respondents disagree that revising the provisions of the SFC policy is necessary (57.8%). 
On the other hand, majority of the respondents are not decided whether 8) The SFC is strictly 
implemented in other municipalities (39.6%). Respondents have varying views whether 9) There 
is an increase in the catch of mackerels in the last 5 years.  
 
There is a statistically significant difference in the perceptions of the regulated and 
regulator’s group about the SFC. Similarly, there is a statistically significant difference in the 
regulated groups’ perceptions about the SFC in the Visayan Sea in the different municipalities. 
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Regulated groups in the municipalities of Carles, Estancia, Concepcion, and Ajuy (Iloilo 
Province); Bantayan and Madridejos (Cebu Province); Cadiz City and E.B. Magalona (Negros 
Occidental Province) and Roxas City (Capiz Province) have relatively high perceptions about the 
SFC in the Visayan Sea. On the contrary, regulated groups in Escalante City (Negros Occidental 
Province) and Cawayan and Milagros (Masbate Province) have relatively low perceptions about 
the SFC. There is a positive and significant correlation in the regulated groups’ perceptions about, 
and compliance with, the SFC in the Visayan Sea. 
 
Overall, there is a varying interpretation of the SFC policy at different levels of 
management, i.e., national BFAR, regional BFAR, and LGUs. While the municipalities claim that 
they are implementing the SFC, there are differences in the degree of implementation and thus, 
differences in compliance.  
 
These findings provide a feedback to the BFAR management on which municipalities they 
need to focus on in terms of IEC campaigns with regards to the SFC policy. Fisheries stakeholder’s 
compliance is vital to the success of the SFC implemented for the Visayan Sea, hence, the BFAR 
should be mindful of the stakeholders’ level of knowledge and perceptions about the SFC policy 
as these clearly affect their level of compliance.  
 
 
Socio-economic and cultural impacts of the SFC in the Visayan Sea 
A majority of the regulated group is affected by the SFC implemented in the Visayan Sea. 
The regulated group’s livelihoods and households are affected because they experience no/ limited 
or low fish catch or fish supply during the SFC. This situation is exacerbated by the lack of 
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alternative livelihoods for the disenfranchised municipal fisheries stakeholders during the 3-month 
fishing ban, which affect their income and thus, has cascading effects on food availability, 
children’s schooling, and household dynamics. 
 
In terms of cultural impacts, the majority of the respondents said there are no cultural 
beliefs and practices affected by the SFC implemented in the Visayan Sea. Respondents claim that 
they have grown to accept the SFC as part of the norm and the local culture. However, 16% of the 
respondents said traditional holidays and events such as Christmas, New Year, Fiestas and 
birthdays are affected by the SFC because the celebration of these holidays and events coincide 
with the SFC period and some respondents are not able to participate in these traditional events 
due to budget shortage. Traditional fishing methods and practices (e.g., use of seine nets, ring nets, 
and fish aggregating devices), and traditional fishing areas are likewise affected by the SFC 
implementation in the Visayan Sea. The municipal fishers are also forced to fish further to the sea, 
posing additional risks and costs to them, as well as longer fishing time. 
 
Although some respondents cited availability of alternative livelihoods, none of the 
livelihood programs identified were specific to the SFC. These were either given as aid after a 
calamity or generic programs of the LGU. Thus, these programs are not addressing the concerns 
of the disenfranchised stakeholders during the 3-month fishing ban. 
 
To cope with the impacts of the SFC, respondents look for land-based alternative 
livelihoods such as farm work (e.g., planting, cutting, weeding, and harvesting); selling fruits, 
vegetables and root crops; service-oriented occupations (e.g., labor, construction, carpentry, 
177 
 
laundry, cleaning, baby-sitting, fetching water for other people, etc.); livestock farming; small-
scale business ventures (e.g., managing a convenience store or computer shop; buy and sell of 
different goods, eatery, vending cooked food, etc.); and transport services (operating a pump boat, 
pedicab, tricycle), among others. Affected respondents who have the resources adjust, either by 
shifting to allowable fishing methods such as hook and line, beach seine, squid and crab fishing, 
gleaning, or by catching or selling other aquatic species. 
 
The BFAR management must be cognizant of these socio-economic and cultural impacts 
of the SFC policy as these can undermine the effective management of the Visayan Sea.  
Recognizing the differential impacts of the SFC policy among fisheries stakeholders is imperative 
to ensure that appropriate livelihood programs are provided to those who needed them most.  
 
To cope with the impacts of the SFC, the affected municipal fisheries stakeholders resort 
to myriad strategies which include engaging in land-based alternative livelihoods, namely: farm 
work;  service-oriented occupations like labor, construction, carpentry, laundry, working for other 
people, etc.; livestock farming; small-scale business venture; and transport services (utilizing boat 
for passenger transport or driving pedicab, tricycle, or vehicle). Those who have the resources 
adjust, either by shifting to allowable fishing methods such as hook and line, beach seine, squid 





Political factors that affect the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea 
 There is a grey area on jurisdiction in the management of the Visayan Sea because existing 
legal frameworks provide that registration and management of the commercial fishing boats (and 
commercial waters, i.e., beyond 15 kms) is under the BFAR, although some municipalities allow 
commercial fishing boats to operate from 10.1. kms seaward. Management of municipal fishing 
boats and municipal waters (from shoreline to 15 kms seaward) on the other hand, is within the 
jurisdiction of the LGUs. The decision to implement the SFC in the municipalities covered by the 
SFC is left with the Mayors. Thus, MCS activities can be quiet challenging because there is no 
clear demarcation between the municipal and commercial waters. Further, the LGUs are 
responsible for regulating and monitoring fishery activities within their municipal waters. While 
the DILG enjoins the coastal LGUs to regulate and monitor fishery activities within their municipal 
waters, however, there is no accountability mechanism in place. The complex interactions of the 
different stakeholders in the Visayan Sea at various levels are conditioned by power relations (i.e., 
what enables who to do what to whom) that emanate from these administrative arrangements. The 
unequal power relations among these fisheries stakeholders provide opportunities to perpetuate 
illegal activities which can lead to failures in achieving management goals of the SFC and equity 
among the fisheries stakeholders. Further, the LGUs have varying priorities and financial and 
logistical capabilities that greatly affect the implementation of the SFC in their respective 
municipalities. While majority of the study sites claim that they are implementing the SFC, there 
are differences in the level of enforcement and thus, compliance. The level of compliance with the 




Some members of the regulatory group (i.e., LGU representatives, Fish wardens, PNP-
MG/PCG and BFAR) who are overseeing the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan Sea 
misuse their authority over the resources and their clients for illegitimate private gains. The 
patronage system and corruption embedded in the system result in the uneven implementation of 
the SFC in the different municipalities which perpetuates inequality and distrust between the 
regulated fisheries stakeholders and regulators. These illegal practices also undermine enforcement 
and management goals, injuring further the already disadvantaged fisheries stakeholders in the 
community. Further, these result in ineffective use of government funds because fishery 
management goals are compromised. Furthermore, the SFC in the Visayan Sea does not serve the 
interests of the different fisheries stakeholders, contrary to what is often claimed by the 
government. 
 
For the SFC policy to be effective, the BFAR management and the participating LGUs 
need to address the identified factors that weaken the implementation of the SFC in the Visayan 
Sea. As it is now, the government’s expenditure in implementing the SFC policy does not translate 
into achieving its goals of conserving the sardines and mackerels’ populations in the Visayan Sea.  
 
 
Effects of the SFC on the sardine and mackerel catch in the Visayan Sea 
Using a BACI design analysis with DID estimation strategy, anecdotal claims about the 
increasing catch of sardines (and mackerels) in the Visayan Sea was verified by evaluating the 
differences before and after the strict implementation of the SFC policy in 2012 in the participating 
(tretament) and non-participating (control) provinces. Results of this study show that catch for 
180 
 
sardines significantly declined after the strict implementation of the SFC policy in 2012. While 
there is an observed increase in the catch for mackerels, the increase is not significant. These 
findings do not support the claims by the BFAR on the increasing catch of sardines in the Visayan 
Sea. These results are also contrary to the perceptions of the municipal fisheries stakeholders in 
the Visayan Sea about the increasing catch for sardines catch in the area in the last 5 years. 
 
The fluctuation in the abundance of the regulated species in the Visayan Sea may be a 
result of the combined effects of fishing activity and productivity shifts driven by changes in the 
environment. Understanding the underlying mechanisms that govern the fluctuations in the 
abundance of fish stocks is critical to the appropriate management of the fisheries.  
 
 
Coming full circle to the political ecology framework 
Analyzing the SFC in the Visayan Sea is a complex undertaking, but a necessary challenge. 
To understand it requires the examination of its parts and how these are interrelated, and a political 
ecology framework is useful in this aspect. By using a political ecology framework, this study was 
able to show how and why particular interests dominate in the SFC in the Visayan Sea, and how 
power circulates at different levels and scales, in ways that influence the biophysical and social 
outcomes. The SFC in the Visayan Sea needs to be understood in terms of why fisheries 
stakeholders act the way they do, and how their actions and interactions with each other are 
influenced by the socio-economic, cultural and political environment around them, which in turn 
shape practice, the environmental, and policy outcomes. A political ecology framework lends itself 
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useful in understanding the degree to which such outcomes are ‘non-incidental, persistent, and 
repetitive’ (Robbins 2012). 
 
Findings of this study validate some of the arguments made by scholars engaged in the 
field. One of which is by Watts (2000), which highlights the importance of understanding 
communities in terms of hegemonies because according to him, “not everyone participates or 
benefits equally in the construction and reproduction of communities, or from the claims made in 
the name of community interest”. The SFC implemented in the Visayan Sea has garnered varying 
support from its surrounding municipalities and has caused differential impacts to the fisheries 
stakeholders. These municipalities are internally differentiated in complex social, economic, and 
political ways, which influence resource use and conservation efforts in the Visayan Sea. The 
decision of the government to control access to resources through the implementation of 
conservation efforts like the SFC, results in inevitable repercussions on the local systems of 
livelihood and production. While some would argue that the SFC is ony for 3 months and thus, 
has limited impacts, its temporary nature makes it particularly challenging because it leaves the 
stakeholders vulnerable and confused because the 3-month fishing ban is too long for them to 
persist without income, but not too long enough for them to become re-settled in a new livelihood 
before open season begins again.  
 
Results of this study also corroborate Brogden and Greenberg’s (2005) argument that as 
the rules of access and use become inscribed in law and administrative procedures, this limits the 
bureaucratic structures’ responsiveness to local variance and their ability to mediate competing 
claims over resources because they tend to simplify and regularize decision making. The 
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classification of municipal and commercial sectors in the Philippines for example, shows critical 
variations even within the same sector (e.g., municipal sector), which indicate different fishing 
objectives and practices. Such simplified sectoral categorization masks the differences in scale and 
the varying needs and concerns of the stakeholders involved in the fisheries, which may require a 
more specific management approach, rather than a ‘blanket solution such as the SFC. 
 
Further, results of the study validate one of the theoretical foundations of the conservation 
and access thesis of political ecology on territorialization of conservation, which proves to be 
problematic because conservation areas poorly match ecosystem functions and flows in the 
environment. The enclosed area in the Visayan Sea serves as an example of a conflict between a 
political geography and ecological geography, especially that some of the LGUs included in the 
SFC overlook the interconnectivity of the ecosystems in their respective municipal waters.  
 
This interdisciplinary study extends the political ecology lens in analyzing human-coastal 
environment articulations, specifically in understanding the intricacies of the SFC in the Visayan 
Sea. It is direct response to a criticism of political ecology, i.e., the lack of attention that political 
ecology has given on the actors’ (i.e., the farmer, scientist, the regulator, the politician, and so on) 
social construct of the environment and environmental issues (Watts 2000). Finally, this body of 
work is a contribution to the growing literature on political ecology studies that focus on coastal 
resource management.
 
CHAPTER 6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study has provided the preliminary work which points to areas that need urgent 
attention regarding the SFC in the Visayan Sea. The following are some ‘food for thought’ which 
may be helpful when thinking about ways to go forward: 
1. Future efforts by the government, through the BFAR and LGUS, should pay critical 
attention to the cumulative and differential impacts of the SFC and the political realities in 
its implementation, to ensure that the disadvantaged stakeholders in the Visayan Sea will 
not sustain further injury. A key step to this is to identify the most affected stakeholders in 
the coastal communities included in the SFC and revisit existing programs to accommodate 
their needs and concerns during the 3-month fishing ban. Assistance in the form of food 
subsidies, provision of allowable fishing gears or nets, and land-based livelihoods designed 
for both women and men members of the fishing households must be explored.  
2. To facilitate effective implementation of the SFC, the BFAR must come up with 
implementing guidelines that specify the fishing gears that target sardines and mackerels 
as their primary catch, including those that are known to catch these species as bycatch. 
The guidelines must also specify a catch ceiling for the allowable ‘subsistence fishing’ of 
the regulated species (e.g., 5 kgs as the maximum) such that small-scale fishers will be 
guided accordingly. This will make MCS activities much easier for the members of the 
regulatory group.  
3. The dichotomous classification of the capture fisheries sector should be revisited. 
According to Pauly and Mines (1982), the oversimplified distinction between the 
municipal and commercial fishing sectors based on boat tonnage was an arbitrary decision 
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that was codified in 1932 to define ‘commercial fishing’ for taxation and licensing purposes 
only. This needs to be reviewed and re-classified based on appropriate criteria such as 
financial capital, scale of operation, degree of ownership of fishing boats, gear type, among 
others. A more detailed proposal by Spoehr (1984) on this matter can be found in his paper 
entitled ‘Change in Philippine capture fisheries: An historical overview”. The re-
classification of the capture fisheries in the Philippines will be beneficial to both the BFAR 
and the fisheries stakeholders (especially the small-scale fishers). First, this will capture 
the specific sectoral variations and nuances, which could help the BFAR come up with a 
sound and ‘implementable’ management actions. Second, the re-classification will afford 
fisheries stakeholders with the commensurate regulation and privileges, based on their 
classification. For example, subsistence fishing will be exempted from the SFC. 
4. There should be a stricter monitoring and law enforcement at the marketplaces and landing 
sites to discourage both the fishers from catching, and the fish vendors, fish traders, and 
fish brokers, from selling the regulated species. Perhaps, combining the SFC with a ‘sales 
ban’ will render a more efficient outcome as enforcement will shift its focus on 
marketplaces and landing sites, thereby reducing fuel costs from seaborne patrol. 
5. The BFAR should strictly monitor issuance of certifications for catch of sardines and 
mackerels caught outside the enclosed area while the SFC is in effect, to ensure authenticity 
and to avoid corruption. Findings of this study show that some certifications are issued by 
municipalities that are also included in the SFC, or by some unauthorized individuals who 
use the certification as an opportunity to commit fraud (e.g., Barangay captain). There must 
only be one template for the certification, and it should have security features to verify its 
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authenticity. A protocol should also be established among the members of the regulatory 
group, as well as the port managers, for better coordination and accountability. 
6. An appropriate reporting system must be in place for all fishing boats to ensure 
transparency, accountability, traceability, and good record keeping. Information about the 
boat (captain, crew, tonnage), fishing gears used, target species, date and time of operation, 
among others, should be reported as a requirement for fish landing. Fishers’ compliance to 
such reporting system can be used as a basis for the issuance or renewal of their fishing 
license.  
7. The government, through the BFAR and LGUs, must explore ways to help fishers acquire 
insurance for their protection. If the agriculture sector can provide insurance for farmers, 
fishers must be accorded with the same services. Similarly, all deputized fish wardens must 
have an insurance. 
8. The BFAR should clearly define the objectives of the SFC policy and develop a metrics 
for the appropriate evaluation of impact the policy, not only on the fishery resources, but 
also on the stakeholders whose livelihoods are dependent on these resources.  
9. In addition to monitoring fish catch landings, it will be valuable for the NFRDI 
management to collect biophysical data (e.g., sea temperature, chlorophyll-a, dissolved 
oxygen, salinity, among others) to aid in understanding the ecosystem drivers of fish stock 
productivity in the Visayan Sea because several studies have shown that physical and 
biological conditions of the ecosystems in other areas greatly influence fish migration and 
recruitment.  
10. It will be very helpful if the BFAR/NFRDI will allow access to the NSAP data they have 
collected to facilitate a more robust analysis of their programs which can be beneficial to 
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the stakeholders and policymakers. This will ultimately redound to informed decision-
making and improved fisheries management framework, appropriate programs for the 
affected fisheries stakeholders, as well as efficient and responsible spending of government 
funds. 
11. In addition to the ongoing IEC campaign about the SFC, the BFAR should conduct a 
regular seminar for members of the PNP-MG, PCG and fish wardens in the different 
municipalities to ensure that they understand the provisions of the SFC policy. This has 
been raised by respondents from these groups during our interviews, as they admittedly 
lack adequate information about the SFC. 
12. There must be an independent body that audits the performance of the regulatory groups 
(i.e., BFAR, LGUs, fish wardens, PNP-MG, PCG) to ensure coherence, credibility, 
organizational integrity, and engagement in the management of the fisheries in the Visayan 
Sea in accountable ways.  
13. The BFAR should create incentive structures for municipalities and stakeholders that are 
actively supporting not only the conservation program for sardines and mackerels, but also 
similar activities aimed towards achieving sustainable fisheries. This will motivate good 
behavior among the participating groups in the SFC which could translate to reduced MCS 
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APPENDIX A. IRB APPROVAL 
 
APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM 
 






Municipality of ______________ 
Province of _________________ 
 
 
Dear Mayor _________: 
 
My name is Farisal U. Bagsit, a PhD in Coastal Resources Management student at the East Carolina University, 
Greenville, North Carolina, USA. I am currently working on my dissertation entitled ‘Political ecology of the 
seasonal closure in the Visayan Sea, Philippines’. This study aims to provide a better understanding of the 
impacts of the closed season policy on the fishery resource and stakeholders in the Visayan Sea, as well as the 
underlying factors that influence policy outcomes. The results of this study will not only provide invaluable 
information that can help improve current fishery management framework for the Visayan Sea but will also 
inform future decisions towards a more inclusive development of the fisheries sector in the Philippines. 
 
In this regard, I would like to request for assistance from your office specifically in identifying respondents and 




Semi-structured interviews  • 10 Municipal fishers 
• 3 Fish brokers/fish traders 
• 3 Fish dryers 
• 2 LGU representatives involved in fisheries management 
• 2 members of the Bantay Dagat or PNP Maritime Group 
 
Focus groups  
(participants should be different 
from SSI respondents) 
• 3 Municipal fishers 
• 3 Fish brokers/fish traders/fish dryers 
• 2 LGU representatives involved in fisheries management 
• 2 members of the Bantay Dagat or PNP Maritime Group 
 
Key informant interviews • 2 members of the Municipal Fisheries and Aquatic Resource 
Management Council (MFARMC) 
 
Additionally, we will be visiting your municipality on _______________, to pre-test our interview instrument. 






FARISAL U. BAGSIT 
Email: bagsitf16@students.ecu.edu  
Mobile no: 0918 2872690 
 
APPENDIX D. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
Date (Petsa):__________   Time started (Oras sang pagsugod): _______Time ended (Oras sang pagtapos): ______ 
Resp. #. ___ Gender (Kasarian): ____ Age (Edad): ___ Marital status (Estado): ____ Ethnicity (Tribo): __________ 
Primary source of livelihood (Primero nga pangabuy-anan): ____________________________________________   
% of income from fishing/fishing-related activity (% sang kita nga halin sa pagpangisda o kun panglab-as): ______ 
Highest educational level (Pinakataas nga naeskwelahan): ______________________________________________  
Household size (Pila kamo sa sulod balay?): ____ Brgy/Municipality (Barangay/Munisipyo): __________________ 
No. of yrs of residing in the area (Pila ka tuig na gaistar sa in inga lugar) ________ 
 
 
SCREENING QUESTIONS  
(Municipal fishers) 
 
1. Is your boat motorized or non-motorized? 1 – Non-motorized 2 – Motorized 
(Ano imo baroto?)   (1 – De sagwan)  (2 – De motor) 
2. What is your boat engine type (Ano ang makina sang imo baroto)? _______________________  
3. What is your engine’s horsepower (Pila ka horsepower)? ____________________ 
4. What is your boat length (Pila ka sangkad imo baroto)? ____________________________ 
5. What is your boat tonnage (Pila ka tonelada imo baroto)? ___________________________ 
6. How many boat crews do you have (Pila ka tawo gaupod sa imo mangisda)? ___________________ 
7. Are you a registered fisher?   1 – Yes  2 – No 
7.1. If Yes, where (Kung huo, sa diin)? ________________________________________ 
7.2. How much did you pay (Pila imo ginbayad)? ________________________________ 
 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE SEASONAL FISHERY CLOSURE (SFC) 
(Municipal fishers, Fish dyers, Fish traders/fish brokers, LGU reps, FW, PNP-MG/PCG) 
 
8. Are you aware that an SFC is implemented in the Visayan Sea?    1 – Yes  2 – No 
(Kabalo ka bala nga may ara SFC nga gina-implementar sa Visayan Sea?  1 – Huo  2 – Indi) 
 




10. The SFC applies to (Ang SFC para sa):  
1- Municipal fishers    2 - Commercial fishers    3 - Both  
(1- Munisipal nga mga mangingisda  2 – Komersyal nga mga mangisngisda  3 – Parehos)  
 
11. What species are banned for fishing during the SFC in the Visayan Sea? 
(Ano ang mga isda nga ginadilian dakop sat ion sang SFC?)  
1- Sardines   2 - Mackerels   3 – Both  4 – Other species 
________________________) 





12. What months of the year are covered by the SFC in the Visayan Sea (Ano nga mga binulan gina-

























            
 
13. What are the penalties for violation of the SFC? (Ano ang pena sa biolasyon sa SFC?)  
1 - Imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years (6 nga bulan kag 1 ka adlaw asta 6 ka tuig nga 
pagpreso) 
2 - Fine of PhP 6,000 (Multa nga gabalor PhP 6,000) 
3 - Confiscation of catch (Pagkumpiska sa hulik) 
4 - Cancellation of fishing permit or license (Pagkansela sa fishing permit o kun lisensya) 
5 - Other answers (Iban nga sabat)_________________________________________________ 
             __________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Please encircle the number that corresponds to the extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
(Palihog bilugan ang numero sang sabat nga nagakaangay sa imo pagpati o kun pagdumili sa hambalanun) 
 
Choices: strongly agree 5; somewhat agree 4; neutral 3; somewhat disagree 4; strongly disagree 1 
(Mga pilian: Nagapati guid ako 5; Medyo gapati ako 4; Nyutral 3; Medyo wala ako gapat 4; Wala guid ko gapati 1) 
 
(Municipal fishers, Fish dryers, Fish traders/ fish brokers, LGU reps, FW, PNP-MG/PCG) 
 
14. There is sufficient and accurate information in support of the implementation of 
the SFC in the Visayan Sea (May ara supisyente kag tsakto nga impormasyon sa 
pagimplementar sang SFC). 
5 4 3 2 1 
15. There are opportunities for consultation and dialogue with the different 
stakeholders about the SFC (May ara mga oportunidad para sa konsultasyon 
kag dialogo kaupod ang mga nagkalain-lain nga stakeholders parte sa SFC). 
5 4 3 2 1 
16. The SFC is strictly implemented in our municipality (Ang SFC ay strikto gid 
nga gina implementar sa amon munisipalidad). 
5 4 3 2 1 
17. The SFC is strictly implemented in other municipalities (Ang SFC ay strikto gid 
nga gina implementar sa iban nga munisipalidad). 
5 4 3 2 1 
18. The implementation of the SFC is necessary for the conservation of fisheries 
(Kinahanglan gd ang implementasyon sang SFC para sa pagkonserbar sang 
pangisdaan). 
5 4 3 2 1 
19. There is an observed increase in the catch of sardines in the last 5 years (May 
naobserbahan nga pagdamo sang hulik sang tuloy/tabagak sa nagligad nga 5 ka 
tuig). 
5 4 3 2 1 
20. There is an observed increase in the catch of mackerels in the last 5 years (May 
naobserbahan nga pagdamo sang hulik sang alumahan/hasa-hasa sa nagligad 
nga 5 ka tuig). 
5 4 3 2 1 
21. I am benefitting from the SFC (Nagabenepisyo ako sa SFC). 5 4 3 2 1 
22. The SFC should be continued (Kinanglang padayunon ang SFC). 5 4 3 2 1 
23. The provisions of the SFC should be revised (Kinaglan bag-uhon ang mga 
probisyon sang SFC). 





SOCIO-ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL IMPACTS OF THE SC  
(Municipal fishers) 
 
24. What are the lean, average, peak months in a year (Ano nga mga binulan nga tig-kiliwi, tama-tama lang 
kag tig-bawi)? 
25. How many days per month do you fish during lean, average and peak months (Pila ka adalw kada bulan 
kamo naga-pangisda kung tig-kiliwi, tama-tama lang kag kung tig-bawi)? 
26. What are the fishing gears do you use during lean, average and peak months (Ano nga mga gamit pangisda 
ang inyo gina-usar kung sa mga binulan sang tig-kiliwi, tama-tama lang kag tig-bawi)? 
27. What species do you catch during lean, average and peak months (Ano nga mga sahi/klase sang isda ang 
inyo makuha sa mga binulan sang tig-kiliwi, tama-tama lang kag tig-bawi)? 
28. What is your estimated income per day during lean, average and peak months (Sa imo pagbanta, pila ang 
imo kita sa kada adlaw sa mga binulan sang tig-kiliwi, tama-tama lang kag tig-bawi)? 
29. What is your estimated catch per day during lean, average and peak months (Sa imo pagbanta, pila ka kilo 










No of days/ 
month (Pila ka 
adlaw/bulan) 
(25) 



















Jan       
Feb       
Mar       
Apr       
May       
Jun       
Jul       
Aug       
Sep       
Oct       
Nov       
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30. Do you continue fishing during SFC (Naga-sige ka sigihapon pangisda bisan SFC)? (fishers only)  
1 – Yes (Huo) 2 – No (Indi/wala) 
 
30.1. If Yes (Kung huo→ Where (sa diin) (show graded map)? 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. Are you allowed to fish in other municipalities (Gina tugutan kamo mangisda sa iban nga munisipalidad)?  
1 – Yes (Huo) 2 – No (Indi/wala) 
 




(Municipal fishers, Fish dryers, Fish traders/fish brokers) 
 
32. Is your livelihood affected by the SFC (Gaka-apektohan ang imo pangabuhian tungod sa SFC)? 1 – Yes
 (Huo) 2 – No (Indi/wala) 
 
 33.1. If Yes, how (Kung huo, sa diin)? ______________________________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
33.2. How does this affect your household (Paano nagaka-apektohan sang SC ang inyo panimalay)? (e.g., 
migration (pag-saylo puluy-an), change in gender roles in the household (pag-bago sang buluhaton sang 










34. Do you have secondary sources of livelihood (Luwas sa pangisda, may iban pa ikaw nga ginakuha-an sang 
pangabuhian)? 1 – Yes (Huo) 2 – No (Wala) 
 
 34.1. If Yes, please enumerate (Kung may ara, palihog lista) _____________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
35. How do you compare your income from fishing/fishing-related activity during open and SFC (Paano mo 
makomparar ang imo kita halin sa pagpangisda o kun mga buluhaton nga may koneksyon sa pagpangisda 







The same  
(Parehos lang 
Open 3 2 1 
Closed 3 2 1 
 
 
(Municipal fishers, Fish dryers, Fish traders/fish brokers LGU reps, FW, PNP-MG/PCG) 
 
36. Is there any alternative livelihood provided during the SFC (May ara bala iban nga alternatibo nga 
pangabuhi-an nga ginhatag sa ti-on sang SFC)?   
1 – Yes (Huo) 2 – No (Indi) 
 
36.1. If Yes, what kind of livelihood and from which organization (Kung may ara, anu nga klase sang 
pangabuhi-an kag anu nga organisasyon)? 
Livelihood  
(Pangabuy-anan) 
Sponsoring organization  






36.2. Are there alternative livelihoods provided able to augment your income (May ara bala nga 
alternatibo ngapalangabuhi-an nga gin hatag sa pag padaku sang inyo kita)?  
 (Municipal fishers, Fish dryers, Fish traders/fish brokers)   
 1 – Yes (Huo)  2 – No (Indi) 
 
 
(Municipal fishers, Fish dryers, Fish traders/fish brokers, LGU reps, FW, PNP-MG/PCG) 
 
37. What are the problems/challenges experienced by the community during the different months of the year 





Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
             
             
             
             
             
 
38. Are there cultural beliefs and practices in your municipality that are affected by the implementation of the 
SFC (May ara bala sang mga gina patihan kag gina praktis sa inyo munisipalidad nga naga kaapekto o 
kung aka apektohan sa pag implementar sang SFC)?  
 
1 – Yes (May ara) 2 – No (Wala) 
 





39. Is the SFC implemented in your municipality (Ang SFC gin implementar bala sang inyo municipalidad)? 1 
– Yes (Huo)  2 – No (Indi) 
 
 If Yes (Kung huo),  
 
39.1. Are municipal fishing boats included in the fishing ban (Ang munisipalidad nga baroto sa pag pangisda 
nadala bala sa fishing ban?)?   1 – Yes (Huo) 2 – No (Indi) 
 
39.2. Are commercial fishing boats included in the fishing ban? (Ang komersyal nga baroto sa pag pangisda 
nadala bala sa fishing ban??   1 – Yes (Huo) 2 – No (Indi) 
 
39.3. What is the level of compliance among fishers in your municipality (Anu ang lebel sa pag sunod sang 



























5 4 3 2 1 
Municipal 
(Munisipal) 
5 4 3 2 1 
 






41. What are the challenges encountered in the implementation of the SFC in your municipality (Anu ang mga 





42. Are you in favor of the SFC (Pabor ka bala sa SFC)?   
1 – Yes (Huo) 2 – No (Indi) 
 
43. What are the things you agree and don’t agree about the SFC (Anu ang mga butang nga imu gina tugutan 
kag wala gina tugutan parti sa SFC)? 
Things you agree about CS  
(Mga butang parte sa SFC nga nagasugot ka) 
Things you don’t agree about CS 






44. Will you support revisions in its provisions (Ma suporta ka bala sa revisions kag sa provisions)?    
1 – Yes (Huo)  2 – No (Indi) 
 




45. Do you follow the SFC (Naga sunod ka bala sa SFC?)?     
1 – Yes (Huo) 2 – No (Indi)  3 – Sometimes (Kun kis-a) 
 
46. What is the biggest motivation in following or not following the SFC (Anu ang daku nga rasun nga nag 
inganyo sa pag sunod ukon wala nag sunod sa SFC?) 
Motivation for following (mga rason nga naga-
inganyo sa pagsunod sa SFC) 
Motivation for not following (mga rason nga 






(Municipal fishers, Fish dryers, Fish traders/fish brokers, LGU reps, FW, PNP-MG/PCG) 
 
47. Have you ever been apprehended for violating the SFC (Naka agi ka bala nadakpan sa pag lapas sang 
SFC)?   
1 – Yes (Huo) 2 – No (Indi) 
 
If Yes (Kung huo):  
48.1. Who apprehended you (Sin-o naka dakop sa imu)? ____________________________________ 
48.2. How was the case handled (Anu natabo sa kaso)? _____________________________________ 
48.3. What was the penalty (Ano ang multa)? _____________________________________________ 
48.4. Who were the people/agencies that handled it (Sin-o ang mga tawo ukon ahensya nga nag 
pangamot sa kaso?) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
48.5. Who helped you (Sin-o nag bulig sa imu)? ___________________________________________ 
 
48. Do you know anyone who has been apprehended for violating the SFC (May ara ka bala sang nabal-an 
nga nag lapas sang SFC)?  1 – Yes (Huo) 2 – No (Indi) 
 
48.1.  If Yes, was the offender from (Kung Oo, taga diin)?   
1 - your municipality (sa inyo munisipalidad)  2 – other municipality (sa iban nga munisipalidad) 
 
49. Can you give 5 words which you can think about, or you associate with, the SFC? (Maghatag sang lima ka 
tinaga kung sa diin sa pamatyag mo kag sa imu ka updanan ang parti sa SFC)?  
   
   








Gender 1 Female 
2 Male 



















Respondent group 1 Municipal fisher 
2 Fish dryer 
3 Fish vendor/Fish trader/Fish broker 
4 LGU representative 
5 Fish warden 
6 PNP-MG/PCG 
Educational attainment 1 Elem level 
2 Elem grad 
3 Hs level 
4 Hs grad 
5 Coll level 




8 Post grad 






7 Cadiz City 
8 E.B. Magalona 
9 Escalante City 
10 Milagros 
11 Cawayan 
12 Roxas City 
Boat type 1 Motorized 
2 Non-motorized 
3 NA 
Are you a registered fisher? 1 Yes 
2 No 
Are you aware that an SFC is implemented 
in the Visayan Sea? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
Q9. Score 0 Wrong answer 
1 Correct answer 
Who are included in the SFC? 1 Municipal fishers 
2 Commercial fishers 
3 Municipal and commercial fishers 
4 No answer/No idea 
Q10.Score 0 Wrong answer 
1 Correct answer 
What species are banned from fishing 
during SFC in the Visayan Sea? 
1 Sardines 
2 Mackerels 
3 Sardines and mackerels 
4 Other species 
5 No answer 
Q11.Score 0 Wrong answer 
1 Correct answer 
What months of the year are covered by the 
SFC in the Visayan Sea? 




Q12.Score 0 Wrong answer 
1 Correct answer 




3 Forfeiture of catch 
4 Cancellation of fishing permit of 
license 
5 Other answers 
6 No answer/No idea 
Q13.Score 0 No idea/No answer 
1 1 pt 
2 2 pts 
3 3 pts 
4 4 pts 
There is sufficient and accurate information 
in support of the implementation of the SFC 
in the Visayan Sea. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Somewhat disagree 
3 Neutral 
4 Somewhat agree 
5 Strongly agree 
There are opportunities for consultation and 
dialogue with the different stakeholders 
about the SFC. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Somewhat disagree 
3 Neutral 
4 Somewhat agree 
5 Strongly agree 
The SFC is strictly implemented in our 
municipality. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Somewhat disagree 
3 Neutral 
4 Somewhat agree 
5 Strongly agree 
The SFC is strictly implemented in other 
municipalities. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Somewhat disagree 
3 Neutral 
4 Somewhat agree 
5 Strongly agree 
The implementation of the SFC is necessary 
for the conservation of fisheries. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Somewhat disagree 
3 Neutral 
4 Somewhat agree 
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5 Strongly agree 
There is an observed increase in the catch of 
sardines in the last 5 years. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Somewhat disagree 
3 Neutral 
4 Somewhat agree 
5 Strongly agree 
There is an observed increase in the catch of 
mackerels in the last 5 years. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Somewhat disagree 
3 Neutral 
4 Somewhat agree 
5 Strongly agree 
I am benefitting from the SFC. 1 Strongly disagree 
2 Somewhat disagree 
3 Neutral 
4 Somewhat agree 
5 Strongly disagree 
The SFC should be continued. 1 Strongly disagree 
2 Somewhat disagree 
3 Neutral 
4 Somewhat agree 
5 Strongly agree 
The provisions of the SFC should be 
revised. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Somewhat disagree 
3 Neutral 
4 Somewhat agree 
5 Strongly agree 
Do you continue fishing during the SFC? 1 Yes 
2 No 
Is your livelihood affected by SFC? 1 Yes 
2 No 
3 NA 





Is there any alternative livelihood provided 




4 No answer/No idea 
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Are the alternative livelihoods provided able 




4 No answer 
Are there cultural belief and practices in 




3 Not sure 
4 No answer 





4 No answer/No idea 
Are commercial fishing boats included in 




4 No answer/No idea 
Are commercial fishing boats included in 




4 No answer/No idea 
What is the level of compliance among 
commercial fishers in your municipality? 
1 0 compliance 
2 Very low 
3 Moderately low 
4 Moderately high 
5 Moderately high 
What is the level of compliance among 
municipal fishers in your municipality? 
1 0 Compliance 
2 Very low 
3 Moderately low 
4 Moderately high 
5 Very high 
Are you in favor of the SFC? 1 Yes 
2 No 
Do you follow the SFC? 1 Yes 
2 No 
3 Sometimes 





Have you been apprehended for violating 
the SFC? 
2 No 






7 71 and over 
% income from fishing and fishing-related 
activities 






Household size 1 1-3 
2 4-6 
3 7-10 
4 11 and above 





6 46 and over 
No of boat crew 1 1-3 
2 4-6 
3 7-10 
4 11 and over 
Q8. Score 0 No 
1 Yes 
No of fishing days_Lean months 0 0 
1 1-7 days 
2 8-14 days 
3 15-21 days 
4 22-30 days 
No of fishing days_Peak Months 0 0 
1 1-7 days 
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2 8-14 days 
3 15-21 days 
4 22-30 days 





Catch _Lean months 1 1-10 kgs 
2 11-20 kgs 
3 21-30 kgs 
4 31-40 kgs 
5 41-50 kgs 
6 51-60 kgs 
7 61-70 kgs 
8 71-80 kgs 
9 81-90 kgs 
10 91-100 kgs 
11 over 100 kgs 
Catch_Peak months 1 1-10 kgs 
2 11-20 kgs 
3 21-30 kgs 
4 31-40 kgs 
5 41-50 kgs 
6 51-60 kgs 
7 61-70 kgs 
8 71-80 kgs 
9 81-90 kgs 
10 91-100 kgs 
11 over 100 kgs 
Income_Lean months 1 below PhP 275 (min. wage) 
2 PhP 276-500 
3 PhP 501-1,000 
4 PhP 1,001-1,500 
5 PhP 1,501-2,000 
6 PhP 2,001-2,500 
7 PhP 2,501-3,000 
8 above PhP 3,000 
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Income_Peak months 1 below PhP 275 (min. wage) 
2 PhP 276-500 
3 PhP 501-1,000 
4 PhP 1,001-1,500 
5 PhP 1,501-2,000 
6 PhP 2,001-2,500 
7 PhP 2,501-3,000 
8 above PhP 3,000 
1 Selected 
Respondent Group 1 Regulated group 
2 Regulator's group 
 
 
 
 
 
